Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman, referred to as Naomi, was charged with felony battery by a prisoner after slapping a nurse while incarcerated in the Milwaukee County jail. At her initial court appearance, concerns were raised about her competency to stand trial, and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court ordered a competency evaluation. Upon finding Naomi incompetent but likely to regain competence with treatment, the court committed her to the Department of Health Services (DHS) for treatment. The court originally found her incompetent to refuse medication and, after applying the standards from Sell v. United States, ordered involuntary medication to restore competency. Naomi appealed, and the court stayed the order. Subsequently, after DHS raised concerns about Naomi’s dangerousness, the court vacated its earlier order and issued a new involuntary medication order based solely on Naomi’s dangerousness, relying on WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3.Naomi challenged the legal authority for this order, arguing that someone committed only under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 for competency restoration could not be involuntarily medicated on dangerousness grounds under § 51.61(1)(g)3. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed with Naomi, rejecting the State’s arguments that various statutory and case law authorities permitted the order.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the matter and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize a court to order involuntary medication for an individual committed exclusively under WIS. STAT. § 971.14. The court based its decision on statutory language, context, and history, finding that § 971.14 provides a separate, more stringent process for involuntary medication orders in the context of competency restoration, and that § 51.61(1)(g)3. cannot be used as an alternative basis for such orders. View "State v. N. K. B." on Justia Law

A group of Wisconsin taxpayers challenged a state program that provides need-based college grants to students belonging to specified racial, national origin, ancestry, or alienage groups attending private and technical colleges. The program, administered by the Higher Educational Aids Board (HEAB), was created to address disproportionate attrition rates among certain minority students by offering them financial support. Students who do not fall into the listed preferred groups are categorically ineligible for this aid.The Jefferson County Circuit Court ruled in favor of HEAB, holding that the taxpayers had standing and that the program was constitutional. The court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, finding that fostering diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest and that the program was narrowly tailored to address high attrition rates among minority students. The taxpayers appealed this decision.While the case was on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, which held that achieving diversity in higher education is no longer a compelling interest justifying race-based classifications. Applying this new precedent, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding the program unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and ordering HEAB to stop administering it.On further review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the taxpayers had standing because any illegal expenditure of public funds creates taxpayer injury. The court also held that the grant program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It found that neither promoting diversity nor equalizing educational opportunity for certain groups was a sufficiently compelling interest under current law, and that the means chosen were not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the Court of Appeals and enjoined HEAB from operating the program. View "Rabiebna v. Higher Educational Aids Board" on Justia Law

Nathan was emergently detained and subsequently subjected to involuntary commitment proceedings under Wisconsin law after reporting auditory hallucinations that suggested self-harm. During the circuit court hearings, Nathan’s counsel indicated that Nathan was not contesting the commitment or involuntary medication orders, and the court accepted this stipulation after some discussion on the record. Nathan expressed a desire for release but ultimately agreed to the commitment, particularly after assurances regarding his likely discharge timeline.Following entry of the six-month commitment and involuntary medication orders by the Sheboygan County Circuit Court, Nathan filed a post-disposition motion arguing his due process rights were violated because the court did not conduct a colloquy to ensure his stipulation was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The circuit court denied this motion. Nathan appealed both the entry of the orders and the denial of his post-disposition motion. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s orders.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether constitutional due process requires a circuit court to conduct a colloquy before accepting a stipulation to orders for commitment and involuntary medication. The Court held that due process does not require such a colloquy in this context. The absence of a colloquy is not a structural constitutional error; rather, a due process violation would arise only if a waiver of fundamental rights was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Because Nathan did not otherwise challenge the validity of his waiver, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. View "Sheboygan County v. N. A. L." on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute granting immunity to health care providers from civil liability for certain acts or omissions occurring between March 12, 2020, and July 11, 2020. Savannah Wren, whose pregnancy was considered high risk, experienced the stillbirth of her child after multiple visits to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital. She alleged negligent care and subsequently filed suit for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and associated medical professionals.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the immunity provided by WIS. STAT. § 895.4801. Wren challenged the statute’s constitutionality on several grounds, including vagueness, overbreadth, and violations of her rights to redress, jury trial, due process, and equal protection. The circuit court struck her supplemental equal protection claim and ultimately dismissed her complaint with prejudice, finding the statute constitutional.Upon appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. It held that § 895.4801 was facially unconstitutional because it deprived litigants of their right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed only whether § 895.4801 facially violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that because the legislature has the authority to abrogate or suspend common law causes of action under Article XIV, Section 13, and because the statute eliminated Wren’s causes of action during the specified period, her right to a jury trial did not attach. The court concluded that § 895.4801 does not implicate the constitutional jury trial right, reversed the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved issues. View "Wren v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital Milwaukee, Inc." on Justia Law

A 12-year-old seventh-grade student was accused by a classmate of inappropriate touching at school. The following day, two police officers, neither previously known to the student, removed him from class for questioning. The first interrogation took place in a small, closed office used by the school resource officer, with one officer questioning the child and another, fully uniformed and armed, standing in front of the door. No Miranda warnings were given, and the student was not told he could leave, refuse to answer, or contact his parents. He eventually admitted that he may have accidentally touched the other student. Less than an hour later, questioning continued in a school suspension cubicle, where multiple authority figures, including the officers and an assistant principal, stood around him and asked more direct questions, resulting in a similar admission.The State charged the student with Fourth Degree Sexual Assault. Before trial in the Manitowoc County Circuit Court, the student sought to suppress his statements to law enforcement, arguing violations of Miranda v. Arizona and involuntariness. The circuit court denied suppression, finding the interrogations non-custodial and voluntary. After a bench trial, the court adjudicated the student delinquent. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Miranda did not apply because the student was not in custody and that his statements were voluntary.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It concluded that the student was in custody for Miranda purposes during both interrogations and that the lack of Miranda warnings rendered his statements inadmissible. However, the court found that admitting the statements was harmless error: the essential evidence was provided by other witnesses, and the statements were not crucial to the finding of delinquency. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. K. R. C." on Justia Law

A young man, referred to as Jared, was charged with battery to a law enforcement officer after an incident in which he threatened his family and police, and struck an officer. Following his arrest, concerns about Jared’s mental health led to a competency evaluation. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incompetent to stand trial. While initially taking prescribed medication inconsistently in jail, Jared later refused medication in a mental health institution, resulting in disruptive and aggressive behavior. The State, through a Department of Health Services doctor, sought and obtained a Milwaukee County Circuit Court order for involuntary medication to restore Jared’s competency for trial.On appeal, Jared challenged the involuntary medication order, arguing that neither the statutory requirements under Wisconsin law nor the constitutional standards articulated in Sell v. United States were met. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, finding the circuit court’s findings on both the statutory and Sell factors clearly erroneous and concluding that the State had not sufficiently established any of the four Sell factors necessary for involuntary medication.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case to clarify the standard of appellate review for each of the Sell factors and to determine whether the circuit court’s application of those factors and the statutory requirements was correct. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether an important governmental interest exists (Sell factor one) is reviewed de novo, while the remaining three Sell factors (significant furtherance of the interest, necessity, and medical appropriateness) are findings of fact reviewed for clear error. The Supreme Court found that the State’s interest in prosecuting Jared was important and not sufficiently diminished by special circumstances. It further held that the lower court’s findings on the remaining Sell factors and the statutory requirements were not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the circuit court’s order for involuntary medication. View "State v. J. D. B." on Justia Law

A digital service provider scanned a user’s online photo storage account for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) as part of its ongoing content moderation efforts. After the system flagged several files, an employee at the company reviewed and confirmed they were CSAM. The provider then generated a report to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, supplying the files and information linking them to a specific user. Law enforcement traced the report to a residence, viewed the flagged files without a warrant, and subsequently obtained a warrant to search the home, where additional CSAM was found on the user’s device.The Jefferson County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the technology company acted on its own initiative and was not functioning as an agent or instrument of the government. The court held there was no Fourth Amendment violation and found that the defendant had not established that the company was acting on behalf of law enforcement. The defendant pleaded guilty and appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, requesting clarification on whether the provider’s search was private or governmental and whether a search warrant was required for police review of the flagged files.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the provider acted as a private actor when it scanned and reviewed the files, and not as an agent of the government. Therefore, the provider’s actions did not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. The Court further ruled that law enforcement’s review of the files did not constitute a new “search” under the Fourth Amendment, as it merely replicated the provider’s actions and did not exceed their scope. The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Sharak" on Justia Law

Law enforcement charged the defendant with multiple counts of possession of child sexual abuse material and child exploitation after content was discovered on his cell phone. The investigation began when Snapchat’s automated hash-based scanning program flagged a 16-second video uploaded from the defendant’s account as known child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Snapchat forwarded this video to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which confirmed the file’s hash matched previously identified CSAM but did not view the video itself. NCMEC then sent the report and video to the Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ), where a DOJ analyst first viewed the video without a warrant. Subsequently, local law enforcement also viewed the video without a warrant, obtained account information via subpoena, and secured a search warrant for the defendant’s home and devices, leading to the recovery of additional CSAM.In Waukesha County Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that viewing the video without a warrant constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court granted the motion, finding a legitimate privacy interest in the cell phone and concluding that the private search doctrine was inapplicable because no human at Snapchat had seen the video and the hash algorithm used was allegedly unreliable.The State appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the video due to Snapchat’s policies and the nature of the conduct, and found no Fourth Amendment search occurred.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Snapchat’s automated scan constituted a private search, and that the government’s subsequent viewing of the flagged video did not exceed the scope of that private search. Because any expectation of privacy was frustrated by the private scan and there was virtual certainty regarding the video’s contents, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. The court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of suppression and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Gasper" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of certain Wisconsin statutes that grant the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the power to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules. The Governor and other petitioners argue that these statutes amount to unconstitutional legislative vetoes, as they allow JCRAR to halt the implementation of rules without passing legislation. The Legislature contends that these statutes are permissible extensions of legislative power, maintaining that rulemaking must remain subordinate to the legislature.The lower courts had previously upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions. In Martinez v. DILHR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a three-month rule suspension by JCRAR did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. This reasoning was later extended in SEIU, where the court upheld the multiple suspension provision, allowing JCRAR to suspend rules repeatedly.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, adopted the reasoning from Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which requires bicameralism and presentment when legislative action alters the legal rights and duties of others outside the legislative branch. Applying this standard, the court found that the challenged statutes empower JCRAR to take actions that alter the legal rights and duties of the executive branch and the people of Wisconsin without requiring bicameralism and presentment. Consequently, the court held that the statutes WIS. STAT. §§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm), and 227.26(2)(d), (im) facially violate the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and are therefore unconstitutional. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law