Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of seven misdemeanors and one felony. Prior to serving his sentences, defendant was in custody in 1998, 1999, and 2001, Upon his conviction, Petitioner was given some sentence credit for these periods of custody, but he accumulated more sentence credit than the court awarded. After Petitioner’s parole from the felony sentence was revoked, Petitioner requested sentence credit. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s motion for sentence credit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) forty-two of the 105 days of custody prior to Defendant’s 2001 incarceration should have been applied to his term of reincarceration for the felony conviction; and (2) when a convicted defendant’s parole is revoked, the parolee’s indeterminate sentence that was issued by the circuit court resumes running so that it is available to accept sentence credit. View "State v. Obriecht" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court took this opportunity to clarify the law on waiver of the right to counsel after a defendant has been charged with a crime. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of delivering heroin, second or subsequent offense, as a repeater and as party to a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that statements he made to investigators while he was incarcerated and after his initial appearance should have been suppressed in accordance with State v. Dagnall. Before the interview, Defendant waived his Miranda rights and did not ask for counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana effectively overruled Dagnall by establishing that a waiver of Miranda rights is sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and such a waiver is not presumed invalid simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel; and (2) Wis. Const. art. I, 7 does not provide greater protections than the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have counsel present during questioning. View "State v. Delebreau" on Justia Law

After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made during police questioning, Defendant pled guilty to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the crime. Defendant requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea, arguing that his confession to police was involuntary and, alternatively, that the incriminating statements he made that were not recorded during his custodial interrogation as a juvenile were inadmissible. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statements were voluntary; and (2) the police violated Wis. Stat. 938.195 by turning off the device recording Defendant’s interrogation during questioning, but the error in not suppressing some of Defendant’s statements was harmless. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), sixth offense. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to four years' imprisonment. The State appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by excluding additional evidence that the State sought to submit to prove that Defendant possessed six, rather than five, prior drunk-driving related convictions. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the circuit court erred in excluding the additional evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to prove the additional prior conviction. The remanded with instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and to impose a sentence accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld Defendant’s conviction, holding that because a conviction of operating a PAC as a seventh offense carries a greater range of punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of appeals’ remedy rendered Defendant’s plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. Further, a remedy that requires a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea is violative of due process. View "State v. Chamblis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide and attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial based on the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony proffered by Defendant that a third party committed the homicide. The court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the third party had the opportunity to kill the victim and that the State failed to show that the circuit court’s alleged error in not admitting Defendant’s proffered evidence was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State v. Denny test is the appropriate test for courts to use to determine the admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence; (2) for a defendant to show that a third party had the opportunity to commit a crime by employing gunmen to kill the victim, the defendant must provide some evidence that the third party had the realistic ability to engineer such a scenario; and (3) because Defendant failed to show that the alleged third party perpetrator had the opportunity to kill the victim, directly or indirectly, the circuit court did not err in excluding Defendant’s proffered evidence. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After receiving a complaint from Defendant’s wife, police officers conducted an investigatory stop of Defendant’s vehicle. Defendant did not comply with police orders after being stopped and also complained of chest pain. The police transported Defendant to a hospital for medical assessment and then conducted a legal blood draw. Results of the blood test demonstrated that Defendant had operated his vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC). Defendant was subsequently charged with operating while intoxication (OWI) and with a PAC. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant’s transportation to the hospital exceeded the scope of the investigatory detention and violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s stop and detention satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment because they were supported by reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention; (2) Defendant’s arrest when he was transported to the hospital was constitutional because the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (3) the transportation to the hospital was lawful as a community caretaker function of law enforcement. View "State v. Blatterman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime and armed burglary as party to a crime. Petitioner’s defense counsel later asked for a ruling regarding Petitioner’s competency to seek postconviction relief. In a postconviction competency hearing, the circuit court concluded that Petitioner’s defense counsel failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was incompetent. The court of appeals remanded for a new competency hearing, determining that the circuit court erred by failing to apply the lower preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that once a defense attorney raises the issue of competency at a postconviction hearing, the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is competent to proceed. Remanded to the circuit court to apply the correct standard if Petitioner’s competency is still challenged. View "State v. Daniel" on Justia Law

Defendants in these two separate cases were found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, among other crimes. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the State did not violate Defendants’ due process rights when the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene had destroyed their blood samples in accordance with routine procedures before each defendant had the opportunity to test the samples. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with Arizona v. Youngblood, because Defendants’ blood samples were neither apparently exculpatory nor destroyed in bad faith, the State did not violate Defendants’ due process rights; and (2) operating a motor vehicle with a detective mount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood under Wis. Stat. 346.63(1)(am) is a strict liability offense that does not require scienter, and the statute is constitutional. View "State v. Luedtke" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right of confrontation was violated when the circuit court admitted an expert witness’s testimony that established Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration while he was operating his vehicle. The expert witness based his opinion in part on forensic tests conducted by an analyst at the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, who was unavailable for trial. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s admission of the witness’s testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the witness’s review of Defendant’s laboratory file, including the forensic test results at issue in this case, to form an independent opinion to which he testified did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation. View "State v. Griep" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The circuit court concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument were improper and ordered a new trial in the interest of justice. The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, concluding that the amended complaint and information charging Defendant failed to provide adequate notice to satisfy Defendant’s due process rights and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court with instructions that the judgment of conviction be reinstated, holding (1) the amended complaint and information provided adequate notice and, thus, did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; (2) the circuit court did not err in admitting the other-acts evidence; and (3) the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting a new trial in the interest of justice because of the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument. View "State v. Hurley" on Justia Law