Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc. (hereinafter, Bostco) filed a complaint against Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), claiming that MMSD's negligent operation and maintenance of a sewerage tunnel beneath Bostco's property resulted in excessive groundwater seepage into the tunnel, causing significant damage to Bostco's buildings. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on all but one of the issues, holding (1) MMSD was not entitled to immunity for its construction and maintenance of the tunnel; (2) the court of appeals erred in denying the equitable relief of abatement, as MMSD's duty to abate the private nuisance that MMSD caused by its negligent maintenance of the deep tunnel was not statutorily abrogated; (3) the damage cap capping the damages recoverable in an action against governmental entities at $50,000 does not violate equal protection; and (4) MMSD had sufficient notice of Bostco's claim. Remanded. View "Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist." on Justia Law

Musson Brothers, Inc. was conducting sewer removal and installation as a contractor for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) when Mark Showers' property was flooded. Showers filed a complaint against Musson and the City alleging that the two entities were jointly and severally liable for the negligent acts or omissions that caused Showers' building to flood. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City and Musson, finding that the entities were entitled to governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment for Musson, finding that Musson was entitled to governmental contractor immunity as a statutory "agent" under Wis. Stat. 893.80(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Musson failed to show it was acting as a governmental entity's agent for purposes of the alleged injury-causing conduct because it was not acting pursuant to "reasonably precise specifications" as required under section 893.80(4); and (2) in asserting the defense of immunity Musson failed to assert that the acts for which it claimed immunity were "acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" as required under section 893.80(4). Remanded. View "Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc. " on Justia Law

Defendant condemned a pair of easements on the residential property of Plaintiffs to facilitate the placement of high-voltage transmission lines. Plaintiffs filed a right-to-take action, arguing that because the proposed easements would cover more than half of their property and render their residential improvements obsolete, they would be left with an "uneconomic remnant" under Wis. Stat. 32.06(3m). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Plaintiffs' property, after the taking of the easements, was an uneconomic remnant, and ordered Defendant to acquire the entire property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that after Defendant took two easements for transmission lines, Plaintiffs' property was an uneconomic remnant because its condition was such that it was of substantially impaired economic viability as either a residential or an industrial parcel. View "Waller v. Am. Transmission Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault by use of force. Defendant appealed, contending that his right to confrontation was violated when the circuit court allowed a state crime lab analyst to testify that an out-of-state lab produced DNA profiles of semen found on the victims' swabs, which the analyst discovered resulted in a match to Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the DNA profiles produced by the out-of-state lab were not testimonial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation; and (2) even assuming that the admission of the expert's testimony violated Defendant's right to confrontation, the error was harmless in light of Defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse with the victims. View "State v. Deadwiller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The circuit court dismissed the motion for exceeding the page length limit. Two days later, Defendant filed a Cherry motion to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge, which the circuit court denied as untimely. Defendant subsequently refiled his original section 974.06 motion within the page limit requirement. The circuit court denied the motion on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant's second section 974.06 was procedurally barred because Defendant did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his Cherry motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant is not required to raise postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in a Cherry motion; but (2) Defendant's appellate attorney was not ineffective. View "State v. Starks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant subsequently sought postconviction relief, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the trial judge held separate in-chambers discussions with two jurors regarding a potential bias issue outside Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court's decision to exclude Defendant from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not deprive Defendant of a fair and just hearing because his attorneys were present at the in-chambers meetings and Defendant would not have been able to contribute anything to the circuit court's inquiry of the jurors; and (2) Defendant's statutory right to be present during voir dire was not violated because, in this case, the trial had already commenced and the jurors had been selected when the in-chambers meeting took place. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant was a suspect in two arsons committed in a nearby town. On March 30, a detective met with Defendant and asked him about the two arsons. Defendant requested counsel, and the detective ceased questioning him. On April 20, the detective arrested Defendant for the arson fires. Defendant asked if his attorney could be "present for this" before being brought into an interrogation room. After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant made incriminating statements to the detective. Defendant was charged with the arsons and moved to suppress the statements he made after he waived his right to counsel on April 20. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that the detective violated Defendant's right to counsel on April 20 when he interrogated Defendant after Defendant unequivocally, unambiguously requested counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because nineteen days had passed between when Defendant was released from custody and when he was reinterrogated, the March 30 invocation did not bar the interrogation on April 20; but (2) after Defendant's request for an attorney on April, police should have ceased questioning him, and because they did not, Defendant's statements made after that request must be suppressed. View "State v. Edler" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two felonies. The Department of Corrections prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) to assist in Defendant's sentencing, but when the circuit court and the parties received the PSI, Defendant disputed some of the information in the report. The circuit court judge ordered that a second PSI be prepared omitting the disputed information and that the first PSI be destroyed. The judge's successor modified the destruction order after Defendant was sentenced, ordering that the first PSI be sealed rather than destroyed because he questioned the court's authority to order the destruction of PSIs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts do not have either express or implied statutory authority to order the destruction of PSIs; and (2) courts lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of PSIs on the facts before the Court because that power is not necessary to a court's administration of justice. View "State v. Melton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant had previously entered pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect but later withdrew the not guilty pleas as part of a plea agreement. After he was sentenced, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error because he was not informed about the possibility of a bifurcated plea with the right to a jury trial focused on the issue of his mental responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim alleging ineffective assistance was insufficient, as Defendant never alleged (i) his trial counsel failed to inform him that he had the option of pleading guilty to the crimes but also not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or (ii) if trial counsel had informed him of the option of a trial focused solely upon mental responsibility, he would have chosen that option; and (2) Defendant's second claim was also insufficient because Defendant failed to state that, due to a defect in the plea colloquy, he did not enter his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a minor diagnosed with aplastic anemia. Petitioner opposed any life-saving blood transfusions on religious grounds. Petitioner's parents supported her position. The circuit court ultimately appointed a temporary guardian for the purpose of deciding whether to consent to medical treatment. While Petitioner's appeal was pending, the order appointing the temporary guardian expired. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal, finding that the issues presented were moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issues presented in this case were moot; and (2) it was unwise to address the moot issues because the legislature was far better able to decide substantial social policy issues such as those presented in this case. View "In re Sheila W." on Justia Law