Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mother and Father divorced, Grandmother filed a motion seeking to visit her four grandchildren. The circuit court ultimately denied the motion, concluding that Grandmother failed to prove that she maintained “a parent-like relationship” with the children pursuant to Wis. Stat. 767.43(1). The children appealed, and the the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 767.43(1) does not require a grandparent, great-grandparent, or stepparent who files a motion for visitation rights to prove that he or she has maintained a parent-like relationship with the child, as the parent-child relationship element applies only to a person seeking visitation rights who is not a grandparent, great-grandparent, or stepparent; and (2) the legislature’s decision to allow courts to grant visitation rights to grandparents, great-grandparents, and stepparents when visitation is in the best interest of the child does not infringe on parents’ constitutional rights. View "S. A. M. v. Meister" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of narcotic drugs. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress a warrantless draw of his blood. Later testing of Defendant’s blood indicated the presence of opiates and morphine. The circuit court held that the warrantless draw of Defendant’s blood was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirements of the federal and state Constitutions. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, but on different grounds, determining that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to prevent suppression of the drug-related evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the warrantless blood draw was constitutional because it was supported by exigent circumstances. View "State v. Parisi" on Justia Law

Police obtained evidence of marijuana production in Defendant’s home while investigating the source of injuries sustained by Defendant’s brother. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of THC, and manufacture or delivery of THC. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence as unconstitutionally conducted without a warrant and without consent. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the officers were not exercising a bona fide community caretaker function and that the officers’ search did not constitute a lawful protective sweep. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers reasonably exercised a bona fide community caretaker function when they searched Defendant’s home, and therefore, the search was lawful. View "State v. Matalonis" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation (DOT) eliminated Hoffer Properties, LLC’s direct driveway connections to a controlled-access highway and separately exercised its power of eminent domain to acquire .72 acres of Hoffer’s land to extend Frohling Lane westward so as to connect Hoffer’s property to the highway. Hoffer appealed the amount of compensation, arguing that compensation for the .72 acre must include the diminution of value of the property due to the loss of direct access to the highway. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to DOT, concluding that Hoffer’s direct access to the highway was a noncompensable exercise of the police power and that reasonable access had been given as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that summary judgment was proper because DOT provided alternate access to Hoffer’s property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hoffer was precluded from compensation under Wis. Stat. 32.09(6)(b) because alternate access to the property was provided by the Frohling Lane extension. View "Hoffer Props., LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by police inside the parking garage underneath his apartment building and subsequently arrested for operating while intoxicated. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officers’ conduct occurred during a warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area - the curtilage of his home. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parking garage under the apartment building did not constitute curtilage of Defendant’s home; (2) Defendant failed to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking garage; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s stop and subsequent arrest in the garage did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. View "State v. Dumstrey" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of THC with intent to deliver following the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stop was not an investigatory stop and that the officer lacked probable cause to stop Defendant’s vehicle, making the subsequent search unlawful. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating or has violated a traffic law is sufficient for the officer to initiate a stop of the offending vehicle, and an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law may form the basis for a finding of reasonable suspicion; and (2) although the officer in this case wrongly interpreted the law in stopping Defendant for violating a traffic law, the officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable, and therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. View "State v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine and child neglect after the circuit court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his truck. At issue in this case was the reasonableness of police conduct after a lawful traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his truck, as (1) the officer who stopped Defendant for a seat belt violation had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to administer field sobriety tests; and (2) Defendant’s consent to search his truck was valid. View "State v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Defendant, who came to the United States from Mexico in 1997, pleaded no contest to substantial battery as an act of domestic abuse. After Defendant completed his jail sentence Immigration and Customs Enforcement commenced removal proceedings against him. Defendant subsequently filed a postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him that his no-contest plea to substantial battery, with a domestic abuse enhancer, was certain to result in his deportation. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery because his trial counsel did not perform deficiently. View "State v. Ortiz-Mondragon" on Justia Law

Defendant, an Egyptian foreign national, pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, as party to a crime. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant argued that, under Padilla v. Kentucky, his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him that his conviction would absolutely result in deportation. The circuit court denied Defendant’s post-conviction motion, concluding that Defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Defendant’s attorney correctly advised Defendant that his guilty plea carried a “strong chance” of deportation, Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Shata" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court took this opportunity to clarify the law on waiver of the right to counsel after a defendant has been charged with a crime. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of delivering heroin, second or subsequent offense, as a repeater and as party to a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that statements he made to investigators while he was incarcerated and after his initial appearance should have been suppressed in accordance with State v. Dagnall. Before the interview, Defendant waived his Miranda rights and did not ask for counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana effectively overruled Dagnall by establishing that a waiver of Miranda rights is sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and such a waiver is not presumed invalid simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel; and (2) Wis. Const. art. I, 7 does not provide greater protections than the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have counsel present during questioning. View "State v. Delebreau" on Justia Law