Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against St. Patrick Congregation, alleging that her employment was terminated for an improper reason. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, concluding that because St. Patrick was a religious institution and Plaintiff was a ministerial employee, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court may not review whether St. Patrick improperly terminated its ministerial employee because St. Patrick's choice of who shall serve as its ministerial employee is a matter of church governance protected from state interference by the First Amendment and by Wis. Const. art. I, 18; and (2) accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which a court may grant relief. View "DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation" on Justia Law

This case concerned a circuit court's order to transfer to a tribal court a civil suit that was brought against a tribally owned entity by a nonmember of the tribe. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it transferred the action to tribal court. At issue was the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 801.54, which authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to transfer an action to the tribal court and sets forth the conditions for doing so. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts and the applicable law were not fully stated and considered together in making the determinations that the statute requires, the order to transfer was an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion. Remanded. View "Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp." on Justia Law

This case arose from a fatal motorcycle accident in which Steven Wadzinski was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist. Steven's wife, Michelle, sought uninsured motorist (UM) coverage under an umbrella insurance policy that Steven's company carried on him at the time of his death. At issue was the meaning of an endorsement to the executive umbrella policy, and whether that endorsement caused contextual ambiguity such that a reasonable insured would expect $2,000,000 of UM coverage under the policy. The circuit court held that the executive umbrella policy was clearly intended to provide only third-party liability coverage and granted summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners Insurance Company. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the executive umbrella policy was contextually ambiguous, and therefore, the policy should be construed in favor of the insured to afford coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the policy at issue unambiguously did not afford first-party UM coverage, and therefore, the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners was proper. View "Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The questions before the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from damages sustained because of food contaminated by E. coli pathogens at two Sizzler Steak House restaurants. The plaintiffs in the underlying actions settled years ago, and the claims before the Court related to the apportionment of liability and costs among those who were defendants in the underlying actions. The defendants included Sizzler and Excel corporation, which processed and distributed the contaminated meat that was source of the E. coli pathogens. Among the plaintiffs was the estate of Brianna Kreifall, who died from the contaminated food. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues, holding, inter alia, that (1) Sizzler was entitled to recover consequential damages for Excel's breach of implied warranties in the parties' meat supply contract; (2) Sizzler was entitled to indemnity from Excel for the entirety of Sizzler's advance partial payment to the Kriefall family; and (3) notwithstanding the jury's determination that Sizzler was zero percent responsible for the E. coli contaminated food, Sizzler may not recover attorney fees from Excel because the exception to the American Rule did not apply here. View "Estate of Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc." on Justia Law

The circuit court granted summary judgment to Community Insurance Corporation (CIC) on a claim by the Hartford Union High School Board of Education and the Hartford Union High School District (collectively, the District) that insurance coverage had been created by virtue of CIC's failure to issue a reservation of rights letter during its unsuccessful defense of the District in a contract lawsuit. The court of appeals reversed, holding that CIC was estopped from denying coverage because the District relied on CIC's defense to its detriment and was prejudiced thereby. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure to issue a reservation of rights letter cannot be used to defeat, by waiver or estoppel, a coverage clause in an insurance contract that would otherwise justify the insurer's denial of coverage. View "Maxwell v. Hartford Union High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In this breach of contract case, the jury found that a contract existed between Erie Insurance Exchange and Best Price Plumbing but that Erie did not breach the contract. The circuit court granted Best Price's motion after verdict to change the jury's answer. The court then concluded as a matter of law that a breach occurred, and it entered judgment in favor of Best Price. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. Best Price appealed, asserting that under State. v. Kenosha Home Telephone Co., it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the jury instructions was forfeited because the jury was not asked to answer any questions that would support the application of the Kenosha Home Telephone rule as a matter of law; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the circuit court was clearly wrong when it changed that answer to the verdict question. View "Best Price Plumbing, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Robert Johnson filed a summons and complaint against Cintas Corporation, alleging he had automobile liability insurance coverage through Cintas. Johnson subsequently served his summons and complaint upon the registered agent for Cintas Corporation No. 2, a wholly owned subsidiary of Cintas. Johnson then amended his summons and complaint to name Cintas No. 2 as the correct defendant. The circuit court granted default judgment against Cintas No. 2 and denied that Cintas No. 2 was entitled to notice of the amended summons and complaint. The court of appeals reversed, holding that because Johnson's summons and complaint did not name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, and therefore, the default judgment was void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that service in this case was fundamentally defective because Johnson failed to name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant in his summons and complaint, and therefore, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, regardless of the manner in which Cintas No. 2 held itself out to the public or to Johnson specifically. View "Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 " on Justia Law

After Employer and Employee settled a suit Employee brought against Employer, Employer's Insurer paid the policy's maximum of $2 million pursuant to an oral funding agreement. Insurer then filed an action against Employer, seeking a declaration that its policies provided no coverage for Employee's claim and reimbursement of the $2 million. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer on March 26, but the parties agreed to delay entry of a final judgment. On July 8, the circuit court entered a final judgment. Insurer appealed on August 12. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the circuit court's March 26 decision and order was the final order for purposes of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer's appeal was timely because although the March 26 order arguably disposed of the entire matter in litigation between the parties, it did not unambiguously do so, and therefore, the July 8 judgment was final for purposes of appeal; (2) the funding agreement was an enforceable contract; (3) under these circumstances, an insurer cannot recover payments based on an unjust enrichment theory; and (4) Insurer's asserted mistake of fact did not provide grounds for voiding the contract. View "Admiral Ins. Co. v. Paper Converting Machine Co." on Justia Law

Joel and Evelyn Hirschhorn filed suit against their homeowners insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, for breach of contract and bad faith, claiming that Auto-Owners was liable for the total loss of their vacation home. The Hirschhorns alleged that their vacation home became uninhabitable and unsaleable as a result of the accumulation of bat guano between the home's siding and walls. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners, concluding that Auto-Owners' insurance policy's pollution exclusion clause excluded coverage for the Hirschhorns' loss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the pollution exclusion clause was ambiguous and therefore must be construed in favor of coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the Hirschhorns' complaint against Auto-Owners, as the pollution exclusion clause excluded coverage for the loss of the Hirschhorns' home that allegedly resulted from the accumulation of bat guano. View "Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Todd Olson filed suit against Robert Farrar, alleging he was liable for property damage to Olson's trailer home and vehicle. Farrar's insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaration that it had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Farrar under the terms of its insurance policy. The circuit court granted a declaratory and summary judgment in favor of Mt. Morris. The court of appeals reversed. Mt. Morris appealed, arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because of certain coverage exclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy provisions at issue were ambiguous; therefore, the Court construed them in favor of coverage. Remanded. View "Olson v. Farrar" on Justia Law