Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated - fourth offense. Defendant requested a new trial, arguing that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements that Defendant had refused to submit to a breathalyzer test following his arrest for drunk driving. Specifically, Defendant claimed that he possessed a constitutional right to refuse to take a warrantless breathalyzer test such that the prosecutor was not permitted to seek an inference of guilt from the refusal, and therefore, his trial attorney should have objected to the prosecutor’s statements. The circuit court denied the postconviction motion with a hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) upon Defendant’s arrest for drunk driving he had no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to take the breathalyzer test; (2) therefore, the State could comment at trial on Defendant's improper refusal to take the test; and (3) accordingly, Defendant’s attorney did not render ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to argue contrary to controlling precedent. View "State v. Lemberger" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary, possession of burglarious tools, criminal damage to property, and criminal trespass, each as a repeater. Defendant filed a motion to suppress seeking to prevent the prosecution from using at trial Defendant’s statement, “they caught me,” that Defendant made to detectives at the county jail. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that there was no violation of Defendant’s right to be free from self-incrimination. Thereafter, a jury found Defendant guilty on all four counts. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the question that preceded Defendant’s statement did not constitute interrogation, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State did not compel Defendant to be a witness against himself. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of operating while intoxicated and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration, both as third offenses. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress all evidence obtained during a traffic stop, claiming that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion. Before the court could hold a suppression hearing, the officer died. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the use of the deceased officer’s recorded statements at the suppression hearing did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause or the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Confrontation Clause protects a defendant’s right to confrontation at trial but not at suppression hearings; and (2) in this case, the admission of the deceased officer’s recorded statements during the suppression hearing did not deprive Defendant of due process. View "State v. Zamzow" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that testimony given by Catherine Gainey, the social worker who conducted a cognitive graphic interview with the child victim, violated the Haseltine rule and that Defendant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Gainey’s testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule and was therefore admissible, and accordingly, Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Gainey’s testimony; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. View "State v. Maday" on Justia Law

Universal Processing Services of Wisconsin, LLC, d/b/a Newtek brought a lawsuit against one of its independent sales agents, Samuel Hicks, and his Idaho company, Merchant Card Services (collectively, Hicks). Here, Newtek petitioned the Supreme Court for a supervisory writ, asking the Court to exercise its constitutional authority to vacate an order of the circuit court appointing a retired judge as the referee and to vacate purportedly unlawful orders of the referee issued pursuant to the reference. In support of its petition, Newtek argued that the circuit court’s order appointing the referee expanded the role of the referee into the role of de facto circuit court judge in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. Stat. 805.06. The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the circuit court and remanded, holding that the order of reference impermissibly delegated to the referee judicial power constitutionally vested in Wisconsin’s unified court system and infringed on the legislature’s authority to define a circuit court’s appellate jurisdiction. View "Universal Processing Services v. Circuit Court of Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances 3.14(4)(h) created the City of Madison’s Department of Transportation and Transit and Parking Commission and empowered the Commission to establish rules and procedures. In 2005, The Commission adopted a Rule prohibiting passengers from bearing weapons on the Metro Transit. Petitioners sought to harmonize the Rule with the Concealed-Carry Statute, Wis. Stat. 175.60, which authorized Wisconsin residents to carry concealed weapons upon obtaining the required license. Petitioners filed an amended complaint arguing that Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances 3.14(4)(h) offended the Local Regulation Statute, Wis. Stat. 66.0409. The circuit court dismissed the amended complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Local Regulation Statute has withdrawn authority from the City, either through its governing body or its sub-units, to regulate the subjects identified in the statute in a manner more stringent than an analogous state statute; and (2) the Concealed-Carry Statute preempts the City’s authority to restrict a licensee’s right to carry concealed weapons on the City’s buses so long as the licensee complies with the statute’s requirements. View "Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw on the basis that the deputy that arrested him lacked probable cause to do so and that the deputy violated Defendant’s rights by obtaining the blood draw. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant but that the section of Wisconsin’s implied consent statutes that permits a blood draw from an unconscious individual is unconstitutional unless exigent circumstances exist, and exigent circumstances did not exist in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy’s warrantless search was permissible under the exigent circumstances doctrine that relates to the risk of destruction of evidence. Remanded. View "State v. Howes" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded no contest to one count of burglary as a party to a crime. The judgment of conviction provided that Petitioner submit to a DNA sample and pay a $250 DNA analysis surcharge. At the time Petitioner committed the offense Wis. Stat. 973.046, which provided that the decision of whether to impose a DNA surcharge was within the circuit court’s discretion, was in effect. Thereafter, Wis. Stat. 973.046(1r)(a) took effect. When Petitioner was sentenced, the amended statute made the imposition of a DNA surcharge mandatory. Petitioner filed a postconviction motion seeking to vacate the $250 DNA surcharge, arguing that imposing the mandatory DNA surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because imposition of the DNA surcharge was discretionary at the time she committed the offense. The circuit court denied the postconviction motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not meet her burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the amended statute is unconstitutional. View "State v. Scruggs" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide for delivering heroin that caused the death of S.L. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of a toxicology report at trial through a medical examiner’s testimony, without testimony by the analyst who signed it, violated his confrontation rights. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the admission and use at trial of the toxicology report did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the toxicology report as not “testimonial” under the primary purpose test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Clark. In so holding, the Court overruled State v. VanDyke, which reached the opposite conclusion. View "State v. Mattox" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of drunk driving, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s order denying Defnednat’s motion to suppress, concluding that the warrantless entry by a deputy with the sheriff’s department into Defendant’s garage was not justified by the exigent circumstance of the deputy’s “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy’s warrantless entry into Defendant’s garage and subsequent arrest of Defendant were constitutional because they were justified by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law