Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Purtell was on probation after conviction for animal cruelty when his computer was searched by a probation agent. Purtell was convicted of four counts of possession of child pornography (Wis. Stat. 948.12(1m)). The trial court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that the search of Purtell's computer complied with Wis. Admin. Code DOC 328.21(3)(a) because she had reasonable grounds to believe the computer, which Purtell knowingly possessed in violation of the terms of his probation, contained contraband. The court of appeals concluded that the agent improperly searched the computer under the mistaken understanding that Purtell possessed images that violated the terms of his probation. Because the images were not prohibited under the terms of Purtell's probation or otherwise illegal to possess, the court of appeals held the probation agent lacked reasonable grounds to search the computer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. A probation agent's search of a probationer's property satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment if the probation agent has "reasonable grounds" to believe the probationer's property contains contraband. The record demonstrates that the probation agent had reasonable grounds to believe Purtell's computer, which Purtell knowingly possessed in violation of the conditions of his probation, contained contraband. View "State of WI v. Purtell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - the Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, Voces de la Frontera, and numerous individuals - challenged several provisions of 2011 Wis. Act 23, Wisconsin’s voter photo identification act, as unconstitutional. Act 23 requires an elector to present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in order to vote. The circuit court declared Act 23’s photo identification requirements unconstitutional and granted permanent injunctive relief, finding that the time, inconvenience and costs incurred in obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification impermissibly burden the right to vote. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to prove Act 23 unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, as the burdens of time and inconvenience associated with obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification are not undue burdens on the right to vote and do not render the law invalid. View "Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker" on Justia Law

Madison Teachers, Inc. and Public Employees Local 61 sued Governor Walker and three commissioners of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission challenging several provisions of Act 10, a budget repair bill that significantly altered Wisconsin’s public employee labor laws. Plaintiffs (1) alleged that certain aspects of Act 10 violate the constitutional associational and equal protection rights of the employees they represent; and (2) challenged Wis. Stat. 62.623, a separate provision created by Act 10, as a violation of the home rule amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution, and argued, in the alternative, that section 62.623 violates the constitutionally protected right of parties to contract with each other. The circuit court invalidated several provisions of Act 10, including the collective bargaining limitations, annual recertification requirements, and the prohibitions of fair share agreements and on payroll deductions of labor organization dues. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld Act 10 in its entirety, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ associational rights argument is without merit; (2) Act 10 survives Plainiffs’ equal protection challenge under rational basis review; (3) Plaintiffs’ home rule amendment argument fails because section 62.623 primarily concerns a matter of statewide concern; and (4) Plaintiffs’ Contract Clause claim fails. View "Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. and its president, brought a facial challenge to Wisconsin’s voter identification law, asserting that the legislature lacked authority under Article III of the Wisconsin Constitution to require an elector to present Act 23-acceptable photo identification. Act 23 requires an elector to present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in order to vote. The circuit court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the challenged portions of Act 23 were unconstitutional in that they served as a condition for voting at the polls. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to show that the photo identification requirement was on its face an additional qualification for voting; (2) Act 23 was validly enacted pursuant to the legislature’s authority; and (3) Plaintiffs’ facial challenge failed because Act 23’s requirement to present photo identification is a reasonable regulation that could improve and modernize election procedures, safeguard voter confidence, and deter voter fraud. View "League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Wis. Stat. Chapter 770, by which the legislature created the legal status of domestic partnership for same-sex couples, violates the following constitutional provision: “Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this state.” Those two sentences were added by Wisconsin voters in 2006 as an Amendment to the state constitution. The court of appeals concluded that Chapter 770 is constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Chapter 770 is constitutional based on the presumption of constitutionality, Plaintiffs’ failure to carry their burden of proof, and the evidence reviewed in accordance with caselaw establishing the framework used to interpret constitutional provisions. View "Appling v. Walker" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to first-degree reckless homicide. At issue on appeal was whether law enforcement officers (1) violated Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights by contacting Appellant’s cell phone provider to obtain Appellant’s cell phone location information without first securing a court order; and (2) violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they continued to interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. While the Court was deeply divided on the issues presented in this case, the lead opinion contained the following conclusions: (1) assuming without deciding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that police conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when they track a cell phone’s location, and assuming there was a search in this case, police did have probable cause for a warrant, and the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Appellant in this case failed to unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when officers continued to question Appellant after he asked how he could get an attorney. View "State v. Subdiaz-Osorio" on Justia Law

Law enforcement obtained evidence by tracking Appellant’s cell phone using cell site location information and a stingray. Before tracking Appellant’s cell phone, law enforcement obtained an order approving the procedures used to track Appellant’s cell phone. Appellant pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide. Appellant then appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing (1) law enforcement violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches; and (2) the order authorizing the tracking of his cell phone required statutory authority, which the court lacked. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) assuming that law enforcement’s activities constituted a search, the search was reasonable because it was executed pursuant to an order that met the Fourth Amendment’s requirements; and (2) specific statutory authorization was not necessary for the circuit court judge to issue the order that authorized the tracking of Appellant’s cell phone through cell site information and a stingray because the order was supported by probable cause. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

In these two cases, State v. Cummings and State v. Smith, the court of appeals affirmed the orders of the circuit courts denying Defendants’ motions to suppress. Defendants appealed, contending that they unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent prior to making incriminating statements to the police, and therefore, their statements should have been suppressed. Cummings argued separately that his sentence was unduly harsh. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in both cases, holding (1) neither Cummings nor Smith unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent during their interrogations, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied each Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) Cummings’ sentence was not unduly harsh. View "State v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first-degree sexual assault of a child. Thereafter, Defendant filed three postconviction motions for relief. The third postconviction motion was brought under Wis. Stat. 974.06 and alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise a strong argument for plea withdrawal. The circuit court denied Defendant’s section 974.06 motion because it did not demonstrate why postconviction counsel was ineffective. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant who alleges in a section 974.06 motion that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring certain viable claims must demonstrate that the claims he wishes to bring are clearly stronger than the claims postconviction counsel actually brought; (2) because Defendant did not offer a sufficient reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise his section 974.06 claim in his second postconviction motion, Defendant’s section 974.06 claim was barred; and (3) even if the section 974.06 motion was not barred, the motion did not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle Defendant to relief. View "State v. Romero-Georgana" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window constitutes a “seizure.” Defendant argued that he was seized when a sheriff’s deputy knocked on the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle and asked Defendant to roll down the window. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he rolled down the window and was subsequently found guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that “when a uniformed officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free to ignore the officer.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officer did not show a level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Defendant rolled down his window and exposed the grounds for the seizure. View "County of Grant v. Vogt" on Justia Law