Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wis. Stat. 157.067(2) and 445.12(6) (the anti-combination laws), which prohibit the joint ownership or operation of a cemetery and a funeral home, do not violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.The circuit court concluded that the anti-combination laws are constitutional because they are rationally related to a number of legitimate government interests. On appeal, the parties disagreed on the proper scope of rational basis review and whether the anti-combination laws have a rational basis. The court of appeals concluded that, regardless of the scope of rational basis review employed, the anti-combination laws were not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, applying the standard set forth in Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, __ N.W.2d __ (Wis. 2018), the anti-combination statutes do not violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because they are rationally related to the legitimate government interests of protecting the welfare of vulnerable consumers and limiting the manipulation of funds required to be held in trust by funeral directors and cemetery operators. View "Porter v. State" on Justia Law

A right to visibility of private property from a public road is not a cognizable right giving rise to a protected property interest.Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership brought a takings claim against the City of Madison, asserting that its property was taken when the City constructed a pedestrian bridge over the Beltline Highway that blocked the visibility from the highway of the west-facing side of Adams’ billboard. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that Adams failed to demonstrate a cognizable right underlying its asserted protected property interest. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Adams argued that a taking occurred because the City deprived it of all economically beneficial use of the west-facing side of its billboard. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Adams’ taking claim failed. View "Adams Outdoor Advertising Limited Partnership v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

Applying the teachings of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 473 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the law enforcement officers in this case lawfully entered Defendant’s residence to execute two valid warrants for Defendant’s arrest and lawfully seized evidence discovered in the search incident to Defendant’s arrest.Defendant was convicted of obstructing an officer and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his arrest and the subsequent search were unconstitutional. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the hot pursuit doctrine allowed the lawful enforcement officers to follow Defendant from his driveway into his home to effectuate his arrest. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) because this case is governed by Payton, the applicability of the hot pursuit doctrine need not be addressed; and (2) applying Payton to the undisputed facts of this case, the police officers’ entry into Defendant’s home to execute two valid warrants for Defendant’s arrest was constitutionally permissible. View "State v. Delap" on Justia Law

Circuit courts possess statutory competency to proceed in criminal matters when the adult defendant was charged for conduct he committed before his tenth birthday.Defendant was charged with four counts of criminal misconduct. Defendant was nine through twelve years old during the time period charged in count one and fourteen through eighteen years old during the time period charged in counts two through four. Defendant was nineteen years old when the charges were filed. The jury acquitted Defendant of count one but convicted him of counts two through four. Defendant brought a postconviction motion alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a pre-trial motion to dismiss count one. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the defendant’s age at the time he is charged, not his age at the time the underlying conduct occurred, determines whether charges are properly brought as a criminal matter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court possessed statutory competency to hear Defendant’s case as a criminal matter because he was an adult at the time he was charged; and (2) therefore, Defendant’s counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to raise a meritless motion. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The intent-effects test is the proper test used to determine whether a sanction is “punishment” such that due process requires a defendant be informed of it before entering a plea of guilty.In the instant case, the circuit court failed to inform Defendant that his plea of guilty to second-degree sexual assault would subject him to lifetime GPS tracking pursuant to Wis. Stat. 301.48. The circuit court concluded that lifetime GPS tracking is not punishment and therefore denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Applying the intent-effects test to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the intent nor effect of lifetime GPS tracking is punitive. View "State v. Muldrow" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court ruling that Defendant’s trial counsel’s failure to object to an exhibit sent to the jury during deliberations constituted ineffective assistance with respect to only one of the six counts for which Defendant was convicted.On appeal, Defendant argued that all six of his convictions should be vacated due to his trial counsel’s deficient performance and that the State forfeited its right to argue the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test at his Machner hearing. In affirming, the Supreme Court held (1) circuit courts reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel following multiple-count trials may conclude that deficient performance prejudiced only one of the multiple convictions; and (2) the State did not forfeit its right to challenge the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test when it did not petition the Supreme Court for review following the court of appeals’ original decision remanding for a Machner hearing. View "State v. Sholar" on Justia Law

At issue was the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. 980.09(2), as amended by 2013 Wis. Act 84, which establishes the discharge procedure for a person civilly committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980.David Hager, Jr. and Howard Carter both filed petitions for discharge from commitment as sexually violent persons. Both petitions were denied. The court of appeals reversed in Hager but affirmed in Carter. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals as to Hager and affirmed as to Carter, holding (1) under Wis. Stat. 980.09(2), circuit courts are to carefully examine, but not weigh, those portions of the record they deem helpful to their consideration of a petition for discharge, which may include facts both favorable and unfavorable to the petitioner; (2) section 980.09(2) does not violate the constitutional right to due process of law as guaranteed by the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions; and (3) Carter’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge retroactive application of Act 84 to Carter. View "State v. Hager" on Justia Law

In this commitment-extension proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s order denying J.M.’s motion for post-disposition relief in which J.M. claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court answered (1) J.M. had a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in his Chapter 41 commitment-extension hearing, and the Strickland standard is the correct standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a commitment-extension hearing; (2) J.M. did not show that a reasonable probability existed that the result of the proceeding would have been different had his trial counsel’s performance not been allegedly deficient regarding J.M.’s appearance in prison garb; and (3) J.M. did not establish that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that his wearing of prison garb during the trial so distracted the jury that justice was miscarried, and the circuit court’s conflicting jury instructions did not entitle J.M. to a new trial in the interest of justice. View "Winnebago County v. J.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court’s decision rejecting Defendant’s motion to vacate his judgments of conviction and requesting a new trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial.In his motion, Defendant argued that his first trial, which resulted in convictions for the sexual assault of two victims, was unfair because the State shifted the burden of proof and distorted the jury’s credibility determinations and that the jury based its verdict in part on inadmissible evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding (1) the State’s trial commentary was not improper; and (2) there was no reasonable probability that redacting the challenged evidence would have changed the result of the trial. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Oshkosh in this action challenging the special assessment imposed by the City following the reconfiguration of a traditional traffic light intersection into a roundabout. The Court held (1) the term “special benefits” in Wisconsin’s eminent domain statute has the same meaning in Wisconsin’s special assessment statute, and the City’s admission that special benefits are non-existent in the context of an earlier eminent domain proceeding constitutes relevant evidence in a later challenge to the special assessment; and (2) the court of appeals erred in concluding that Plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the City’s special assessment and to establish sufficient genuine issues of material fact. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for a trial. View "CED Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh" on Justia Law