Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded no contest to first-degree recklessly endangering safety as domestic abuse. In the plea colloquy accepting Defendant’s plea, the circuit court misstated the potential punishment if Defendant were convicted. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion. In so doing, the court relied on the remedy set forth in State v. Bangert for cases where a circuit court fails to comply with Wis. Stat. 971.08(1) or other mandatory duties at a plea colloquy and the defendant does not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court’s defect could be remedied by reducing the sentence to the punishment Defendant was informed and believed he could receive or whether Defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of the present case, Bangert and State v. Brown governed, and Defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea. Remanded with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and operating without a license, causing death. The convictions arose after Defendant killed an individual while he was driving under the influence of alcohol in the wrong direction on a freeway. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years of initial confinement followed by seven years of extended supervision. Defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that the sentencing court improperly considered his immigration status at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s comments at sentencing did not deny Defendant due process in the form of reliance on an improper sentencing factor. View "State v. Gayton" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant moved to suppress her incriminating statements made during a six-hour interrogation conducted without a Miranda warning and evidence of the search of her house conducted after the interrogation. The circuit court suppressed Defendant’s statements and the physical evidence obtained from her house, which the court concluded was fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the officers searching Defendant’s house would have discovered the incriminating physical evidence during their search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) application of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule does not require that the State prove the absence of bad faith by the officers who intentionally engaged in the misconduct that provides the basis for exclusion; and (2) the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that officers inevitably would have discovered the physical evidence at issue. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an element of Wis. Stat. 948.075(1r) - use of a “computerized communication system” - was satisfied when Defendant used his cell phone to exchange texts with, and receive picture messages from, the fourteen-year-old victim. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime in violation of section 948.075(1r). The court of appeals reversed, sua sponte holding that a jury instruction misdirected the jury by asking it to determine whether the cell phone itself constituted the computerized communication system rather than asking whether Defendant’s uses of the cell phone constituted communication via a computerized communication system. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the jury instruction here accurately stated the law, and even if the instruction was erroneous, it was harmless error; (2) section 948.075 is not unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the court of appeals erred when it exercised its discretion authority to reverse Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. McKellips" on Justia Law

Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Defendant would plead no contest to certain counts brought against him, while other counts would be dismissed and read into the record for purposes of sentencing and recitation. At a plea hearing, the court concluded that Defendant’s pleas were made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion and ordered judgments of guilt. Defendant was then sentenced. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his no contest pleas. Specifically, Defendant claimed that his pleas were unknowing because he did not understand the effect the read-in charge could have at sentencing. The postconviction court denied Defendant’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the postconviction court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before it determined whether Defendant had entered his pleas in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion to withdraw his plea because he was correctly informed of and understood the effect of the read-in charges at sentencing. View "State v. Sulla" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Wisconsin Supreme Court's review was whether the Circuit Court erred when it granted the State's motion to join intimidation charges involving two victims, a mother and her daughter, with already-pending sexual assault charges where the daughter was the victim. The circuit court held that joinder was proper under Wis. Stat. 971.12(1)(2009-10); the court of appeals reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. After review, the Supreme Court held that joinder was proper because the charges joined were "2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan," the charges were "connected together," and the charges constituted parts of a "common scheme or plan." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the jury's verdicts finding Luis Salinas guilty of: (1) repeated sexual assault of a child; (2) second-degree sexual assault; (3) second-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 16; (4) intimidation of witness, M.S.; and (5) intimidation of witness, V.G. View "Wisconsin v. Salinas" on Justia Law

The charges of first-degree sexual assault against defendant-appellant Stephen LeMere arose out of events that occurred after a gathering in the Eau Claire on Friday evening, May 13, 2011, at the home of J.C. and his wife, A.C. LeMere was then 24. Also present that evening was C.R.C., J.C.'s 12-year-old sister. During the gathering, LeMere and another visitor drank the majority of two 30 packs of beer, in addition to other alcohol in the house. LeMere also took a narcotic pain killer. Although his memory of the evening became "fuzzy," LeMere recalled playing drinking games throughout the night. Early the next morning, LeMere sent text messages to C.R.C., and when she refused to have sex with her, he placed her in a choke hold, put a knife to her throat, fondled her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about what happened. C.R.C. did tell someone about it, and charges were later filed against him. In "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010)), the federal Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation. Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court assessed "Padilla" in a different context: did the Sixth Amendment require defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility of civil commitment, under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, when the client entered a plea to a sexually violent offense? LeMere wanted to withdraw his plea, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not informing him of the possibility of civil commitment following the confinement portion of his sentence under Chapter 980. The Wisconsin Court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient in this case, and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Wisconsin v. LeMere" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect to strangulation and suffocation and related crimes. After a plea hearing, the parties agreed that Defendant would plead guilty to all five criminal counts against him but that the case would be tried on the mental responsibility phase of the bifurcated trial. During the responsibility phase of Defendant’s bifurcated trial, the circuit court did not conduct a right-to-testify colloquy with Defendant. The court adjudged Defendant guilty of the five counts against him. Defendant filed a postconviction motion arguing that because he did not understand that he had a right to testify at the responsibility phase, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under State v. Garcia for a determination as to whether he properly waived his right to testify. The lower courts denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) upon a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, a circuit court is not required to conduct a right-to-testify colloquy at the responsibility phase of a bifurcated trial; and (2) Defendant in this case was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he did not make the requisite showing for such a hearing. View "State v. Lagrone" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault and sentenced to twenty-five years of confinement and fifteen years of extended supervision. Defendant subsequently moved to vacate the judgment of conviction, asserting that he was incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing. The postconviction court denied relief, concluding that Defendant had been competent during trial and sentencing. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of review to the circuit court’s competency finding and improperly weighed evidence rather than giving deference to the postconviction court’s finding; and (2) when the evidence is reviewed under the proper standard, the postconviction court did not commit clear error in finding that Defendant was competent to stand trial and be sentenced. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In four separate, unrelated cases, Appellant was charged with seventeen criminal counts. Pursuant to a single plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty or no-contest to felony theft as a party to a crime, felony bail jumping, burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon, and misdemeanor theft. The circuit court accepted Appellant’s plea and sentenced him to consecutive prison sentences totaling twenty-six years. Appellant subsequently filed a motion seeking post-conviction relief, asserting (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object after the State allegedly breached the plea agreement by recommending consecutive sentences, and (2) there was an insufficient factual basis for the trial court to accept his guilty plea to the charge of party to the crime of felony theft. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish that his counsel provided ineffective assistance, as the State did not breach the plea agreement by arguing for consecutive sentences; and (2) there was a sufficient factual basis to accept Appellant’s guilty plea to the charge of party to the crime of felony theft. View "State v. Tourville" on Justia Law