Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Defendant had engaged in two counts of sexual assault of a child under thirteen years of age. Defendant move to dismiss the complaint and information on the grounds that he was not adequately informed of the charges against him because the time periods in which the alleged crimes were committed were too vague. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint and information. The court of appeals reversed, relying on State v. Fawcett as a basis for its determination that Defendant received adequate notice as to the charges against him. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded to the circuit court with instructions to reinstate the complaint and information against Defendant, holding (1) in child sexual assault cases, courts may apply the factors outlined in Fawcett and may consider any other relevant factors necessary to determine whether the complaint and information states an offense to which the defendant can plead and prepare a defense; and (2) the complaint and information in this case provided Defendant adequate notice of the charges against him. View "State v. Kempainen" on Justia Law

Based on evidence obtained from a search of Defendant’s home, the State charged Defendant with possession with several drug-related offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his home, contending that the warrant was unlawfully obtained because it was based on information gained from a prior illegal search. Specifically, Defendant contended that the police officers needed, but did not have, a warrant to conduct the dog sniff, and because the warrant relied on an affidavit detailing the dog’s alert to the presence of drugs, the warrant was invalid and the evidence must be suppressed. The circuit court denied the motion. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued Florida v. Jardines. Based on Jardines, the court of appeal determined that Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers brought the drug-sniffing dog to his home without a search warrant. The court nevertheless affirmed the conviction because the police subsequently obtained a search warrant upon which they relied in good faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the evidence at issue was obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. View "State v. Scull" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree intentional homicide. At trial, Defendant indicated that he wished to testify. Defendant insisted that he would inform the jury of allegedly wrongful prior conviction for armed robbery. The circuit court decided that Defendant’ proposed testimony concerning the prior conviction was irrelevant. Defendant, however, promised that, if permitted to testify, he would disobey the circuit court’s evidentiary ruling. The circuit court determined, over timely defense objection, that Defendant forfeited his right to testify at trial by exhibiting stubborn and defiant conduct that threatened both the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, order and decorum in the courtroom. The jury subsequently convicted Defendant of first-degree intentional homicide. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant the right to testify, as the court’s forfeiture determination was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve; and (2) even if the court assumed error, such error was subject to harmless error analysis, and in this case, the assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Anthony" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony forgery. After Defendant was sentenced he filed a motion for resentencing, arguing that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated because compelled, self-incriminating statements to his probation agent were appended to the report of the presentence investigation the circuit court reviewed at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and granted resentencing based on ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court of appeals raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) assuming, without deciding, that Defendant’s statements to his probation agent were compelled, Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by actually relying on Defendant’s compelling, incriminating statements in imposing sentence; and (2) therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s lack of objection to those statements. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three offenses. Defendant filed two postconviction motions requesting a new trial, asserting that the circuit court judge, Jon M. Counsell, had no authority to preside over Defendant’s trial or sentencing because Defendant had filed a proper request for substitution of judge and the request had been granted. The circuit court denied the postconviction motions. The court of appeals summarily reversed the judgment of conviction and postconviction order and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not forfeit his statutory right to peremptory substitution of the judge; and (2) harmless error did not apply in this case when the circuit court erred by presiding over Defendant’s trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit courts’ orders denying Defendants’ petitions for discharge from involuntary commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 as a sexually violent person. Defendants argued, inter alia, that the circuit courts erred by declining to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard under Wis. Stat. 907.02(1) to the prosecution’s expert witnesses who testified in Defendants’ discharge petition trials because the petitions commenced “actions” or “special proceedings” after the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability. (The underlying chapter 980 commitments commenced several years before the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability.) The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Daubert evidentiary standard under section 907.02(1) did not apply to expert testimony in Defendants’ chapter 980 discharge petition trials because their discharge petitions did not “commence” “actions” or “special proceedings”; and (2) Defendants’ equal protection and due process rights were not violated because the legislature had a rational basis for not applying the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in post-Daubert chapter 980 discharge petitions that seek relief from pre-Daubert chapter 980 commitments. View "State v. Knipfer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, sixth offense. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, and Defendant’s post-conviction counsel filed a no-merit report with the court of appeals. The court of appeals accepted the no-merit report and affirmed the conviction. Defendant petitioned for review. While the petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) McNeely applies retroactively to the facts of this case, rending the warrantless nonconsensual blood draw performed on Defendant unconstitutional, but the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the evidence; and (2) the court of appeals properly accepted post-conviction counsel’s no-merit report. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that struck the victim as she crossed a street. Defendant was transported to a hospital, where hospital personnel conducted a warrantless investigatory blood draw upon the orders of the police. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. McNeely did rendered unconstitutional the warrantless blood draw performed on Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s arrest was lawful because the police had probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a drunk-driving related crime; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Defendant was not supported by exigent circumstances, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Defendant was involved in a single-vehicle accident that killed one of the occupants of the vehicle. Defendant, who denied being the driver, was being treated at the hospital when the hospital staff performed a warrantless blood draw at the instructions of a sheriff’s deputy. Defendant moved to suppress the blood draw as an unreasonable search without a warrant. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and other crimes. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that probable cause and exigent circumstances supported the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. View "State v. Tullberg" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver THC. At Defendant’s sentencing, the circuit court found him eligible for expungement on the condition that he successfully complete probation. After successfully completing probation, Defendant petitioned for expungement, but the circuit court denied the petition. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the expungement statute required Defendant to forward his certificate of discharge to the circuit court and to petition the circuit court for expungement in a timely fashion, and Defendant’s failure to petition the circuit court until a year after his discharge rendered his petition for expungement tardy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the successful completion of probation automatically entitled Defendant to expungement; (2) the expungement statute places no burden on Defendant to petition for expungement within a certain period of time; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion when it reversed the decision it made at sentencing to find Defendant eligible for expungement. Remanded with instructions that the clerk of court expunge Defendant’s record. View "State v. Hemp" on Justia Law