Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves M.A.C., a homeless individual with mental health disorders, who was involuntarily committed in Waukesha County in 2020. In 2022, the County sought to extend M.A.C.'s commitment. However, M.A.C. was not present at the recommitment hearing, and her appointed counsel had been unable to contact her. The circuit court found M.A.C. in default and ordered her to be recommitted and involuntarily medicated. M.A.C. appealed, challenging the recommitment and involuntary medication orders on three grounds: lack of individual notice of the hearings, the unavailability of default judgment in such hearings, and insufficient evidence for her involuntary medication.The case was initially reviewed by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's orders. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on a previous case, Waukesha County v. S.L.L., to uphold the circuit court's decisions. M.A.C. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that under Wisconsin statutes, a subject individual is entitled to notice of recommitment and involuntary medication hearings, and providing notice to counsel only is not sufficient. The court also held that default judgment is not available for recommitment or involuntary medication hearings under Wisconsin statutes. Finally, the court found that the County failed to provide sufficient evidence for M.A.C.'s involuntary medication. The court overruled the contrary holdings of the S.L.L. case. View "Waukesha County v. M.A.C." on Justia Law

The case involves a harassment injunction issued against Brian Aish, an anti-abortion protestor, for statements he made to Nancy Kindschy, a nurse practitioner at a family planning clinic. Aish regularly protested outside the clinics where Kindschy worked, initially expressing his Christian and anti-abortion beliefs broadly. However, in 2019, Aish began directing his comments towards Kindschy, which she perceived as threatening. Kindschy petitioned for a harassment injunction under Wisconsin law, which allows for an injunction if there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner."The circuit court heard two days of testimony and found that Aish's statements were intimidating and did not serve a legitimate purpose. The court issued a four-year injunction prohibiting Aish from speaking to Kindschy or going to her residence or any other premises temporarily occupied by her. Aish appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the injunction. The court concluded that the injunction was a content-based restriction on Aish's speech and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The court held that the injunction failed to satisfy either of the two standards required for such a restriction to comply with the First Amendment: (1) Aish's statements were not "true threats" and he did not "consciously disregard a substantial risk that his statements would be viewed as threatening violence," or (2) the injunction did not satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. View "Kindschy v. Aish" on Justia Law

The case involves Erik A. Andrade, a former Milwaukee Police Officer, who was terminated for a series of posts and comments he made on Facebook. The posts attracted significant local and national attention following a civil rights lawsuit that brought them to light. The Milwaukee Police Department conducted an internal investigation into the posts, informed Andrade of the policies he potentially violated, and scheduled an interview. Following the internal investigation, the Department formally charged Andrade with violating two policies, both citing Andrade's posts as the basis for the violations. The Chief of Police, Alfonso Morales, determined his guilt and imposed the appropriate punishment. The Chief had internal affairs reach out to the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, which explained that Andrade's posts would diminish his credibility in court so severely that they would no longer use him as a witness. Given the critical importance of testifying in police work, this fact convinced the Chief that termination was appropriate.The Chief's decision was reviewed by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. After a full evidentiary trial, the Board issued a detailed decision determining that Andrade was guilty of the violations and the punishments he received were appropriate. Andrade then filed two actions in the circuit court. The first was a statutory appeal focused on whether there was just cause to sustain the charges. The second was a petition for a writ of certiorari alleging that the Board committed legal and jurisdictional errors. The circuit court upheld the Board's decision, Andrade appealed on his certiorari petition, and the court of appeals affirmed.Before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Andrade challenged his termination on procedural grounds. He contended that it fell short of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. He argued that due process required the Department to explain why Chief Morales terminated him instead of imposing a lesser form of discipline. As such, the Department should have told him that Chief Morales made his decision based on the DA's determination that they would no longer use Andrade as a witness. Andrade insisted that the Department's failure to tell him this prior to termination means he was not given an explanation of the evidence supporting his termination in violation of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with Andrade's claim and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the case against him with prejudice after a mistrial was declared, holding that retrial would not violate Defendant's right against double jeopardy.Defendant was tried on one count of trafficking of a child. During trial, the trial court declared a mistrial on the basis that certain evidence was improperly admitted. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that retrial would violate his right under the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exercised sound discretion in ordering a mistrial based on manifest necessity and that retrial will not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's demand for a jury trial before Walworth County extended his involuntary commitment for twelve additional months, holding that Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 966 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. 2021), applied retroactively to Appellant's case and that the denial of Appellant's jury demand was erroneous.Following a mental health crisis, Appellant was involuntarily committed and forcibly medicated for six months. Walworth County later sought to extend Appellant's commitment for twelve months. Appellant filed a jury demand at least forty-eight hours prior to his rescheduled final hearing date, but the circuit court denied the jury demand as untimely. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided E.J.W., which held that a jury demand is timely filed if it is filed at least forty-eight hours before a rescheduled final hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that E.J.W. applied retroactively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) E.J.W. applies retroactively; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the proper remedy for the circuit court's denial of Appellant's jury demand was not remand but reversal. View "Walworth County v. M.R.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court to suppress the results of a search of Defendant, holding that the law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant, and therefore, the underlying search was a lawful search incident to arrest.A police officer executed a traffic stop of Defendant for speeding and, during her initial contact with Defendant, "detected an odor of raw marijuana." The officer called for back-up, and two officers escorted Defendant out of the vehicle. The officers proceeded to search Defendant based on the odor of marijuana and found two baggies containing cocaine and fentanyl. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that the State lacked probable cause to arrest and search him. The circuit court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant on the belief that he was committing or had committed a crime, and therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that any error during the underlying proceedings that may have violated Defendant's right to confrontation was harmless.Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of delivering more than fifty grams of methamphetamine. In his postconviction petition, Defendant argued that the admission of certain testimony was hearsay, and therefore, his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment was violated. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that if any error occurred it was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, assuming without deciding that Defendant's confrontation right was violated, the error was harmless. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's issuance of an injunction compelling Aurora Health Care, Inc. to administer Ivermectin to Petitioner's uncle (Patient), holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction without analyzing Petitioner's reasonable probability of success on the merits.Patient was in Aurora's care when he tested positive for COVID-19. Petitioner, who held health care power of attorney for Patient, received a prescription for Ivermectin from a retired OB/GYN, but Aurora declined to effect the prescription. Thereafter, Petitioner bright a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court issued an order compelling Aurora immediately to enforce the prescription and administer Ivermectin to Patient. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by issuing the temporary injunction without referencing any basis demonstrating that Petitioner had a reasonable probability of success on the merits of "some type of legal claim." View "Gahl v. Aurora Health Care, Inc." on Justia Law

A fight erupted during a house party; someone fired multiple shots into the bedroom through the door, striking and killing Walker. Police obtained statements from more than 25 individuals. Eyewitness descriptions identified the shooter as a black male who used his right hand, but descriptions were otherwise very inconsistent. After the party, rumors circulated on Facebook accusing Smyth of the shooting. The police later turned their attention to Harris and, ultimately, to Mull, who was identified as the shooter by several witnesses. At Mull’s jury trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses. The defense did not call any witnesses. Convicted of first-degree reckless homicide, Mull was sentenced to 25 years' confinement.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed an order granting Mull a new trial, rejecting Mull’s argument that his attorney was ineffective for "failing to file a third-party perpetrator motion regarding any one of the viable alternate suspects.” Counsel testified he thought a reasonable doubt defense was preferable to a third-party perpetrator defense because it was difficult to locate witnesses, even using an investigator, and that there were credibility issues and inconsistent accounts. Counsel objected to a line of questioning relative to out-of-court messages and attempted to discredit that testimony on cross-examination; he did not move to strike a statement made during cross-examination because he did not want "too much attention." The court concluded that the controversy was fully tried, and it is not probable that justice has miscarried. View "State v. Mull" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for two counts each of second-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault of a child and also reversing the circuit court's order denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief.In his motion for postconviction relief, Defendant argued that the prosecutor at his trial violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by adversely commenting on his decision not to testify. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecutor's argument that the evidence was "uncontroverted" was improper, thus violating Defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor did not comment on Defendant's silence, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion for postconviction relief. View "State v. Hoyle" on Justia Law