Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason Goss was pulled over for a traffic stop, after which the officer discovered that Goss had a revoked license and, due to four prior drunk driving convictions, was subject to a .02 prohibited alcohol content (PAC) standard. While arresting Goss for the license offense, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol and asked Goss to provide a breath sample for a preliminary breath test (PBT). Goss was subsequently convicted for fifth offense drunk driving. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the officer's request for a PBT sample was made in violation of Wis. Stat. 343.303, which states that such requests may be made only where there is probable cause to believe the driver is operating a vehicle in violation of one of the statutes related to drunk driving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, where Goss was known to be subject to a .02 PAC standard, the officer knew it would take very little alcohol for Goss to exceed that limit, and the officer smelled alcohol on Goss, there was probable cause to request a PBT breath sample. View "State v. Goss" on Justia Law

A jury convicted David Domke of repeatedly sexually assaulting his ten-year-old stepdaughter. Domke moved for postconviction relief and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion after concluding that while Domke had shown that counsel had performed deficiently, Domke had failed to show that the deficient performance had prejudiced him. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Domke had established cumulative prejudice from three instances of deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction, holding (1) Domke was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel because, although counsel performed deficiently in three aspects during trial, those errors did not prejudice Domke; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances, Domke received a fair trial. View "State v. Domke" on Justia Law

In 1997, a jury found that Edwin West was a sexually violent person. West was committed under Wis. Stat. 980.08(1), which allows persons committed under chapter 980 to petition for supervised release into the community. In 2005, the legislature amended the statute, removing language that allocated the burden of proof to the State to prove that supervised release was not warranted. In 2008, West filed a motion with the circuit court to interpret whether the amended statute continued to allocate the burden on the State. The circuit court denied West's motion, finding that the amendments unambiguously placed the burden of proof with the committed individual. West appealed, arguing that the burden of proof did not rest with the committed person, and if it did, such allocation would violate due process and equal protection. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute unambiguously places the burden of proof with the committed individual, and the appropriate burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence; and (2) this allocation does not violate due process and equal protection. View "State v. West" on Justia Law

In 2001, Glen Nordberg was committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. 980. Subsequently, Nordberg submitted several petitions for supervised release or discharge, including a petition in 2009 from which this appeal stemmed. The circuit court denied Nordberg's petition after reading Wis. Stat. 980.08(4)(cg) as placing the burden on the committed individual to prove by clear and convincing evidence that supervised release is warranted and finding that Nordberg had not met that burden. Nordberg filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the statute does not allocate the burden of proof to any party, and if the burden were on the individual, a clear and convincing evidence standard would be too onerous. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that (1) Wis. Stat. 980.08(4) unambiguously places the burden of proof on the committed individual, and policy considerations dictate that the individual bear his burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) requiring an individual lawfully committed under chapter 980 to carry the burden of proof in a petition for supervised release does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Nordberg" on Justia Law

David Balliette was convicted of, inter alia, homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. Balliette filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising four claims, including two for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied all four postconviction claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. Balliette then filed a motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for counsel's failure to raise certain claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, holding Balliette had made merely conclusory allegations and did not provide a sufficient reason for raising the claim now rather than previously, and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, ruling that Balliette's motion alleged sufficient material facts that, if true, would warrant relief, and concluding that Balliette alleged a sufficient reason for not previously raising the claim. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Balliette was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the allegations in his motion for a new trial did not provide sufficient material facts that, if proven, demonstrated an entitlement to the relief sought. View "State v. Balliette" on Justia Law

In this case, the court of appeals reversed Defendant Olu Rhodes's conviction of first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree recklessly endangering safety. Defendant had argued that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to confront a witness when it cut off his cross-examination of a prosecution witness, Defendant's sister, Nari. Defendant's cross-examination sought to cast doubt on the State's theory of the motive in the case, that Rhodes had killed the victim because the victim was responsible for Nari being beaten the day before the shooting of the homicide victim. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court reasonably limited Defendant's cross-examination of his sister about incidents of domestic abuse against her by the victim of the homicide to avoid confusing the issues and misleading the jury. This limitation did not prevent Defendant from presenting evidence to rebut the State's theory of Defendant's motive for the crime and to make that argument in closing. Remanded. View "State v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Rickey Denson was found guilty of recklessly endangering safety as a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and false imprisonment. Denson moved the circuit court for a judgment acquitting him of the charges or, alternatively, an order granting him a new trial on the grounds that the circuit court failed to engage him in an on-the-record colloquy regarding his right not to testify. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Denson's postconviction motion, concluding that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to determine whether a defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify; (2) once a defendant properly raises in a postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the right not to testify, an evidentiary hearing is an appropriate remedy to ensure the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify; and (3) the circuit court properly concluded that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify. View "State v. Denson" on Justia Law

After Dimitri Henley was convicted of five counts of second degree sexual assault, Henley made several attempts to seek a new trial. Henley also moved Justice Roggensack to recuse herself from the review of his case. Roggensack denied the motion. The current appeal involved a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decision reversing the circuit court's order granting Henley a new trial. Henley argued that by denying him a new trial and by providing no court procedures for reviewing Justice Roggensack's decision not to recuse, the Court denied Henley's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the motion for reconsideration met none of the criteria for granting a motion for reconsideration and was therefore denied; (2) determining whether to recuse is the sole responsibility of the individual justice for whom disqualification from participation is sought; (3) a majority of the Court does not have the power to disqualify a judicial peer from performing the constitutional functions of a Supreme Court justice on a case-by-case basis; and (4) Henley received due process. View "State v. Henley" on Justia Law

Defendant Esteban Gonzales was convicted of exposing a child to harmful material. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant had shown there was a reasonable likelihood that a jury instruction misled the jury into believing that the State did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) that the jury was not instructed that it had to determine whether Defendant had knowingly exhibited the harmful material to the child, as distinguished from accidentally or unknowingly exhibiting harmful material to the child; and (2) Defendant established a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, David Funk was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault. The circuit court vacated the jury verdict and ordered a new trial based on its post-trial discovery that one juror had not revealed during voir dire that she had been a victim of two prior incidents of sexual assault, finding that these experiences made the juror biased against Funk and deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction, concluding (1) the circuit court's finding that the juror was subjectively biased against Funk was unsupported by facts of record and was clearly erroneous; and (2) the circuit court's conclusion that the juror was objectively biased was erroneous because the facts necessary to ground a court's reasonable legal conclusion that a reasonable person in the juror's position could not be impartial were not developed in this case. View "State v. Funk" on Justia Law