Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Circuit Judge Richard J. Nuss presided over two jury trials, State v. Pinno and State v. Seaton. In both voir dire proceedings, Judge Nuss asked the public to leave the courtroom to make room for large jury panels. Defendants were subsequently convicted after jury trials open to the public. Defendants filed postconviction motions, alleging violations to their right to a public trial. Judge Nuss denied all postconviction motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire, and a judge’s decision to close or limit public access to a courtroom in a criminal case requires the analysis set forth in Waller v. Georgia; (2) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial may be asserted by the defendant at any time during a trial; (3) because neither Defendant in this case objected to the alleged courtroom closure, Defendants both forfeited their rights to a public trial; (4) defendants must demonstrate prejudice to prove ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object to the closure of the courtroom, and Defendants in this case failed to prove that their counsel was ineffective; and (5) Seaton was not denied his right to an impartial judge. View "State v. Seaton" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police officers after the officers observed an unlit light bulb in the vehicle’s tail lamp. The officers searched the vehicle during the stop and discovered a gun. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant then sought an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and suppressing all evidence seized during the stop, contending that the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion. At issue on appeal was whether Wis. Stat. 347.13(1) requires every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding a vehicle’s tail lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition to be in good working order. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 347.13(1) requires only that “a tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours of darkness”; and (2) because the only basis for the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was the unlit bulb, the stop was unconstitutional, and so too was the search of the vehicle. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child. At trial, Defendant told the court that she wanted to testify to “tell what actually happened. The circuit court concluded that Defendant was not “intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against self-incrimination” and refused to allow Defendant to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional rights and that she was automatically entitled to a new trial because the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is not subject to harmless error review. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to testify but argued that harmless error review applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the harmless error doctrine applies to the denial of a defendant’s right to testify; and (2) given the nature of Defendant’s defense and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant’s conviction for possession of a narcotic arose from a warrantless search of his briefcase. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for equipment violations. When the officer asked if he could search the car the driver gave his consent. When the officer discovered the briefcase, Defendant said, “Got a warrant for that?” Defendant argued that, with this question, he asserted ownership of the briefcase and withdrew the driver’s consent. The Supreme Court held that the search of the briefcase was reasonable under the circumstances, as (1) Defendant did not effectively withdraw the driver’s consent by asking “Got a warrant for that?”; and (2) police officers confronted with ambiguous statements are not under a duty to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity. View "State v. Wantland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, as a party to a crime, with use of a dangerous weapon. Defendant brought a postconviction motion alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present testimony at trial of potentially exculpatory witnesses, including an eyewitness other than the State's witnesses. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a particular eyewitness to testify at trial, and prejudice against Defendant resulted from counsel’s deficient performance. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The newly enacted Wis. Stat. 970.038 permits hearsay evidence at a preliminary examination, the purpose of which is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant felony has committed a felony. Petitioners in separate actions were charged with several criminal offenses. Both sets of Petitioners sought to preclude hearsay evidence at their preliminary examinations, arguing that section 970.038 violated their constitutional rights. The circuit court denied the motions. The court of appeals accepted and consolidated interlocutory appeals from Petitioners and concluded that the admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to section 970.038 presents no blanket constitutional problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no constitutional right to confrontation at a preliminary examination; and (2) due to the limited scope of preliminary examinations, the admission of hearsay evidence does not violate defendants’ rights to compulsory process, effective assistance of counsel, or due process. View "State v. Butts" on Justia Law

In Milwaukee County Circuit Court Defendant pled guilty to criminal charges. At the time of her arrest, Defendant was on probation after pleading guilty to three criminal charges in Waukesha County. Consequently, the Waukesha County Circuit Court sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and a term of probation. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court subsequently sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and extended supervision. The next day, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court sua sponte recalled the case and modified Defendant’s sentences due to the court’s mistaken belief in the length of Defendant’s Waukesha County sentence. The result was a nine-month increase in Defendant’s overall time of incarceration. Defendant filed a post-conviction motion to reinstate her original sentence, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of finality, and therefore double jeopardy principles were not implicated, and the circuit court acted appropriately in resentencing Defendant. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Ardonis Greer pled guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In 2007, Greer began serving his period of probation. Subsequently, Greer was erroneously issued a discharge certificate stating that he was discharged from supervision. In 2010, Greer pled no contest to intimidating a witness. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections (DOC) discovered that Greer was still purportedly serving the probation term from his 2004 conviction and initiated revocation proceedings against Greer. The Division of Hearings and Appeals ordered Greer’s probation revoked. Greer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the DOC lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation when it issued the discharge certificate. The circuit court reversed the Division’s decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate did not deprive the DOC of jurisdiction to revoke Greer’s probation because his court-ordered term of probation had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer despite the erroneous issuance of the discharge certificate; (2) Greer’s due process rights were not violated; and (3) the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, was not empowered to equitably estop the DOC from revoking Greer’s probation. View "Greer v. Wiedenhoeft" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his niece. During trial, the jury asked the circuit court if it needed to agree on the location of the assault, and the court responded, “no.” The court of appeals remanded for a new trial, concluding that this exchange permitted the jury to speculate beyond the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court’s response of “no” did not deprive Defendant of a unanimous verdict because, where the location of the crime was not one of the essential elements of the crime, the jurors did not need to unanimously agree on the location; and (2) Defendant failed to show that the court’s response of “no” was ambiguous or reasonably likely to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner that violated due process, as the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing that the victim’s credibility was irrelevant and that it could speculate beyond the evidence. View "State v. Badzinski" on Justia Law

Mother and Father chose to treat their eleven-year-old daughter's undiagnosed illness with prayer rather than medicine. Their daughter subsequently died from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile onset diabetes mellitus. In separate trials with different juries, Mother and Father were each convicted of second-degree reckless homicide. The parents appealed, arguing (1) their convictions for choosing treatment through prayer violated due process fair notice requirements; and (2) their convictions should be reversed because the real controversy was not fully tried due to erroneous jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, inter alia, (1) the second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child abuse statute provided sufficient notice that the parents' conduct could have criminal consequences if their daughter died; (2) the jury instructions on parents' duty to provide medical care were not erroneous, as the statutory provision protecting treatment through prayer does not negate the legal duty to provide medical care in a second degree reckless homicide prosecution; (3) trial counsels did not provide ineffective assistance; and (4) the controversy was fully tried where the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the parents' sincerely held religious belief in prayer.View "State v. Neumann" on Justia Law