Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue was the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. 980.09(2), as amended by 2013 Wis. Act 84, which establishes the discharge procedure for a person civilly committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.David Hager, Jr. and Howard Carter both filed petitions for discharge from commitment as sexually violent persons. Both petitions were denied. The court of appeals reversed in Hager but affirmed in Carter. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals as to Hager and affirmed as to Carter, holding (1) under Wis. Stat. 980.09(2), circuit courts are to carefully examine, but not weigh, those portions of the record they deem helpful to their consideration of a petition for discharge, which may include facts both favorable and unfavorable to the petitioner; (2) section 980.09(2) does not violate the constitutional right to due process of law as guaranteed by the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions; and (3) Carter’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge retroactive application of Act 84 to Carter. View "State v. Hager" on Justia Law

In this commitment-extension proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s order denying J.M.’s motion for post-disposition relief in which J.M. claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court answered (1) J.M. had a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in his Chapter 41 commitment-extension hearing, and the Strickland standard is the correct standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a commitment-extension hearing; (2) J.M. did not show that a reasonable probability existed that the result of the proceeding would have been different had his trial counsel’s performance not been allegedly deficient regarding J.M.’s appearance in prison garb; and (3) J.M. did not establish that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that his wearing of prison garb during the trial so distracted the jury that justice was miscarried, and the circuit court’s conflicting jury instructions did not entitle J.M. to a new trial in the interest of justice. View "Winnebago County v. J.M." on Justia Law

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.Defendant was convicted of attempted armed robbery, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. During trial, the State presented testimony from two men that Defendant was their accomplice in the robberies. Defendant later filed a motion for a new trial alleging that he had newly discovered evidence represented by the affidavits of three men alleging that the State’s witnesses lied when they testified that Defendant was involved in the subject crimes. The circuit court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the affidavits were merely cumulative evidence and were insufficient to require the circuit court to hold a hearing on the motion for a new trial because they were supported by neither newly discovered corroborating evidence or circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. View "State v. McAlister" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.Defendant was convicted of attempted armed robbery, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. During trial, the State presented testimony from two men that Defendant was their accomplice in the robberies. Defendant later filed a motion for a new trial alleging that he had newly discovered evidence represented by the affidavits of three men alleging that the State’s witnesses lied when they testified that Defendant was involved in the subject crimes. The circuit court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the affidavits were merely cumulative evidence and were insufficient to require the circuit court to hold a hearing on the motion for a new trial because they were supported by neither newly discovered corroborating evidence or circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. View "State v. McAlister" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s decision rejecting Defendant’s motion to vacate his judgments of conviction and requesting a new trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial.In his motion, Defendant argued that his first trial, which resulted in convictions for the sexual assault of two victims, was unfair because the State shifted the burden of proof and distorted the jury’s credibility determinations and that the jury based its verdict in part on inadmissible evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding (1) the State’s trial commentary was not improper; and (2) there was no reasonable probability that redacting the challenged evidence would have changed the result of the trial. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon, in violation of the Concealed Carry Statute, Wis. Stat. 941.23(2).In convicting Defendant, the trial court rejected Defendant’s argument that because his conduct was in compliance with the Safe Transport Statute, Wis. Stat. 167.31(2)(b), his conviction was precluded under the Concealed Carry Statute. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that compliance with the Safe Transport Statute does not preclude conviction for a violation of the Concealed Carry Statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Concealed Carry Statute and Safe Transport Statute are not in conflict; and (2) the Concealed Carry Statute is not unconstitutionally vague. View "State v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

At issue was at which point in time Defendant was considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law enforcement officers, concluding that Defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s confession did not transform his status to that of “in custody.” Rather, Defendant was not in custody until detectives took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room. Because Defendant was not in custody until this point, which was after his alleged request for counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach. View "State v. Bartelt" on Justia Law

At issue was at which point in time Defendant was considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law enforcement officers, concluding that Defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s confession did not transform his status to that of “in custody.” Rather, Defendant was not in custody until detectives took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room. Because Defendant was not in custody until this point, which was after his alleged request for counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach. View "State v. Bartelt" on Justia Law

The lower courts properly denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea he entered to one count of child enticement because the plea colloquy comported with both Wis. Stat. 971.08 and State v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. 1986).The circuit court summarily denied Defendant’s plea withdrawal motion, finding that Defendant failed to establish a defect in the plea colloquy and that no evidentiary hearing was required. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court’s failure to tell him the legal definition of “sexual contact” at his plea hearing violated the statutory requirement that a pleading defendant must understand the nature of the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish any deficiency in his plea colloquy because sexual contact is not an element of the crime of child enticement and the record showed that Defendant understood the nature of the charge. The Supreme Court rejected the State’s request to change the Bangert requirements. View "State v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

In this appeal from Defendant’s judgments of conviction for three crimes related to his domestic violence toward his then-girlfriend, the Supreme Court held (1) the recently amended language in Wis. Stat. 904.04(2)(b)1 allows admission of other-acts evidence with greater latitude than under an analysis pursuant to State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30 (Wis. 1998); and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s other acts because the court applied the correct legal standard, and admission was a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach based on the facts of the record. View "State v. Dorsey" on Justia Law