Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, hit and run resulting in death, and related crimes. After Defendant was sentenced, he filed a postconviction motion seeking resentencing by a different judge, asserting that the circuit court’s statements at sentencing supported a conclusion that the judge was biased. The court of appeals denied relief, determining that the circuit court judge’s statements at sentencing were insufficient to support a conclusion that she was biased. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the judge acted fairly, impartially, and without prejudice. View "State v. Herrmann" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of THC with intent to deliver following the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stop was not an investigatory stop and that the officer lacked probable cause to stop Defendant’s vehicle, making the subsequent search unlawful. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating or has violated a traffic law is sufficient for the officer to initiate a stop of the offending vehicle, and an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law may form the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion; and (2) although the officer in this case wrongly interpreted the law in stopping Defendant for violating a traffic law, the officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. View "State v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and child neglect after the circuit court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his truck. At issue in this case was the reasonableness of police conduct after a lawful traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his truck, as (1) the officer who stopped Defendant for a seat belt violation had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to administer field sobriety tests; and (2) Defendant’s consent to search his truck was valid. View "State v. Hogan" on Justia Law

When Defendant and two accomplices attempted to rob Michael Parker, Parker and a houseguest, Authur Robinson, were shot and killed. During trial, the jury was instructed that it could convict Defendant of the felony murder of the Robinson if the defendants had attempted to rob Robinson and the attempted robbery caused Robinson’s death. The State, however, presented insufficient evidence that the defendants had attempted to rob Robinson. The jury convicted Defendant of felony murder in Robinson’s death even though it found Defendant not guilty of the attempted robbery of Robinson. A valid theory of felony murder for the death of Robinson would be that Defendant, as a party to the crime, caused the death of Robinson while engaged in an attempted armed robbery of Parker. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) a jury instruction may be considered erroneous when it describes a theory of criminal culpability that was not presented to the jury or it omits a valid theory of criminal culpability that was presented to the jury; and (2) the defect in the jury instructions in this case was harmless error. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant, who came to the United States from Mexico in 1997, pleaded no contest to substantial battery as an act of domestic abuse. After Defendant completed his jail sentence Immigration and Customs Enforcement commenced removal proceedings against him. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him that his no-contest plea to substantial battery, with a domestic abuse enhancer, was certain to result in his deportation. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery because his trial counsel did not perform deficiently. View "State v. Ortiz-Mondragon" on Justia Law

Defendant, an Egyptian foreign national, pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, as party to a crime. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant argued that, under Padilla v. Kentucky, his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him that his conviction would absolutely result in deportation. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-conviction motion, concluding that Defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Defendant’s attorney correctly advised Defendant that his guilty plea carried a “strong chance” of deportation, Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Shata" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy of violating RICO. Approximately seven years later, Defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine in violation of Wis. Stat. 961.41(3g)(c). Defendant’s prior RICO conviction was listed as a prior conviction to enhance the penalty for cocaine possession conviction. The circuit court found Defendant guilty of violating section 961.41(3g)(c). Under the enhancement, Defendant’s cocaine possession constituted a felony. The court also convicted Defendant of felony bail jumping. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly enhanced the penalty for conviction of cocaine possession due to his prior RICO conspiracy conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s prior RICO conviction enhanced the penalty for cocaine possession under section 961.41(3g)(c) to a second offense as a Class I felony; and (2) Defendant’s bail-jumping offense was properly a felony conviction. View "State v. Guarnero" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of intentional homicide for the murders of his parents. Defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The circuit court found that Defendant had not met his burden of proving that he was not mentally responsible for the murders. The court convicted and sentenced Defendant to consecutive life sentences. The court of appeals granted Defendant a new trial under Wis. Stat. 752.35, concluding that Defendant met his burden of proving by the greater weight of the credible evidence that he was not mentally responsible for the murders. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of a new trial, holding (1) because the circuit court’s finding that Defendant did not meet his burden of showing by the greater weight of the credible evidence that he was not mentally responsible for the crimes was not clearly erroneous, the court of appeals abused its discretion in disturbing the factual findings of the circuit court concerning the burden of proof; and (2) the court of appeals therefore abused its discretion in concluding that a new trial in the interest of justice was warranted. View "State v. Kucharski" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of seven misdemeanors and one felony. Prior to serving his sentences, defendant was in custody in 1998, 1999, and 2001, Upon his conviction, Petitioner was given some sentence credit for these periods of custody, but he accumulated more sentence credit than the court awarded. After Petitioner’s parole from the felony sentence was revoked, Petitioner requested sentence credit. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s motion for sentence credit. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) forty-two of the 105 days of custody prior to Defendant’s 2001 incarceration should have been applied to his term of reincarceration for the felony conviction; and (2) when a convicted defendant’s parole is revoked, the parolee’s indeterminate sentence that was issued by the circuit court resumes running so that it is available to accept sentence credit. View "State v. Obriecht" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court took this opportunity to clarify the law on waiver of the right to counsel after a defendant has been charged with a crime. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of delivering heroin, second or subsequent offense, as a repeater and as party to a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that statements he made to investigators while he was incarcerated and after his initial appearance should have been suppressed in accordance with State v. Dagnall. Before the interview, Defendant waived his Miranda rights and did not ask for counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana effectively overruled Dagnall by establishing that a waiver of Miranda rights is sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and such a waiver is not presumed invalid simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel; and (2) Wis. Const. art. I, 7 does not provide greater protections than the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have counsel present during questioning. View "State v. Delebreau" on Justia Law