Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In these two consolidated cases, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit courts’ orders denying Defendants’ petitions for discharge from involuntary commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 as a sexually violent person. Defendants argued, inter alia, that the circuit courts erred by declining to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard under Wis. Stat. 907.02(1) to the prosecution’s expert witnesses who testified in Defendants’ discharge petition trials because the petitions commenced “actions” or “special proceedings” after the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability. (The underlying chapter 980 commitments commenced several years before the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability.) The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Daubert evidentiary standard under section 907.02(1) did not apply to expert testimony in Defendants’ chapter 980 discharge petition trials because their discharge petitions did not “commence” “actions” or “special proceedings”; and (2) Defendants’ equal protection and due process rights were not violated because the legislature had a rational basis for not applying the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in post-Daubert chapter 980 discharge petitions that seek relief from pre-Daubert chapter 980 commitments. View "State v. Knipfer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, sixth offense. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, and Defendant’s post-conviction counsel filed a no-merit report with the court of appeals. The court of appeals accepted the no-merit report and affirmed the conviction. Defendant petitioned for review. While the petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) McNeely applies retroactively to the facts of this case, rending the warrantless nonconsensual blood draw performed on Defendant unconstitutional, but the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the evidence; and (2) the court of appeals properly accepted post-conviction counsel’s no-merit report. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that struck the victim as she crossed a street. Defendant was transported to a hospital, where hospital personnel conducted a warrantless investigatory blood draw upon the orders of the police. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. McNeely did rendered unconstitutional the warrantless blood draw performed on Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s arrest was lawful because the police had probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a drunk-driving related crime; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Defendant was not supported by exigent circumstances, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Defendant was involved in a single-vehicle accident that killed one of the occupants of the vehicle. Defendant, who denied being the driver, was being treated at the hospital when the hospital staff performed a warrantless blood draw at the instructions of a sheriff’s deputy. Defendant moved to suppress the blood draw as an unreasonable search without a warrant. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and other crimes. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that probable cause and exigent circumstances supported the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. View "State v. Tullberg" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver THC. At Defendant’s sentencing, the circuit court found him eligible for expungement on the condition that he successfully complete probation. After successfully completing probation, Defendant petitioned for expungement, but the circuit court denied the petition. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the expungement statute required Defendant to forward his certificate of discharge to the circuit court and to petition the circuit court for expungement in a timely fashion, and Defendant’s failure to petition the circuit court until a year after his discharge rendered his petition for expungement tardy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the successful completion of probation automatically entitled Defendant to expungement; (2) the expungement statute places no burden on Defendant to petition for expungement within a certain period of time; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion when it reversed the decision it made at sentencing to find Defendant eligible for expungement. Remanded with instructions that the clerk of court expunge Defendant’s record. View "State v. Hemp" on Justia Law

This case arose from an attack by multiple people on an inmate in the county jail. Defendant was charged with battery by a prisoner, as a party to a crime. During Defendant’s trial, a witness testified that the victim had identified one of his attackers as a fellow inmate with platinum teeth. The prosecutor then requested, over defense objection, that Defendant reveal his teeth to the jury. Defendant complied, revealing platinum teeth. Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this case did not offend constitutional principles against self-incrimination, where (1) the evidence of Defendant’s platinum teeth was physical evidence that did not have a testimonial aspect sufficient to implicate constitutional protections, as it did not express, make use of, reveal, or disclose the contents of Defendant’s mind; and (2) Defendant’s teeth were material to identification because they were probative of Defendant’s identity. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to armed robbery. Defendant later filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the State, the court, and trial counsel mistakenly advised him when deciding whether to accept the State’s plea offer that he was facing a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of extended supervision. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court to allow Defendant to withdraw his no-contest plea, concluding that Defendant’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant had the right to withdraw his no-contest plea; and (2) Defendant proved that the no-contest plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "State v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Hunt was found guilty of one count of causing a child under 13 to view or listen to sexual activity (Wis. Stat. 948.055). The appeals court reversed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, finding that Hunt received a fair trial, despite the court’s exclusion of the testimony of Hunt's friend that he never sent Hunt a video of a man and woman engaging in sexual intercourse. The prosecution met its burden of proving that it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," Hunt's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments fail under the two-part inquiry of Strickland v. Washington. View "State of WI v. Hunt" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree intentional homicide and one count of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals reversed the judgment, concluding that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that a “temporary mental state which is brought into existence by the voluntary taking of drugs or alcohol does not constitute a mental defect.” Both parties argued that the jury instruction was erroneous: Defendant argued that the instruction was erroneous because it failed to distinguish between prescription medication and illegal drugs, and the State argued that the instruction was erroneous because Defendant’s insanity defense was premised on his reaction to the mixture of alcohol and his prescription medication, and the instruction used the wrong conjunction by referring to drugs OR alcohol. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s jury instruction was an accurate statement of the law. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to first-degree reckless homicide. At issue on appeal was whether law enforcement officers (1) violated Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights by contacting Appellant’s cell phone provider to obtain Appellant’s cell phone location information without first securing a court order; and (2) violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they continued to interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. While the Court was deeply divided on the issues presented in this case, the lead opinion contained the following conclusions: (1) assuming without deciding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that police conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when they track a cell phone’s location, and assuming there was a search in this case, police did have probable cause for a warrant, and the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Appellant in this case failed to unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when officers continued to question Appellant after he asked how he could get an attorney. View "State v. Subdiaz-Osorio" on Justia Law