Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled no contest to possession of narcotic drugs. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress a warrantless draw of his blood. Later testing of Defendant’s blood indicated the presence of opiates and morphine. The circuit court held that the warrantless draw of Defendant’s blood was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirements of the federal and state Constitutions. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, but on different grounds, determining that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to prevent suppression of the drug-related evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Parisi" on Justia Law

Police obtained evidence of marijuana production in Defendant’s home while investigating the source of injuries sustained by Defendant’s brother. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of THC, and manufacture or delivery of THC. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence as unconstitutionally conducted without a warrant and without consent. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officers were not exercising a bona fide community caretaker function and that the officers’ search did not constitute a lawful protective sweep. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers reasonably exercised a bona fide community caretaker function when they searched Defendant’s home, and therefore, the search was lawful. View "State v. Matalonis" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to various drug-related offenses in three separate cases. The circuit court’s colloquies with Defendant failed to adhere to Wis. Stat. 971.08(1)(c) because neither of the circuit courts warned Defendant that her pleas and subsequent convictions may have immigration consequences. Defendant later filed a motion under Wis. Stat. 971.08(2) to withdraw her guilty pleas. Under section 971.08(2), if a circuit court fails to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea and if the defendant shows that the plea is “likely” to result in the defendant’s deportation, the circuit court “shall” permit withdrawal of the plea. In this case, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, concluding that Defendant had not met the statutory standard of “likely” to suffer immigration consequences because she was not presently the object of a proceeding for deportation, exclusion from admission, or denial of naturalization. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, as the circuit court did not comply with section 971.08(1)(c), and Defendant showed that her guilty pleas were “likely” to result in her exclusion from admission to this country. View "State v. Valadez" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police inside the parking garage underneath his apartment building and subsequently arrested for operating while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officers’ conduct occurred during a warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area - the curtilage of his home. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parking garage under the apartment building did not constitute curtilage of Defendant’s home; (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking garage; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s stop and subsequent arrest in the garage did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. View "State v. Dumstrey" on Justia Law

While Christopher S. was serving his sentence for mayhem, Winnebago County filed a petition for the involuntary commitment of Christopher for mental health care under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(ar). The County also filed a petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication and treatment to Christopher. The circuit court granted both petitions. Thereafter, Christopher filed a motion challenging both orders. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 51.21(1)(ar) does not violate an inmate’s substantive due process rights because it is reasonably related to the State’s legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to inmates suffering from mental illness; and (2) the circuit court did not err when if found that the County established by clear and convincing evidence that Christopher was incompetent to refuse psychotropic medication and treatment. View "Winnebago County v. Christopher S." on Justia Law

At issue here was the authority of Attorney Francis Schmitz to act as the special prosecutor throughout proceedings known as “John Doe II.” Unnamed Movants challenged whether Attorney Schmitz retained any authority to act as the special prosecutor and argued that two motions filed by Attorney Schmitz - a motion for reconsideration of a previous decision issued by the Supreme Court and a stay of the Court’s mandate regarding certain information gathered during an investigation - be denied. The Supreme Court held (1) Attorney Schmitz’s appointment as the special prosecutor in the John Doe II proceedings pending in each of five counties at issue was invalid; (2) the authority of someone who is appointed as a special prosecutor ends at the point in time when a court makes a legal ruling that the appointment was invalid and orders that the individual’s authority is terminated; (3) because of the invalidity of his appointment, Attorney Schmitz must cease taking any actions as the John Doe II special prosecutor as of the date of this opinion and order; and (4) Attorney Schmitz’s motion for reconsideration and motion for a stay are hereby denied. View "Schmitz v. Hon. Gregory A. Peterson" on Justia Law

A state traffic patrol officer stopped Defendant’s vehicle after observing a cigarette butt being thrown from the passenger side of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of drunk driving obtained by the officer during the stop, claiming that the officer lacked authority to seize his vehicle to investigate the violation of a state statute prohibiting littering. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an officer of the state traffic patrol is constitutionally authorized to stop a vehicle based solely on the officer’s observation of the commission of a non-traffic civil forfeiture offense by an occupant of that vehicle; and (2) in this case, the officer had probable cause to believe that an occupant of Defendant’s vehicle had violated the statute prohibiting littering by throwing a cigarette butt onto the highway. Remanded. View "State v. Iverson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, hit and run resulting in death, and related crimes. After Defendant was sentenced, he filed a postconviction motion seeking resentencing by a different judge, asserting that the circuit court’s statements at sentencing supported a conclusion that the judge was biased. The court of appeals denied relief, determining that the circuit court judge’s statements at sentencing were insufficient to support a conclusion that she was biased. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the judge acted fairly, impartially, and without prejudice. View "State v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of THC with intent to deliver following the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stop was not an investigatory stop and that the officer lacked probable cause to stop Defendant’s vehicle, making the subsequent search unlawful. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating or has violated a traffic law is sufficient for the officer to initiate a stop of the offending vehicle, and an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law may form the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion; and (2) although the officer in this case wrongly interpreted the law in stopping Defendant for violating a traffic law, the officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. View "State v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and child neglect after the circuit court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his truck. At issue in this case was the reasonableness of police conduct after a lawful traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his truck, as (1) the officer who stopped Defendant for a seat belt violation had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to administer field sobriety tests; and (2) Defendant’s consent to search his truck was valid. View "State v. Hogan" on Justia Law