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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ in which Defendant argued that an automatic stay in his case began upon the circuit court's entry of a involuntary medication order rather than upon filing a notice of appeal but vacated the circuit court's order for involuntary medication, holding that the order was constitutionally insufficient. The circuit court ordered Defendant to be involuntarily medicated to restore his competency to stand trial on a felony charge. After the Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Scott, 914 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 2018), subjecting involuntary medication orders to an automatic stay pending appeal, the circuit court stayed its involuntary medication order. Defendant petitioned the court of appeals for a supervisory writ and challenged the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 971.14 based on its incompatibility with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals did not err in denying Defendant's petition for a supervisory writ; and (2) the standard for ordering involuntary medication set forth in section 971.14(3)(dm) and (4)(b) is unconstitutional to the extent it requires circuit courts to order involuntary medication based on a standard that does not comport with Sell. View "State v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting Waukesha County's motion to dismiss the appeal brought by Ms. L. challenging the circuit court's judgment extending Ms. L's commitment, holding that all three issues brought by Ms. L. on appeal were moot but that the Court would address two of those three issues. Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court still had personal jurisdiction over Ms. L. when it conducted the extension hearing and entered the extension order, and the County's notice did not fail any due process requirements; (2) the circuit court properly entered default against Ms. L. for failing to appear at an extension hearing; and (3) Ms. L.'s issue that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's entry of the extension order was moot. View "Waukesha County v. S.L.L." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, a medical doctor, on Plaintiffs' claim that Defendant negligently failed diagnose Plaintiff with cancer and violated Plaintiff's right to informed consent, holding that Wisconsin's borrowing statute did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claim. In his motion for summary judgment Defendant argued that Plaintiffs' claims were foreign causes of action pursuant to the borrowing statute, Wis. Stat. 893.07, and therefore, Michigan's statute of limitations applied to Plaintiffs' claims rendering their claims untimely. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, applying the Michigan statute of limitations to both of Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because Plaintiff's place of first injury was unknowable, Wisconsin's borrowing statute did not apply; and (2) Plaintiffs' informed consent claim was "foreign" for purposes of Wisconsin's borrowing statute, and therefore, that claim was untimely. View "Paynter v. ProAssurance Wisconsin Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, holding that Wis. Stat. 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) identifies alternative means of committing one element of the crime of burglary under section 943.10(1m), and therefore, a unanimous finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to a locational alternative in subsections (a)-(f) is not necessary to convict. Defendants pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and, based on their previous Wisconsin burglary convictions, were classified as armed career criminals and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Before the Seventh Circuit, Defendants asserted that because the locational alternatives in section 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) provide alternative means of committing one element of the crime of burglary, the Wisconsin burglary statute was too broad to fall within the definition of burglary as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA. The Seventh Circuit then certified a question of Wisconsin state law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that the legislature intended that section 943.10(1m)(a)-(f) set forth alternative means of committing one element of burglary and not elements of distinct crimes and remanded the cause to the Seventh Circuit. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Appellant's postconviction motion, holding that, as a matter of first impression, Miranda warnings are not required at John Doe proceedings. Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not violated because his John Doe testimony regarding the statement of his estranged wife to police was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; (2) Appellant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of his John Doe testimony because he was not read all of the Miranda warnings failed because the law was unsettled as to whether Miranda warnings were required at the John Doe proceedings; and (3) Miranda warnings are not required at John Doe proceedings. View "State v. Hanson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order that determined that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant-insurance company were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, holding that claim preclusion barred the claims of certain plaintiffs, but the Court was evenly divided as to whether claim preclusion barred the claims brought by a fourth plaintiff. This case arose from a car accident in which a mother and her three daughters were seriously injured. The father was not in the car. The accident resulted in two separate lawsuits. In the first action, the mother brought a negligence claim against the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer, State Farm. The children were also named as plaintiffs. The action settled. The second lawsuit brought by the family, including the father, alleging that the driver of the car in which they were passengers was negligent. Plaintiffs sued the driver's insurer directly. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the action was barred by claim preclusion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held (1) claim preclusion barred the claims brought by the mother and daughters in the second action; but (2) the court of appeals properly allowed the father's claims to proceed. View "Teske v. Wilson Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming a jury verdict convicting Defendant of armed robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent and affirming the denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that the court of appeals properly denied Defendant's appeals. Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant waived his right to object to the use of Wis JI-Criminal 140 by failing to object to its use at the jury instruction and verdict conference; (2) Wis JI-Criminal 140 does not unconstitutionally reduce the State's burden of proof below the reasonable doubt standard; and (3) discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. 751.06 was not warranted under the facts of this case. View "State v. Trammell" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the circuit court's plea colloquy was not defective under Wis. Stat. 971.08 or State v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. 1986). Petitioner argued that the plea colloquy was defective because the circuit court failed sufficiently to explain, and he did not understand, the constitutional rights he would be waiving by entering a plea, and therefore, he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that the plea colloquy was defective so as to entitle him to the relief requested, and this Court declines to exercise its superintending authority to require circuit courts to advise a defendant of each constitutional right being waived by pleading guilty. View "State v. Pegeese" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Hiscox Insurance Company on Leicht Transfer & Storage Company's complaint seeking coverage for its losses under a commercial crime insurance policy issued to it by Hiscox, holding that Leicht's losses were not covered under the policy. Pallet Central Enterprises, Inc. forged delivery tickets and used them to bill Leicht for the sale and delivery of pallets that Pallet Central never sold or delivered. Leicht sought coverage for its losses under the policy issued to it by Hiscox. Hiscox denied coverage. Leicht sued for breach of contract, arguing that the forged delivery tickets comprised "directions to pay" within the meaning of the "forgery or alteration" insuring agreement of the Hiscox policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Hiscox, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the delivery tickets did not qualify as "written...directions to pay a sum certain in money"; and (2) the policy did not provide coverage for forged documents that were not themselves "directions to pay," but which were used as proxies for such documents. View "Leicht Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pallet Central Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals summarily denying as untimely Appellant's petition for habeas corpus seeking reinstatement of his right to file a direct appeal, holding that neither the language of Wis. Stat. 809.51 nor principles of equity require a habeas petitioner to allege timeliness in the petition. Without ordering a response from the State, the court of appeals concluded that Appellant's nine-year delay in filing his petition caused prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), abrogated in part by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 714 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 2006), which imposed a "prompt and speedy" pleading requirement on habeas petitioners, is overruled; (2) any equitable concerns regarding substantial delays, such as the delay in the instant case, are properly raised by the State asserting the defense of laches and establishing prejudice resulting from the delay; and (3) Appellant had a right to have his petition considered without the court of appeals imposing a non-existent timeliness requirement as a basis for denying the petition ex parte. View "State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law