Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Madison Teachers, Inc. and Public Employees Local 61 sued Governor Walker and three commissioners of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission challenging several provisions of Act 10, a budget repair bill that significantly altered Wisconsin’s public employee labor laws. Plaintiffs (1) alleged that certain aspects of Act 10 violate the constitutional associational and equal protection rights of the employees they represent; and (2) challenged Wis. Stat. 62.623, a separate provision created by Act 10, as a violation of the home rule amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution, and argued, in the alternative, that section 62.623 violates the constitutionally protected right of parties to contract with each other. The circuit court invalidated several provisions of Act 10, including the collective bargaining limitations, annual recertification requirements, and the prohibitions of fair share agreements and on payroll deductions of labor organization dues. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld Act 10 in its entirety, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ associational rights argument is without merit; (2) Act 10 survives Plainiffs’ equal protection challenge under rational basis review; (3) Plaintiffs’ home rule amendment argument fails because section 62.623 primarily concerns a matter of statewide concern; and (4) Plaintiffs’ Contract Clause claim fails. View "Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to first-degree reckless homicide. At issue on appeal was whether law enforcement officers (1) violated Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights by contacting Appellant’s cell phone provider to obtain Appellant’s cell phone location information without first securing a court order; and (2) violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when they continued to interview him after he asked how he could get an attorney. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. While the Court was deeply divided on the issues presented in this case, the lead opinion contained the following conclusions: (1) assuming without deciding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location data and that police conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when they track a cell phone’s location, and assuming there was a search in this case, police did have probable cause for a warrant, and the exigent circumstances of this case created an exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Appellant in this case failed to unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when officers continued to question Appellant after he asked how he could get an attorney. View "State v. Subdiaz-Osorio" on Justia Law

Law enforcement obtained evidence by tracking Appellant’s cell phone using cell site location information and a stingray. Before tracking Appellant’s cell phone, law enforcement obtained an order approving the procedures used to track Appellant’s cell phone. Appellant pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide. Appellant then appealed the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing (1) law enforcement violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches; and (2) the order authorizing the tracking of his cell phone required statutory authority, which the court lacked. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) assuming that law enforcement’s activities constituted a search, the search was reasonable because it was executed pursuant to an order that met the Fourth Amendment’s requirements; and (2) specific statutory authorization was not necessary for the circuit court judge to issue the order that authorized the tracking of Appellant’s cell phone through cell site information and a stingray because the order was supported by probable cause. View "State v. Tate" on Justia Law

In these two cases, State v. Cummings and State v. Smith, the court of appeals affirmed the orders of the circuit courts denying Defendants’ motions to suppress. Defendants appealed, contending that they unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent prior to making incriminating statements to the police, and therefore, their statements should have been suppressed. Cummings argued separately that his sentence was unduly harsh. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in both cases, holding (1) neither Cummings nor Smith unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent during their interrogations, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied each Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) Cummings’ sentence was not unduly harsh. View "State v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to first-degree sexual assault of a child. Thereafter, Defendant filed three postconviction motions for relief. The third postconviction motion was brought under Wis. Stat. 974.06 and alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise a strong argument for plea withdrawal. The circuit court denied Defendant’s section 974.06 motion because it did not demonstrate why postconviction counsel was ineffective. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant who alleges in a section 974.06 motion that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring certain viable claims must demonstrate that the claims he wishes to bring are clearly stronger than the claims postconviction counsel actually brought; (2) because Defendant did not offer a sufficient reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise his section 974.06 claim in his second postconviction motion, Defendant’s section 974.06 claim was barred; and (3) even if the section 974.06 motion was not barred, the motion did not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle Defendant to relief. View "State v. Romero-Georgana" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window constitutes a “seizure.” Defendant argued that he was seized when a sheriff’s deputy knocked on the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle and asked Defendant to roll down the window. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he rolled down the window and was subsequently found guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that “when a uniformed officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free to ignore the officer.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officer did not show a level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Defendant rolled down his window and exposed the grounds for the seizure. View "County of Grant v. Vogt" on Justia Law

Circuit Judge Richard J. Nuss presided over two jury trials, State v. Pinno and State v. Seaton. In both voir dire proceedings, Judge Nuss asked the public to leave the courtroom to make room for large jury panels. Defendants were subsequently convicted after jury trials open to the public. Defendants filed postconviction motions, alleging violations to their right to a public trial. Judge Nuss denied all postconviction motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire, and a judge’s decision to close or limit public access to a courtroom in a criminal case requires the analysis set forth in Waller v. Georgia; (2) the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial may be asserted by the defendant at any time during a trial; (3) because neither Defendant in this case objected to the alleged courtroom closure, Defendants both forfeited their rights to a public trial; (4) defendants must demonstrate prejudice to prove ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to object to the closure of the courtroom, and Defendants in this case failed to prove that their counsel was ineffective; and (5) Seaton was not denied his right to an impartial judge. View "State v. Seaton" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police officers after the officers observed an unlit light bulb in the vehicle’s tail lamp. The officers searched the vehicle during the stop and discovered a gun. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant then sought an order vacating his conviction and guilty plea and suppressing all evidence seized during the stop, contending that the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion. At issue on appeal was whether Wis. Stat. 347.13(1) requires every single light bulb in a tail lamp to be lit. The court of appeals reversed, concluding a vehicle’s tail lamps do not need to be fully lit or in perfect condition to be in good working order. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 347.13(1) requires only that “a tail lamp emit a red light visible from 500 feet behind the vehicle during hours of darkness”; and (2) because the only basis for the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was the unlit bulb, the stop was unconstitutional, and so too was the search of the vehicle. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child. At trial, Defendant told the court that she wanted to testify to “tell what actually happened. The circuit court concluded that Defendant was not “intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against self-incrimination” and refused to allow Defendant to testify. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional rights and that she was automatically entitled to a new trial because the denial of a defendant’s right to testify is not subject to harmless error review. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to testify but argued that harmless error review applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the harmless error doctrine applies to the denial of a defendant’s right to testify; and (2) given the nature of Defendant’s defense and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant’s conviction for possession of a narcotic arose from a warrantless search of his briefcase. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for equipment violations. When the officer asked if he could search the car the driver gave his consent. When the officer discovered the briefcase, Defendant said, “Got a warrant for that?” Defendant argued that, with this question, he asserted ownership of the briefcase and withdrew the driver’s consent. The Supreme Court held that the search of the briefcase was reasonable under the circumstances, as (1) Defendant did not effectively withdraw the driver’s consent by asking “Got a warrant for that?”; and (2) police officers confronted with ambiguous statements are not under a duty to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity. View "State v. Wantland" on Justia Law