Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the law on testimonial hearsay has not changed in the last fourteen years to such a degree that, at Defendant's new trial, the circuit court was no longer bound by the Supreme Court's decision on appeal in State v. Jensen (Jensen I), 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007).Before Defendant's criminal trial for killing his wife, Julie, the Supreme Court held that certain hearsay statements made by Julie were testimonial and that the statements were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. Defendant was convicted. In subsequent federal habeas corpus litigation, the federal court held that it was not harmless error to admit Julie's testimonial statements and ordered Defendant's conviction vacated. The State then initiated new proceedings against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to exclude Julie's statements, per Jensen I. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that, under the law today, Julie's statements were not testimonial. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the circuit court was bound by Jensen I. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court with directions to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), when he was interviewed by a police officer.Defendant was an inmate in jail when he returned a call from an officer regarding an incident at Defendant's prior correctional institution. During the call, during which no Miranda warnings were given, Defendant admitted to the officer that he took and destroyed an inmate's missing property. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that it was bound to apply the per se rule set forth in State v. Armstrong, 588 N.W.2d 606 (Wis. 1999), that incarcerated individuals are in custody for Miranda purposes. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the per se rule adopted in Armstrong was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decision in Howes functionally overruled Armstrong's per se rule; and (2) Defendant's circumstances did not satisfy the standard requirements for custody under Miranda's framework. View "State v. Halverson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's judgment of conviction and the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that the felon-in-possession statute as applied to Defendant as applied to Defendant is constitutional.In 2003, Defendant was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to support a child. Consequently, Defendant was permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm. Defendant was subsequently charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Wis. Stat. 941.29(2). Defendant moved for postconviction relief, arguing that section 941.29(2) was unconstitutional as applied because his 2003 conviction did not justify the lifetime firearm ban. The circuit court denied postconviction relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's challenge to the felon-in-possession statute requires the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny; and (2) the statute is constitutional as applied because it is substantially related to important governmental objectives. View "State v. Roundtree" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment and order denying Defendant's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that counsel was not ineffective and Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea post-sentencing.Defendant pleaded guilty to violation of sex offender registry and was sentenced. Almost one year later, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that, as a result, his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Defendant's postconviction motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to inform Defendant about State v. Dinkins, 810 N.W.2d 787 (Wis. 2012), because Dinkins did not provide Defendant with a defense. View "State v. Savage" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals by holding that Wis. Stat. 803.09(2m) grants the Wisconsin Legislature the authority to represent the State's interest in the validity of state laws.The question here arose in the context of litigation in federal court over election-related laws. The Wisconsin Legislature was denied standing to appeal an adverse ruling below. The Seventh Circuit subsequently requested that the Supreme Court decide whether, under section 803.09(2m), the Wisconsin Legislature has the authority to represent the State's interest in the validity of state laws. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the Legislature does have that authority. View "Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann" on Justia Law

In this original action requesting a declaration that the governor exceeded his constitutional authority in partially vetoing appropriation bills the Supreme Court declared that the vetoes to the school bus modernization fund, the local roads improvement fund, and the vapor products tax were unconstitutional and invalid.Petitioners asserted that four series of partial vetoes in 2019 Wis. Act 9 - the state's 2019-21 biennial budget bill - were unconstitutional. While no rationale had the support of a majority of the Supreme Court, a majority reached a conclusion with respect to the constitutionality of each series of vetoes. The Supreme Court declared rights such that the vetoes to the school bus modernization fund, local roads improvement fund, and vapor products tax were unconstitutional and granted relief such that the portions of the enrolled bills that were vetoed are in full force and effect as drafted by the legislature. View "Bartlett v. Evers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this original action challenging whether two partial vetoes in the 2017-19 biennial budget exceeded the governor's constitutional authority, holding that this action was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.Two of the governor's vetoes struck individual digits from dates written in numeral form. Petitioners argued that the digit vetoes violated the constitutional prohibition against creating new words by striking individual letters in words. The biennial budget was enacted in September 2017, and Petitioners waited until October 2019 to file this action. Respondents urged the Supreme Court not to reach the merits in Petitioners' petition for original action and instead to bar the action pursuant to the doctrine of laches. The Supreme Court dismissed the original action, holding that where the 2017-19 biennium has closed and a new biennial budget as since been enacted relying in part on the law enacted in 2017, Respondents established the elements of laches and demonstrated that application of the equitable doctrine was appropriate in this case. View "Wisconsin Small Businesses United, Inc. v. Brennan" on Justia Law

In this case arising from the enactment of 2017 Wis. Act 369 and 2017 Wis. Act 370 the Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs did not meet their high burden to demonstrate that the challenged provisions were unconstitutional in all of their applications, and therefore, the motion to dismiss the facial challenges to these claims should have been granted.The acts at issue were passed by the legislature and signed by the governor after the 2018 election but before the legislature, governor, and attorney general were sworn into office. Plaintiffs - several labor organizations and individual taxpayers - filed suit against the leaders of both houses of the legislature, the Governor, and the Attorney General, claiming that many of the enacted provisions violate separation of powers principles. The legislative defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that for all provisions where arguments were sufficiently developed, the legislative defendants successfully showed that the motion to dismiss the facial challenge to these laws should have been granted. View "Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v. Vos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine, holding that the Wisconsin Constitution permits law enforcement to ask drivers stopped for a traffic violation to exit the vehicle, inquire about the presence of weapons, and request consent to search the driver.Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of the vehicle, contending that it was fruit of an unlawful search because the arresting officer's actions unlawfully extended the stop, and he lacked reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer did not impermissibly extend Defendant's traffic stop beyond constitutional boundaries because his actions were negligently burdensome directly related to officer safety and therefore part of the stop's mission. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, holding that the circuit court did not err in its evidentiary rulings.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court (1) improperly excluded the expert testimony of Dr. Lawrence White, and (2) erred in denying his motion to suppress statements that he made to law enforcement because he was not read the Miranda warnings or, in the alternative, because his statements were not voluntarily made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly excluded Dr. White's exposition testimony on the grounds that it did not fit with the facts of Defendant's case; (2) Defendant was subject to custodial interrogation and was not read the Miranda warnings, but the admission of those statements was harmless error; and (3) all of Defendant's statements were voluntary. View "State v. Dobbs" on Justia Law