Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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This case arose from an attack by multiple people on an inmate in the county jail. Defendant was charged with battery by a prisoner, as a party to a crime. During Defendant’s trial, a witness testified that the victim had identified one of his attackers as a fellow inmate with platinum teeth. The prosecutor then requested, over defense objection, that Defendant reveal his teeth to the jury. Defendant complied, revealing platinum teeth. Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this case did not offend constitutional principles against self-incrimination, where (1) the evidence of Defendant’s platinum teeth was physical evidence that did not have a testimonial aspect sufficient to implicate constitutional protections, as it did not express, make use of, reveal, or disclose the contents of Defendant’s mind; and (2) Defendant’s teeth were material to identification because they were probative of Defendant’s identity. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded no contest to armed robbery. Defendant later filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the State, the court, and trial counsel mistakenly advised him when deciding whether to accept the State’s plea offer that he was facing a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of extended supervision. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court to allow Defendant to withdraw his no-contest plea, concluding that Defendant’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant had the right to withdraw his no-contest plea; and (2) Defendant proved that the no-contest plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "State v. Dillard" on Justia Law

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Hunt was found guilty of one count of causing a child under 13 to view or listen to sexual activity (Wis. Stat. 948.055). The appeals court reversed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, finding that Hunt received a fair trial, despite the court’s exclusion of the testimony of Hunt's friend that he never sent Hunt a video of a man and woman engaging in sexual intercourse. The prosecution met its burden of proving that it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," Hunt's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments fail under the two-part inquiry of Strickland v. Washington. View "State of WI v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree intentional homicide and one count of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals reversed the judgment, concluding that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that a “temporary mental state which is brought into existence by the voluntary taking of drugs or alcohol does not constitute a mental defect.” Both parties argued that the jury instruction was erroneous: Defendant argued that the instruction was erroneous because it failed to distinguish between prescription medication and illegal drugs, and the State argued that the instruction was erroneous because Defendant’s insanity defense was premised on his reaction to the mixture of alcohol and his prescription medication, and the instruction used the wrong conjunction by referring to drugs OR alcohol. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s jury instruction was an accurate statement of the law. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Appellant pled guilty to first-degree reckless homicide. At issue on appeal was whether law enforcement officers (1) violated Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights by contacting Appellant’s cell phone provider to obtain Appellant’s cell phone location information without first securing a court order; and (2) violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they continued to interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. While the Court was deeply divided on the issues presented in this case, the lead opinion contained the following conclusions: (1) assuming without deciding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that police conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when they track a cell phone’s location, and assuming there was a search in this case, police did have probable cause for a warrant, and the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Appellant in this case failed to unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when officers continued to question Appellant after he asked how he could get an attorney. View "State v. Subdiaz-Osorio" on Justia Law

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Law enforcement obtained evidence by tracking Appellant’s cell phone using cell site location information and a stingray. Before tracking Appellant’s cell phone, law enforcement obtained an order approving the procedures used to track Appellant’s cell phone. Appellant pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide. Appellant then appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing (1) law enforcement violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches; and (2) the order authorizing the tracking of his cell phone required statutory authority, which the court lacked. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) assuming that law enforcement’s activities constituted a search, the search was reasonable because it was executed pursuant to an order that met the Fourth Amendment’s requirements; and (2) specific statutory authorization was not necessary for the circuit court judge to issue the order that authorized the tracking of Appellant’s cell phone through cell site information and a stingray because the order was supported by probable cause. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

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In these two cases, State v. Cummings and State v. Smith, the court of appeals affirmed the orders of the circuit courts denying Defendants’ motions to suppress. Defendants appealed, contending that they unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent prior to making incriminating statements to the police, and therefore, their statements should have been suppressed. Cummings argued separately that his sentence was unduly harsh. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in both cases, holding (1) neither Cummings nor Smith unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent during their interrogations, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied each Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) Cummings’ sentence was not unduly harsh. View "State v. Cummings" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana as a party to a crime. After a preliminary hearing, Defendant filed a timely motion with the circuit court to compel disclosure of the identity of a confidential informer. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of the informer, determining that the defense had not made a sufficient showing to warrant an in camera review. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion without first conducting an in camera review of the confidential informer’s expected testimony. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) in order to trigger an in camera review, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense; and (2) Defendant in this case failed to meet this burden. Remanded. View "State v. Nellessen" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was a juvenile when he was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which is an offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. 938.183(1)(am). At the preliminary hearing held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 970.032(1), the circuit court stated that “there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed” and ordered that the adult court retain original jurisdiction over Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the adult court failed to find probable cause of a violation of the specific crime charged under section 938.183(1), as required by 970.032(1) for an adult court to retain exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the bindover and prosecution of Defendant in adult court were proper, holding that the circuit court made the finding required by section 970.032(1) that there was probable cause to believe Defendant committed the specific section 938.183(1) crime charged in the complaint. View "State v. Toliver" on Justia Law

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Defendant pled no contest to first-degree sexual assault of a child. Thereafter, Defendant filed three postconviction motions for relief. The third postconviction motion was brought under Wis. Stat. 974.06 and alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise a strong argument for plea withdrawal. The circuit court denied Defendant’s section 974.06 motion because it did not demonstrate why postconviction counsel was ineffective. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant who alleges in a section 974.06 motion that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring certain viable claims must demonstrate that the claims he wishes to bring are clearly stronger than the claims postconviction counsel actually brought; (2) because Defendant did not offer a sufficient reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise his section 974.06 claim in his second postconviction motion, Defendant’s section 974.06 claim was barred; and (3) even if the section 974.06 motion was not barred, the motion did not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle Defendant to relief. View "State v. Romero-Georgana" on Justia Law