Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The dispute arose when the Wisconsin Attorney General, acting on behalf of the state, deposited “uncommitted” settlement funds—money from civil actions not specifically designated for particular uses—into the state treasury’s general fund and credited them to a Department of Justice program appropriation. The Wisconsin State Legislature argued that these funds must be deposited and also credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund, rather than to any program appropriations, based on their interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 165.10.The Polk County Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment for the Attorney General, finding that § 165.10 only requires settlement funds to be deposited into the general fund and does not address crediting. Because the Attorney General complied with depositing requirements, the court declined to issue further declaratory relief or address crediting under Wis. Stat. § 20.455(3)(g). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 165.10, construed with other statutes, required all uncommitted settlement funds to be deposited into the general purpose revenues fund and remanded with instructions to issue a declaratory judgment to that effect.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the Attorney General complies with Wis. Stat. § 165.10 by depositing settlement funds into the general fund, regardless of whether they are credited to a specific program appropriation within that fund. The Court found that the statute does not impose restrictions on crediting and rejected the conflation of “deposit” and “credit.” The Supreme Court reversed the relevant part of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Regarding the question of whether funds could be credited as “proceeds from services” under Wis. Stat. § 20.455(3)(g), the Supreme Court was too divided to issue a majority mandate and dismissed that issue as improvidently granted. View "Wisconsin State Legislature v. Kaul" on Justia Law

A child born via surrogate suffered a brachial plexus injury during delivery, allegedly caused by shoulder dystocia due to her large size. The physician, who managed the surrogate’s prenatal care and performed the delivery, was accused of failing to disclose certain risks and alternatives—such as the option of cesarean section—to the surrogate and the child’s parents. The child, through a guardian ad litem, and her parents filed suit against the physician and his insurer, raising claims for negligence and for failure to obtain informed consent. Prior to trial, the parents’ claims and those against certain other defendants were dismissed by stipulation. The child’s claim focused on whether the physician had a legal duty to provide information and obtain informed consent regarding her care, as well as the surrogate’s.The Winnebago County Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants on the informed consent claim, finding that only the surrogate was the physician’s patient and that the claim could only be brought through her. The child’s negligence claim proceeded to a jury, which found the physician was not negligent and awarded no damages. The child appealed only the summary judgment dismissal of the informed consent claim, arguing that she independently qualified as a patient entitled to informed consent under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court, seeking clarification on whether an unborn or minor child is a “patient” under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 and entitled to informed consent with an independent right to legal action.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the child was a patient under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 before her birth. The physician owed a duty to obtain informed consent from the surrogate for both herself and the child. Upon being born alive, the child had an independent right to pursue an informed consent claim. The Court reversed the circuit court’s partial summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the child’s informed consent claim. View "Brekke v. Midwest Medical Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A group sought access to certain court forms used to notify election officials when a person under guardianship has been found incompetent to vote. These forms, known as Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms, contain personal information about the individual and details about the court’s finding of incompetency. The group submitted public records requests for completed NVE forms held by the Walworth County register in probate, seeking to identify individuals found incompetent to vote. The requests were denied, and the group filed a mandamus action to compel disclosure.The Walworth County Circuit Court denied the request, holding that NVE forms were confidential under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals initially reversed, but because of a prior, conflicting published appellate decision (Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Reynolds), the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held it was bound by the Reynolds precedent and affirmed the circuit court’s denial.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It clarified the standard for mandamus actions in public records cases, holding that courts should focus solely on whether the requester has a legal right to the records, and not on other traditional mandamus elements. The court concluded that NVE forms are “court records pertinent to the finding of incompetency” and are therefore “closed” under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75, which protects the privacy of individuals in guardianship proceedings. As a result, the forms are exempt from disclosure under the public records law, the group has no legal right to access them, and the writ of mandamus must be denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

James Ropicky and Rebecca Leichtfuss discovered significant water damage in their home after a storm in 2018. They held a homeowner’s insurance policy with Cincinnati Insurance Company, which they believed should cover the loss. Cincinnati investigated and determined that rainwater had entered the home over the years through a construction defect—a gap present since the house was built. The insurer also found that this persistent water intrusion allowed fungi to grow, contributing to the damage. Citing policy exclusions for construction defects and fungi, Cincinnati made partial payments to Ropicky, including the policy’s limit for fungi coverage, but denied the full claim.The Waukesha County Circuit Court granted Cincinnati's motion for summary judgment, concluding the insurer had fulfilled its policy obligations. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, finding that factual disputes remained regarding the cause of the damage and the interpretation of policy provisions, including the construction defect exclusion and the fungi exclusion. The appellate court also provided its own reading of the policy language, leading to further debate about the correct interpretation.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case to clarify how the insurance policy should be interpreted and whether summary judgment was appropriate. The court held that, under the policy, losses caused by rainwater constitute an ensuing loss and are therefore covered despite the construction defect exclusion. It further ruled that the fungi additional coverage provision is an exception to the fungi exclusion, not a separate grant of coverage. The court concluded that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the existence and extent of construction defects and fungi damage, precluding summary judgment. The court affirmed the appellate decision reversing summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including reinstatement of the bad faith claim. View "Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Ropicky" on Justia Law

A 65-year-old man, referred to as Robert, was found by a food delivery worker lying on the floor in his home and subsequently brought to a hospital. The hospital petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and an order for protective placement, citing Robert’s history of stroke, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, and aphasia, along with significant confusion, memory loss, and poor judgment. The circuit court entered orders for guardianship and protective placement, determining that an unlocked unit in a nursing/rehabilitation facility or a community-based residential facility was the least restrictive placement consistent with Robert’s needs. Robert was later transferred to an adult family home.Following an annual review, Robert’s guardian reported that he still met the statutory criteria for protective placement and requested an independent evaluation, modification or termination of the placement, appointment of adversary counsel, and a due process hearing. The Racine County Circuit Court appointed counsel and ordered an independent evaluation. At the hearing, the court credited the psychologist’s testimony regarding Robert’s diagnoses and cognitive impairments, finding that the County had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Robert met the criteria for continued protective placement. Robert appealed, contending that the County failed to establish a substantial risk of harm and the permanency of his disability. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case, holding that Robert’s appeal was not moot because his financial liability for care costs under the 2024 order persisted as a collateral consequence. Applying a mixed standard of review, the court upheld the circuit court’s factual findings as not clearly erroneous and, upon de novo review, concluded there was sufficient evidence to support continuation of protective placement. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Racine County v. R. P. L." on Justia Law

An individual was subject to involuntary civil commitment under Wisconsin law due to findings that he was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. After several recommitments, his case was transferred to a new county when he moved. As his most recent recommitment period approached its end, the county petitioned for another recommitment. At the hearing, the county presented testimony from a social worker and a forensic psychiatrist, both of whom described the individual's mental health history and risks associated with discontinuing medication. The social worker and psychiatrist also submitted written reports containing information based on records and statements from others; the individual's attorney objected to admission of these reports on hearsay grounds, but did not object to the witnesses’ testimony.The Waukesha County Circuit Court found the individual dangerous under relevant statutory standards and granted the recommitment petition, entering an order for a one-year recommitment. The individual appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay and that non-hearsay evidence was insufficient. While the appeal was pending, another recommitment order was entered. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, reasoning that vacating the previous order would have no practical effect, but also opined any errors at the hearing were harmless.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the appeal was not moot because vacating the expired recommitment order could affect collateral consequences, including the individual’s liability for the cost of care and his ability to restore firearm rights. On the merits, the Supreme Court concluded that any error in admitting the objected-to reports was harmless, as the unobjected-to testimony alone strongly supported the circuit court’s finding of dangerousness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal but affirmed the circuit court’s recommitment order. View "Waukesha County v. R. D. T." on Justia Law

A woman, referred to as Naomi, was charged with felony battery by a prisoner after slapping a nurse while incarcerated in the Milwaukee County jail. At her initial court appearance, concerns were raised about her competency to stand trial, and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court ordered a competency evaluation. Upon finding Naomi incompetent but likely to regain competence with treatment, the court committed her to the Department of Health Services (DHS) for treatment. The court originally found her incompetent to refuse medication and, after applying the standards from Sell v. United States, ordered involuntary medication to restore competency. Naomi appealed, and the court stayed the order. Subsequently, after DHS raised concerns about Naomi’s dangerousness, the court vacated its earlier order and issued a new involuntary medication order based solely on Naomi’s dangerousness, relying on WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3.Naomi challenged the legal authority for this order, arguing that someone committed only under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 for competency restoration could not be involuntarily medicated on dangerousness grounds under § 51.61(1)(g)3. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed with Naomi, rejecting the State’s arguments that various statutory and case law authorities permitted the order.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the matter and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize a court to order involuntary medication for an individual committed exclusively under WIS. STAT. § 971.14. The court based its decision on statutory language, context, and history, finding that § 971.14 provides a separate, more stringent process for involuntary medication orders in the context of competency restoration, and that § 51.61(1)(g)3. cannot be used as an alternative basis for such orders. View "State v. N. K. B." on Justia Law

In this case, an individual referred to as Mark was detained following property damage allegations and later underwent an inpatient psychiatric evaluation to assess his competency for trial. As his mental health concerns continued, Outagamie County initiated involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Wisconsin law. After his emergency detention, two examiners were appointed to assess Mark and submit written reports. One examiner’s report was not made accessible to Mark’s counsel until less than 48 hours before the final hearing, because the filing was delayed due to a holiday.The Outagamie County Circuit Court determined that, despite the delayed access to the report by Mark’s counsel, the court retained competency to proceed. Neither party intended to rely on the late report, and Mark’s counsel declined to seek a postponement. The court found the statutory violation did not affect Mark’s substantial rights and entered orders for involuntary commitment and involuntary medication and treatment. Mark appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the failure to provide timely access to the examiner’s report deprived the circuit court of competency.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement for counsel to have access to the examiners’ reports at least 48 hours before the final hearing is not central to Chapter 51’s statutory scheme governing involuntary commitment, and thus, noncompliance does not strip the circuit court of competency. The court further held that any error in failing to meet the 48-hour requirement was subject to harmless error review. Because the delay in access did not affect Mark’s substantial rights or the outcome, the error was harmless. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s orders. View "Outagamie County v. M.J.B." on Justia Law

A group of non-tribal landowners formed an association to regulate the use of parcels in a residential development on land historically belonging to a Native American tribe. After the tribe reacquired several lots through a designated tribal member, the association amended its restrictive covenants to prevent transfer of land to sovereign nations and to block removal of property from county tax rolls. The tribal member purchased multiple lots for the tribe and requested the federal government hold the land in trust. The association then filed suit in state court, seeking to enforce its covenants and prevent the tribe from reacquiring and exempting the land from local control.The Menominee County Circuit Court initially denied the tribe’s motion to dismiss. Later, after reconsideration, the circuit court dismissed the case, finding that federal law preempted the covenants and that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit. The association appealed. While the state appeal was pending, the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior Board of Indian Appeals determined that federal law required acquisition of the lots into trust, and federal court affirmed dismissal of the association’s challenge, citing federal preemption. The association clarified it still sought a declaration on the enforceability of certain covenants.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case following certification from the court of appeals. It held that the tribe’s sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit, finding no congressional abrogation or waiver of immunity. The court also rejected arguments for in rem or immovable property exceptions to tribal immunity and concluded that immunity extended to the tribal member because the tribe was the real party in interest. The judgment of dismissal by the Menominee County Circuit Court was affirmed. View "Legend Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Keshena" on Justia Law

A group of Wisconsin taxpayers challenged a state program that provides need-based college grants to students belonging to specified racial, national origin, ancestry, or alienage groups attending private and technical colleges. The program, administered by the Higher Educational Aids Board (HEAB), was created to address disproportionate attrition rates among certain minority students by offering them financial support. Students who do not fall into the listed preferred groups are categorically ineligible for this aid.The Jefferson County Circuit Court ruled in favor of HEAB, holding that the taxpayers had standing and that the program was constitutional. The court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, finding that fostering diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest and that the program was narrowly tailored to address high attrition rates among minority students. The taxpayers appealed this decision.While the case was on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, which held that achieving diversity in higher education is no longer a compelling interest justifying race-based classifications. Applying this new precedent, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding the program unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and ordering HEAB to stop administering it.On further review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the taxpayers had standing because any illegal expenditure of public funds creates taxpayer injury. The court also held that the grant program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It found that neither promoting diversity nor equalizing educational opportunity for certain groups was a sufficiently compelling interest under current law, and that the means chosen were not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the Court of Appeals and enjoined HEAB from operating the program. View "Rabiebna v. Higher Educational Aids Board" on Justia Law