Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted and sentenced under 2009 Wis. Act 28, which allowed inmates the opportunity to earn “positive adjustment time,” by which inmates could obtain early release from prison. 2011 Wis. Act 38 retroactively repealed positive adjustment time. Singh filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the new legislation violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it delayed inmates’ release from prison by up to ninety days. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the retroactive application of 2011 Wis. Act 38 was an ex post facto violation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the retroactive repeal of positive adjustment time is an ex post facto violation, and (2) 2011 Wis. Act 38 violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it results in a longer period of incarceration and, consequently, makes the punishment for an offense more burdensome after it was committed. View "State ex rel. Singh v. Kemper" on Justia Law

This case was one of several cases involving litigation between Lands’ End and the City of Dodgeville challenging the City’s property tax assessment of Lands’ End’s headquarters. In 2009, Lands’ End made an offer of settlement, which the City rejected. Eventually, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Lands’ End in the amount of $724,292 plus statutory interest. At issue on remand was whether Lands’ End was entitled to interest at the statutory rate of interest in effect when the offer of settlement was made under Wis. Stat. 807.01(4) or at the statutory rate of interest in effect when Lands’ End recovered the judgment under the amended version of the statute. The circuit court awarded interest at “1 percent plus the prime rate,” the rate in the amended version of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lands’ End did not have a vested right in the twelve percent interest rate in effect in section 807.01(4) at the time Lands’ End made its offer of settlement; and (2) awarding interest under the amended version of the statute did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. View "Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville" on Justia Law

Wis. Act 76 substantially changed the circumstances under which the Department of Children and Families (DCF) may license and certify childcare providers in Wisconsin. One provision in the new law, Wis. Stat. 48.685(5)(br)5., "imposes a lifetime ban on licensure" and certification for persons who have been convicted of specific crimes. After plaintiff's license was revoked based upon a 1986 conviction for misdemeanor welfare fraud, she filed suit challenging the statute. Both the Dane Circuit Court and the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's challenges. The court concluded that the statute rationally advances the legislature's fraud reduction objective in a manner that outweighs any interest that plaintiff might have in eligibility to receive payments through Wisconsin Shares. Because the court concluded that the statute denies plaintiff neither due process nor equal protection of the law, the court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Blake v. Jossart" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant moved to suppress her incriminating statements made during a six-hour interrogation conducted without a Miranda warning and evidence of the search of her house conducted after the interrogation. The circuit court suppressed Defendant’s statements and the physical evidence obtained from her house, which the court concluded was fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the officers searching Defendant’s house would have discovered the incriminating physical evidence during their search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) application of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule does not require that the State prove the absence of bad faith by the officers who intentionally engaged in the misconduct that provides the basis for exclusion; and (2) the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that officers inevitably would have discovered the physical evidence at issue. Remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Since 1938, the City of Milwaukee has required its city employees to comply with a residency requirement. The residency requirement is set forth in section 5-02 of the City’s charter. In 2013, the Legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 66.0502, which bans residency requirements. Despite enactment of the statute, the City continued to enforce its residency requirement, claiming it had the authority to do so under the state Constitution’s home rule amendment. The Milwaukee Police Association sought relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the City can no longer enforce its residency requirement because section 66.0502 trumps section 5-02 of the City’s charter. With respect to Association’s section 1983 claim, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision not to award relief or damages, concluding that because section 66.0502 did not involve a matter of statewide concern and did not affect all local government units uniformly, it did not trump the City’s ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 66.0502 precludes the City from enforcing its residency requirement; and (2) the Police Association is not entitled to relief or damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the Association failed to meet the requirements necessary to prevail on a section 1983 claim. View "Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Defendant would plead no contest to certain counts brought against him, while other counts would be dismissed and read into the record for purposes of sentencing and recitation. At a plea hearing, the court concluded that Defendant’s pleas were made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion and ordered judgments of guilt. Defendant was then sentenced. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his no contest pleas. Specifically, Defendant claimed that his pleas were unknowing because he did not understand the effect the read-in charge could have at sentencing. The postconviction court denied Defendant’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the postconviction court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before it determined whether Defendant had entered his pleas in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion to withdraw his plea because he was correctly informed of and understood the effect of the read-in charges at sentencing. View "State v. Sulla" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Wisconsin Supreme Court's review was whether the Circuit Court erred when it granted the State's motion to join intimidation charges involving two victims, a mother and her daughter, with already-pending sexual assault charges where the daughter was the victim. The circuit court held that joinder was proper under Wis. Stat. 971.12(1)(2009-10); the court of appeals reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. After review, the Supreme Court held that joinder was proper because the charges joined were "2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan," the charges were "connected together," and the charges constituted parts of a "common scheme or plan." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the jury's verdicts finding Luis Salinas guilty of: (1) repeated sexual assault of a child; (2) second-degree sexual assault; (3) second-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 16; (4) intimidation of witness, M.S.; and (5) intimidation of witness, V.G. View "Wisconsin v. Salinas" on Justia Law

The charges of first-degree sexual assault against defendant-appellant Stephen LeMere arose out of events that occurred after a gathering in the Eau Claire on Friday evening, May 13, 2011, at the home of J.C. and his wife, A.C. LeMere was then 24. Also present that evening was C.R.C., J.C.'s 12-year-old sister. During the gathering, LeMere and another visitor drank the majority of two 30 packs of beer, in addition to other alcohol in the house. LeMere also took a narcotic pain killer. Although his memory of the evening became "fuzzy," LeMere recalled playing drinking games throughout the night. Early the next morning, LeMere sent text messages to C.R.C., and when she refused to have sex with her, he placed her in a choke hold, put a knife to her throat, fondled her, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about what happened. C.R.C. did tell someone about it, and charges were later filed against him. In "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010)), the federal Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation. Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court assessed "Padilla" in a different context: did the Sixth Amendment require defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility of civil commitment, under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, when the client entered a plea to a sexually violent offense? LeMere wanted to withdraw his plea, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not informing him of the possibility of civil commitment following the confinement portion of his sentence under Chapter 980. The Wisconsin Court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient in this case, and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Wisconsin v. LeMere" on Justia Law

The circuit court dismissed an action brought by Vilas County District Attorney Albert Moustakis who sought to restrain the Wisconsin Department of Justice from releasing records pertaining to Moustakis in response to a public records request by The Lakeland Times, a newspaper located in Minocqua. The request sought records of any "complaints or investigations regarding Vilas County District Attorney Al Moustakis" and records "regarding any investigation of [Moustakis's] conduct or handling of cases while district attorney." The request also sought "information related to complaints and investigations regarding Mr. Moustakis that were completed or ended without any action taken against him[,]" as well as "any communications between Mr. Moustakis and [Department of Justice] since he took office in 1995." The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court. Finding no error in the circuit or appellate courts' decisions, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Moustakis v. Wisconsin Department of Justice" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was 2011 Wisconsin Act 21 (Act 21), which, among other things, amended portions of Wis. Stat. ch. 227, which governs the procedures for administrative rule making and allows the Governor and the Secretary of Administration (Secretary) permanently to halt the rulemaking process. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and the Department of Public Instruction (DPI). The circuit court permanently enjoined the Governor and Secretary from proceeding under Act with respect to the SPI, concluding that Act 21 is unconstitutional as applied to the SPI because it gives superior authority over public instruction to officers who are not subordinate to the SPI. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Act 21 unconstitutionally vests the Governor and Secretary with the supervision of public instruction in violation of Wis. Const. art. X, 1 because it does not allow the SPI and DPI to proceed with their duties of supervision without the Governor’s, and in some circumstances, the Secretary’s approval. View "Coyne v. Walker" on Justia Law