Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to two felonies. The Department of Corrections prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) to assist in Defendant's sentencing, but when the circuit court and the parties received the PSI, Defendant disputed some of the information in the report. The circuit court judge ordered that a second PSI be prepared omitting the disputed information and that the first PSI be destroyed. The judge's successor modified the destruction order after Defendant was sentenced, ordering that the first PSI be sealed rather than destroyed because he questioned the court's authority to order the destruction of PSIs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts do not have either express or implied statutory authority to order the destruction of PSIs; and (2) courts lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of PSIs on the facts before the Court because that power is not necessary to a court's administration of justice. View "State v. Melton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant had previously entered pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect but later withdrew the not guilty pleas as part of a plea agreement. After he was sentenced, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error because he was not informed about the possibility of a bifurcated plea with the right to a jury trial focused on the issue of his mental responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim alleging ineffective assistance was insufficient, as Defendant never alleged (i) his trial counsel failed to inform him that he had the option of pleading guilty to the crimes but also not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or (ii) if trial counsel had informed him of the option of a trial focused solely upon mental responsibility, he would have chosen that option; and (2) Defendant's second claim was also insufficient because Defendant failed to state that, due to a defect in the plea colloquy, he did not enter his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a minor diagnosed with aplastic anemia. Petitioner opposed any life-saving blood transfusions on religious grounds. Petitioner's parents supported her position. The circuit court ultimately appointed a temporary guardian for the purpose of deciding whether to consent to medical treatment. While Petitioner's appeal was pending, the order appointing the temporary guardian expired. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal, finding that the issues presented were moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issues presented in this case were moot; and (2) it was unwise to address the moot issues because the legislature was far better able to decide substantial social policy issues such as those presented in this case. View "In re Sheila W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of stalking, bail jumping, and violating a harassment injunction. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to use certain fingerprint evidence and related testimony in rebuttal, which the court had previously excluded from the State's case-in-chief due to a discovery violation; and (2) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because, he claimed, one of the jurors was sleeping during a portion of defense counsel's closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly exercised its discretion in permitting the rebuttal use of the fingerprint evidence and related testimony; and (2) did not clearly err in finding that the juror was not sleeping and in therefore concluding that Defendant failed to establish a finding necessary to his contention. View "State v. Novy" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers installed a GPS device on Defendant's vehicle and monitored the vehicle pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on witness reports that a car matching the description of Defendant's vehicle had been seen at the locations of recent burglaries in the area. The device was installed after officers lawfully stopped Defendant and his co-defendant in the suspect vehicle. The officers then moved the vehicle to another location where the GPS device could be installed. Only days later, Defendant was arrested and charged with fourteen criminal counts. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained through the use of the GPS device on the ground that the evidence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Defendant then pled guilty to some counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's suppression motion, holding (1) the three-hour seizure of Defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause and was thus constitutionally permissible; and (2) the technology used in conducing the GPS search did not exceed the scope of the warrant allowing GPS tracking of Defendant's vehicle. View "State v. Brereton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content, fourth offense. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his suppression motion and collaterally attacking a prior conviction as the result of an invalid waiver to the right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress, as the law enforcement officers' warrantless search of Defendant's bedroom was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) despite a technically deficient plea colloquy, Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before he pleaded not contest to his second operating a motor vehicle under the influence offense in 1998, and thus the circuit court properly denied the collateral attack of his earlier conviction and thus properly considered the 1998 conviction in determining that Defendant had three prior relevant convictions. View "City of Menasha v. Gracia" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of robbery, party to a crime. Twelve years later, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and in the interest of justice. Defendant's arguments stemmed from new expert analysis of a video of one of the robberies. By applying new technology - digital photogrammetry - one expert concluded that Defendant was too tall to be the robber in the video. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial based on the photogrammetry evidence and in the interest of justice because the jury was precluded from hearing photogrammetry evidence, and therefore, the real controversy was not fully tried. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was not a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the evidence presented at trial and the new digital photogrammetry evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the controversy was fully tried even though the jury did not hear the photogrammetry evidence. View "State v. Avery" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault of a child. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during an undisputedly non-custodial interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. The circuit court found Defendant's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and allowed admission of the statements at trial. Defendant then testified at trial and was convicted. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the statements were involuntary and were thus improperly admitted. The court of appeals assumed the statements were involuntary but held that, in light of the other evidence produced at trial, the admission of the statements was harmless error. The Supreme Court affirmed but under a different analysis, holding that the admission of Defendant's statements at trial was not error because, under the totality of the circumstances, the statements were voluntary. View "State v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to three felonies on the morning of a scheduled trial in which he was facing six felony charges. As part of the plea bargain, the State agreed to dismiss three felony charges, but there was no agreement that the dismissed charges would be "read-in" under Wis. Stat. 973.20(1g)(b). At sentencing, the circuit court explicitly considered the dismissed charges in explaining and imposing Defendant's sentence. Defendant subsequently challenged the validity of the sentence. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion for resentencing, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a circuit court may consider dismissed charges in imposing sentence; (2) the circuit court here did not use the dismissed charges for an improper purpose; and (3) Defendant had adequate opportunity to refute the purported inaccuracies of the facts underlying the dismissed charges. View "State v. Frey" on Justia Law

The circuit court suppressed an incriminating statement that Defendant made to police during custodial interrogation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though Defendant invoked his right to counsel during questioning, he later initiated conversation with his police interrogator and thereafter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before making the incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his equivalent right under the Wisconsin Constitution were not violated, as Defendant withdrew his request for an attorney by voluntarily initiating a request to resume the questioning; and (2) the court of appeals was not required to disregard State v. Middleton, but Middleton was factually distinguishable from this case and was now overruled in its entirety. View "State v. Stevens" on Justia Law