Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial in 1982, Defendant and his brother were found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2014, Defendant filed a motion requesting forensic DNA testing of evidence taken from the crime scene pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.07 and asking the circuit court to order that the testing occur at public expense or, in the alternative, at Defendant’s own expense. The circuit court denied Defendant’s postconviction motion for DNA testing. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for forensic DNA testing at private or public expense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s postconviction motion for forensic DNA testing, as the requirements of section 974.07(7)(a)2 were not met. View "State v. Denny" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded no contest to one count of burglary as a party to a crime. The judgment of conviction provided that Petitioner submit to a DNA sample and pay a $250 DNA analysis surcharge. At the time Petitioner committed the offense Wis. Stat. 973.046, which provided that the decision of whether to impose a DNA surcharge was within the circuit court’s discretion, was in effect. Thereafter, Wis. Stat. 973.046(1r)(a) took effect. When Petitioner was sentenced, the amended statute made the imposition of a DNA surcharge mandatory. Petitioner filed a postconviction motion seeking to vacate the $250 DNA surcharge, arguing that imposing the mandatory DNA surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because imposition of the DNA surcharge was discretionary at the time she committed the offense. The circuit court denied the postconviction motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not meet her burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the amended statute is unconstitutional. View "State v. Scruggs" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide for delivering heroin that caused the death of S.L. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of a toxicology report at trial through a medical examiner’s testimony, without testimony by the analyst who signed it, violated his confrontation rights. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the admission and use at trial of the toxicology report did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the toxicology report as not “testimonial” under the primary purpose test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Clark. In so holding, the Court overruled State v. VanDyke, which reached the opposite conclusion. View "State v. Mattox" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a no contest plea to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle resulting in great bodily harm. When sentencing Defendant, the sentencing court considered the fact that Defendant had previously successfully completed supervision in a case where the record of conviction had been expunged. Defendant filed a postconviction motion requesting a new sentencing hearing, arguing that the circuit court erred when it considered his expunged record of conviction at sentencing. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion for resentencing. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that under State v. Leitner, a sentencing court is permitted to consider all of the facts underlying an expunged record of conviction, and not only those facts underlying the crime itself. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the fact that Defendant had previously successfully completed supervision in a case where the record of conviction had been expunged. View "State v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to one count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, in violation of Wis. Stat. 346.63(1)(a), second offense. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court to suppress the evidence obtained from Defendant’s blood, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the emergency medical technician (EMT) who drew Defendant’s blood was operating “under the direction of a physician” as required by Wis. Stat. 343.305(5)(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EMT who drew Defendant’s blood was a “person acting under the direction of a physician” and that Defendant’s blood was drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner. View "State v. Kozel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of drunk driving, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s order denying Defnednat’s motion to suppress, concluding that the warrantless entry by a deputy with the sheriff’s department into Defendant’s garage was not justified by the exigent circumstance of the deputy’s “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy’s warrantless entry into Defendant’s garage and subsequent arrest of Defendant were constitutional because they were justified by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced under 2009 Wis. Act 28, which allowed inmates the opportunity to earn “positive adjustment time,” by which inmates could obtain early release from prison. 2011 Wis. Act 38 retroactively repealed positive adjustment time. Singh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the new legislation violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it delayed inmates’ release from prison by up to ninety days. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the retroactive application of 2011 Wis. Act 38 was an ex post facto violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the retroactive repeal of positive adjustment time is an ex post facto violation, and (2) 2011 Wis. Act 38 violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it results in a longer period of incarceration and, consequently, makes the punishment for an offense more burdensome after it was committed. View "State ex rel. Singh v. Kemper" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. Defendant’s presentence investigation report included an attached COMPAS risk assessment, an evidence-based risk assessment tool that provides decisional support for the Department of Corrections when managing offenders. The circuit court referenced the COMPAS risk score along with other sentencing factors in ruling out probation for Defendant. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief requesting a new sentencing hearing, arguing that the circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing violated his right to due process.The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if used properly, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate a defendant’s right to due process; (2) the circuit court’s use of the COMPAS risk scores in this case was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in considering read-in charges in the plea agreement. View "State v. Loomis" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to reexamine State v. Shiffra, modified by State v. Green, (hereinafter Shiffra/Green), under which a defendant can acquire a complainant’s privileged mental health treatment records via a motion for in camera review if the defendant demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that the records contain relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence….” Here the complainant alleged that Defendant sexually assaulted her as a child. Defendant filed a pretrial motion pursuant to Shiffra/Green, seeking an in camera inspection of the complainant’s privileged mental health treatment records. The circuit court granted the motion. Further, the court informed the complainant that if she refused to turn over the records, her testimony would be barred at trial. The complainant refused to give up her mental health treatment records, and the circuit court barred her from testifying at trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court overruled Shiffra/Green and its progeny, holding that Shiffra/Green improperly relied on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie when it invented a right to access privileged information via a motion for in camera review and cannot be grounded in any other legal basis. View "State v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1990, Defendant was convicted in Minnesota of a first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI). In 1992, the Eau Claire County Circuit Court entered a civil forfeiture judgment against Defendant for another first-offense OWI. In 2014, Defendant filed a motion to reopen and vacate her 1992 first-offense OWI civil forfeiture judgment because it was a second OWI offense improperly charged as a first offense, thus implicating subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court voided Defendant’s 1992 Eau Claire County conviction on subject matter jurisdiction grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant forfeited her right to challenge her 1992 first-offense OWI judgment by failing to timely raise it; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred when it granted Defendant’s motion to reopen and vacate her 1992 first-offense OWI civil forfeiture judgment. View "City of Eau Claire v. Booth" on Justia Law