Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to felony forgery. After Defendant was sentenced he filed a motion for resentencing, arguing that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated because compelled, self-incriminating statements to his probation agent were appended to the report of the presentence investigation the circuit court reviewed at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and granted resentencing based on ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court of appeals raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) assuming, without deciding, that Defendant’s statements to his probation agent were compelled, Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by actually relying on Defendant’s compelling, incriminating statements in imposing sentence; and (2) therefore, Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s lack of objection to those statements. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three offenses. Defendant filed two postconviction motions requesting a new trial, asserting that the circuit court judge, Jon M. Counsell, had no authority to preside over Defendant’s trial or sentencing because Defendant had filed a proper request for substitution of judge and the request had been granted. The circuit court denied the postconviction motions. The court of appeals summarily reversed the judgment of conviction and postconviction order and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not forfeit his statutory right to peremptory substitution of the judge; and (2) harmless error did not apply in this case when the circuit court erred by presiding over Defendant’s trial, sentencing, and postconviction motions. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit courts’ orders denying Defendants’ petitions for discharge from involuntary commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 as a sexually violent person. Defendants argued, inter alia, that the circuit courts erred by declining to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard under Wis. Stat. 907.02(1) to the prosecution’s expert witnesses who testified in Defendants’ discharge petition trials because the petitions commenced “actions” or “special proceedings” after the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability. (The underlying chapter 980 commitments commenced several years before the Daubert standard’s first date of applicability.) The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Daubert evidentiary standard under section 907.02(1) did not apply to expert testimony in Defendants’ chapter 980 discharge petition trials because their discharge petitions did not “commence” “actions” or “special proceedings”; and (2) Defendants’ equal protection and due process rights were not violated because the legislature had a rational basis for not applying the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in post-Daubert chapter 980 discharge petitions that seek relief from pre-Daubert chapter 980 commitments. View "State v. Knipfer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, sixth offense. Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, and Defendant’s post-conviction counsel filed a no-merit report with the court of appeals. The court of appeals accepted the no-merit report and affirmed the conviction. Defendant petitioned for review. While the petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) McNeely applies retroactively to the facts of this case, rending the warrantless nonconsensual blood draw performed on Defendant unconstitutional, but the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the evidence; and (2) the court of appeals properly accepted post-conviction counsel’s no-merit report. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that struck the victim as she crossed a street. Defendant was transported to a hospital, where hospital personnel conducted a warrantless investigatory blood draw upon the orders of the police. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v. McNeely did rendered unconstitutional the warrantless blood draw performed on Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s arrest was lawful because the police had probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a drunk-driving related crime; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the warrantless investigatory blood draw performed on Defendant was not supported by exigent circumstances, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Defendant was involved in a single-vehicle accident that killed one of the occupants of the vehicle. Defendant, who denied being the driver, was being treated at the hospital when the hospital staff performed a warrantless blood draw at the instructions of a sheriff’s deputy. Defendant moved to suppress the blood draw as an unreasonable search without a warrant. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and other crimes. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that probable cause and exigent circumstances supported the blood draw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. View "State v. Tullberg" on Justia Law

This case arose from an attack by multiple people on an inmate in the county jail. Defendant was charged with battery by a prisoner, as a party to a crime. During Defendant’s trial, a witness testified that the victim had identified one of his attackers as a fellow inmate with platinum teeth. The prosecutor then requested, over defense objection, that Defendant reveal his teeth to the jury. Defendant complied, revealing platinum teeth. Defendant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this case did not offend constitutional principles against self-incrimination, where (1) the evidence of Defendant’s platinum teeth was physical evidence that did not have a testimonial aspect sufficient to implicate constitutional protections, as it did not express, make use of, reveal, or disclose the contents of Defendant’s mind; and (2) Defendant’s teeth were material to identification because they were probative of Defendant’s identity. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to armed robbery. Defendant later filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the State, the court, and trial counsel mistakenly advised him when deciding whether to accept the State’s plea offer that he was facing a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of extended supervision. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court to allow Defendant to withdraw his no-contest plea, concluding that Defendant’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant had the right to withdraw his no-contest plea; and (2) Defendant proved that the no-contest plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. View "State v. Dillard" on Justia Law

A referee recommended that Attorney Sommers' license to practice law be suspended for 60 days for professional misconduct. He did not appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the misconduct warrants public discipline, but deemed a public reprimand sufficient and imposed the full costs on Attorney Sommers, which total $5,033.16. Sommers was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 1992. His Wisconsin law license is currently suspended for nonpayment of State Bar dues and for noncompliance with continuing legal education requirements. Sommers was previously suspended for 30 days as discipline based on a related matter: allegations relating to improper ex parte communications, press releases, and other statements involving the judiciary. View "Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sommers" on Justia Law

Purtell was on probation after conviction for animal cruelty when his computer was searched by a probation agent. Purtell was convicted of four counts of possession of child pornography (Wis. Stat. 948.12(1m)). The trial court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that the search of Purtell's computer complied with Wis. Admin. Code DOC 328.21(3)(a) because she had reasonable grounds to believe the computer, which Purtell knowingly possessed in violation of the terms of his probation, contained contraband. The court of appeals concluded that the agent improperly searched the computer under the mistaken understanding that Purtell possessed images that violated the terms of his probation. Because the images were not prohibited under the terms of Purtell's probation or otherwise illegal to possess, the court of appeals held the probation agent lacked reasonable grounds to search the computer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. A probation agent's search of a probationer's property satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment if the probation agent has "reasonable grounds" to believe the probationer's property contains contraband. The record demonstrates that the probation agent had reasonable grounds to believe Purtell's computer, which Purtell knowingly possessed in violation of the conditions of his probation, contained contraband. View "State of WI v. Purtell" on Justia Law