Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err by ordering Defendant in this case to register as a sex offender for fifteen years rather than until his death and did not err in finding Defendant ineligible to participate in the earned release program (ERP).Defendant pled guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography. As part of Defendant's sentence the circuit court ordered him to comply with sex offender registration requirements for fifteen years and found him ineligible to participate in the ERP. The State requested that the circuit court amend the judgment of conviction (JOC) to reflect that Defendant was required to register for life. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant also moved to amend the JOC on the grounds that it was error not to allow him to participate in the ERP. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of both requests to amend the JOC, holding that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion. View "State v. Rector" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), which created a process by which a criminal defendant could obtain a limited review by way of in camera review by the court of a victim's privately-held, otherwise privileged health records, holding that Shiffra is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice and has been undermined by developments in the law.Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his son, T.A.J., and his daughter. Citing Shiffra, Defendant sought in camera review of T.A.J.'s mental health and counseling records. T.A.J. opposed the motion, but the circuit court concluded that he lacked standing. On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that Marsy's Law gave crime victims such as T.A.J. standing to oppose Shiffra motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to deny Defendant's motion for in camera review, holding that Shiffra was wrongly decided and is overruled. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A fight erupted during a house party; someone fired multiple shots into the bedroom through the door, striking and killing Walker. Police obtained statements from more than 25 individuals. Eyewitness descriptions identified the shooter as a black male who used his right hand, but descriptions were otherwise very inconsistent. After the party, rumors circulated on Facebook accusing Smyth of the shooting. The police later turned their attention to Harris and, ultimately, to Mull, who was identified as the shooter by several witnesses. At Mull’s jury trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses. The defense did not call any witnesses. Convicted of first-degree reckless homicide, Mull was sentenced to 25 years' confinement.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed an order granting Mull a new trial, rejecting Mull’s argument that his attorney was ineffective for "failing to file a third-party perpetrator motion regarding any one of the viable alternate suspects.” Counsel testified he thought a reasonable doubt defense was preferable to a third-party perpetrator defense because it was difficult to locate witnesses, even using an investigator, and that there were credibility issues and inconsistent accounts. Counsel objected to a line of questioning relative to out-of-court messages and attempted to discredit that testimony on cross-examination; he did not move to strike a statement made during cross-examination because he did not want "too much attention." The court concluded that the controversy was fully tried, and it is not probable that justice has miscarried. View "State v. Mull" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for two counts each of second-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault of a child and also reversing the circuit court's order denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief.In his motion for postconviction relief, Defendant argued that the prosecutor at his trial violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by adversely commenting on his decision not to testify. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecutor's argument that the evidence was "uncontroverted" was improper, thus violating Defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor did not comment on Defendant's silence, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion for postconviction relief. View "State v. Hoyle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the court of appeals that Defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing, holding that the prosecutor cured a breach of the plea agreement in this case and that defense counsel was not deficient for failing to object earlier to the remarks.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of repeated sexual abuse of a child. The circuit court ultimately crafted its own sentence of a term of twenty-five years. Defendant moved for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to be resentenced based on the State's violation of the plea agreement. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the prosecutor materially breached the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant sufficiently received the benefit of his plea bargain; and (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim similarly failed. View "State v. Nietzold" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for first-degree intentional homicide, first-degree sexual assault, and false imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.The Supreme Court accepted for review the issues of (1) whether Defendant's confession of sexual assault was corroborated by a significant fact; and (2) whether the cross-examination of Defendant's expert witness through the use of a Wisconsin Crime Lab report that was not entered into evidence and whose author did not testify violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State sufficiently corroborated Defendant's confession of sexual assault; and (2) the State improperly used the report's content for its truth during closing arguments, but the circuit court's error in permitting this argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant was entitled to a Machner hearing regarding one of his postconviction claims.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of homicide. In his postconviction motion, Defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contact two potential alibi witnesses or call them at trial. The circuit court denied the postconviction motion without holding a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to grant Defendant a hearing on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or call two alibi witnesses, holding that Defendant's motion alleged sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief and that the record failed conclusively to establish that Defendant was not entitled to relief. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Dunn County on Plaintiff's claim filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that Plaintiff's section 1983 claim against Dunn County failed.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that she presented evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Dunn County violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when a correctional officer sexually assaulted her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Dunn County was the causal, moving force behind the sexual assault; and (2) there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that Dunn County acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious consequence that the correctional officer would sexually assault Plaintiff. View "Slabey v. Dunn County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree child sexual assault and denying his motion for postconviction relief, holding that the circuit court did not err.On appeal from the denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, the court of appeals concluded that the State suppressed evidence favorable to Defendant's defense, in violation of his right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State did not violate Defendant's due process rights by filing to disclose a certain report; (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed; and (3) there were no errors at trial that prevented the real controversy from being tried. View "State v. Hineman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court to deny Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the police officer in this case did not have particularized reasonable suspicion that a crime or traffic violation took place before performing the traffic stop at issue.Officer Alexis Meier was told to be on the lookout for a Harley-Davidson motorcycle driving erratically and speeding. Officer Meier spotted a motorcycle that showed to be a Harley-Davidson registered to Defendant. Without seeing any erratic driving, speeding, or other traffic violations, Officer Meier performed a traffic stop. Officer Meier subsequently developed evidence supporting an arrest for Defendant's eighth operating while intoxicated offense. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Meier lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the stop. View "State v. Richey" on Justia Law