Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group sought access to certain court forms used to notify election officials when a person under guardianship has been found incompetent to vote. These forms, known as Notice of Voting Eligibility (NVE) forms, contain personal information about the individual and details about the court’s finding of incompetency. The group submitted public records requests for completed NVE forms held by the Walworth County register in probate, seeking to identify individuals found incompetent to vote. The requests were denied, and the group filed a mandamus action to compel disclosure.The Walworth County Circuit Court denied the request, holding that NVE forms were confidential under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals initially reversed, but because of a prior, conflicting published appellate decision (Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Reynolds), the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held it was bound by the Reynolds precedent and affirmed the circuit court’s denial.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It clarified the standard for mandamus actions in public records cases, holding that courts should focus solely on whether the requester has a legal right to the records, and not on other traditional mandamus elements. The court concluded that NVE forms are “court records pertinent to the finding of incompetency” and are therefore “closed” under Wisconsin Statute § 54.75, which protects the privacy of individuals in guardianship proceedings. As a result, the forms are exempt from disclosure under the public records law, the group has no legal right to access them, and the writ of mandamus must be denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord" on Justia Law

James Ropicky and Rebecca Leichtfuss discovered significant water damage in their home after a storm in 2018. They held a homeowner’s insurance policy with Cincinnati Insurance Company, which they believed should cover the loss. Cincinnati investigated and determined that rainwater had entered the home over the years through a construction defect—a gap present since the house was built. The insurer also found that this persistent water intrusion allowed fungi to grow, contributing to the damage. Citing policy exclusions for construction defects and fungi, Cincinnati made partial payments to Ropicky, including the policy’s limit for fungi coverage, but denied the full claim.The Waukesha County Circuit Court granted Cincinnati's motion for summary judgment, concluding the insurer had fulfilled its policy obligations. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, finding that factual disputes remained regarding the cause of the damage and the interpretation of policy provisions, including the construction defect exclusion and the fungi exclusion. The appellate court also provided its own reading of the policy language, leading to further debate about the correct interpretation.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case to clarify how the insurance policy should be interpreted and whether summary judgment was appropriate. The court held that, under the policy, losses caused by rainwater constitute an ensuing loss and are therefore covered despite the construction defect exclusion. It further ruled that the fungi additional coverage provision is an exception to the fungi exclusion, not a separate grant of coverage. The court concluded that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding the existence and extent of construction defects and fungi damage, precluding summary judgment. The court affirmed the appellate decision reversing summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including reinstatement of the bad faith claim. View "Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Ropicky" on Justia Law

A 65-year-old man, referred to as Robert, was found by a food delivery worker lying on the floor in his home and subsequently brought to a hospital. The hospital petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and an order for protective placement, citing Robert’s history of stroke, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, and aphasia, along with significant confusion, memory loss, and poor judgment. The circuit court entered orders for guardianship and protective placement, determining that an unlocked unit in a nursing/rehabilitation facility or a community-based residential facility was the least restrictive placement consistent with Robert’s needs. Robert was later transferred to an adult family home.Following an annual review, Robert’s guardian reported that he still met the statutory criteria for protective placement and requested an independent evaluation, modification or termination of the placement, appointment of adversary counsel, and a due process hearing. The Racine County Circuit Court appointed counsel and ordered an independent evaluation. At the hearing, the court credited the psychologist’s testimony regarding Robert’s diagnoses and cognitive impairments, finding that the County had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Robert met the criteria for continued protective placement. Robert appealed, contending that the County failed to establish a substantial risk of harm and the permanency of his disability. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case, holding that Robert’s appeal was not moot because his financial liability for care costs under the 2024 order persisted as a collateral consequence. Applying a mixed standard of review, the court upheld the circuit court’s factual findings as not clearly erroneous and, upon de novo review, concluded there was sufficient evidence to support continuation of protective placement. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Racine County v. R. P. L." on Justia Law

An individual was subject to involuntary civil commitment under Wisconsin law due to findings that he was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. After several recommitments, his case was transferred to a new county when he moved. As his most recent recommitment period approached its end, the county petitioned for another recommitment. At the hearing, the county presented testimony from a social worker and a forensic psychiatrist, both of whom described the individual's mental health history and risks associated with discontinuing medication. The social worker and psychiatrist also submitted written reports containing information based on records and statements from others; the individual's attorney objected to admission of these reports on hearsay grounds, but did not object to the witnesses’ testimony.The Waukesha County Circuit Court found the individual dangerous under relevant statutory standards and granted the recommitment petition, entering an order for a one-year recommitment. The individual appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay and that non-hearsay evidence was insufficient. While the appeal was pending, another recommitment order was entered. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, reasoning that vacating the previous order would have no practical effect, but also opined any errors at the hearing were harmless.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the appeal was not moot because vacating the expired recommitment order could affect collateral consequences, including the individual’s liability for the cost of care and his ability to restore firearm rights. On the merits, the Supreme Court concluded that any error in admitting the objected-to reports was harmless, as the unobjected-to testimony alone strongly supported the circuit court’s finding of dangerousness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal but affirmed the circuit court’s recommitment order. View "Waukesha County v. R. D. T." on Justia Law

A woman, referred to as Naomi, was charged with felony battery by a prisoner after slapping a nurse while incarcerated in the Milwaukee County jail. At her initial court appearance, concerns were raised about her competency to stand trial, and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court ordered a competency evaluation. Upon finding Naomi incompetent but likely to regain competence with treatment, the court committed her to the Department of Health Services (DHS) for treatment. The court originally found her incompetent to refuse medication and, after applying the standards from Sell v. United States, ordered involuntary medication to restore competency. Naomi appealed, and the court stayed the order. Subsequently, after DHS raised concerns about Naomi’s dangerousness, the court vacated its earlier order and issued a new involuntary medication order based solely on Naomi’s dangerousness, relying on WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3.Naomi challenged the legal authority for this order, arguing that someone committed only under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 for competency restoration could not be involuntarily medicated on dangerousness grounds under § 51.61(1)(g)3. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed with Naomi, rejecting the State’s arguments that various statutory and case law authorities permitted the order.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the matter and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize a court to order involuntary medication for an individual committed exclusively under WIS. STAT. § 971.14. The court based its decision on statutory language, context, and history, finding that § 971.14 provides a separate, more stringent process for involuntary medication orders in the context of competency restoration, and that § 51.61(1)(g)3. cannot be used as an alternative basis for such orders. View "State v. N. K. B." on Justia Law

In this case, an individual referred to as Mark was detained following property damage allegations and later underwent an inpatient psychiatric evaluation to assess his competency for trial. As his mental health concerns continued, Outagamie County initiated involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Wisconsin law. After his emergency detention, two examiners were appointed to assess Mark and submit written reports. One examiner’s report was not made accessible to Mark’s counsel until less than 48 hours before the final hearing, because the filing was delayed due to a holiday.The Outagamie County Circuit Court determined that, despite the delayed access to the report by Mark’s counsel, the court retained competency to proceed. Neither party intended to rely on the late report, and Mark’s counsel declined to seek a postponement. The court found the statutory violation did not affect Mark’s substantial rights and entered orders for involuntary commitment and involuntary medication and treatment. Mark appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the failure to provide timely access to the examiner’s report deprived the circuit court of competency.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement for counsel to have access to the examiners’ reports at least 48 hours before the final hearing is not central to Chapter 51’s statutory scheme governing involuntary commitment, and thus, noncompliance does not strip the circuit court of competency. The court further held that any error in failing to meet the 48-hour requirement was subject to harmless error review. Because the delay in access did not affect Mark’s substantial rights or the outcome, the error was harmless. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s orders. View "Outagamie County v. M.J.B." on Justia Law

A group of non-tribal landowners formed an association to regulate the use of parcels in a residential development on land historically belonging to a Native American tribe. After the tribe reacquired several lots through a designated tribal member, the association amended its restrictive covenants to prevent transfer of land to sovereign nations and to block removal of property from county tax rolls. The tribal member purchased multiple lots for the tribe and requested the federal government hold the land in trust. The association then filed suit in state court, seeking to enforce its covenants and prevent the tribe from reacquiring and exempting the land from local control.The Menominee County Circuit Court initially denied the tribe’s motion to dismiss. Later, after reconsideration, the circuit court dismissed the case, finding that federal law preempted the covenants and that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit. The association appealed. While the state appeal was pending, the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior Board of Indian Appeals determined that federal law required acquisition of the lots into trust, and federal court affirmed dismissal of the association’s challenge, citing federal preemption. The association clarified it still sought a declaration on the enforceability of certain covenants.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case following certification from the court of appeals. It held that the tribe’s sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit, finding no congressional abrogation or waiver of immunity. The court also rejected arguments for in rem or immovable property exceptions to tribal immunity and concluded that immunity extended to the tribal member because the tribe was the real party in interest. The judgment of dismissal by the Menominee County Circuit Court was affirmed. View "Legend Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Keshena" on Justia Law

A group of Wisconsin taxpayers challenged a state program that provides need-based college grants to students belonging to specified racial, national origin, ancestry, or alienage groups attending private and technical colleges. The program, administered by the Higher Educational Aids Board (HEAB), was created to address disproportionate attrition rates among certain minority students by offering them financial support. Students who do not fall into the listed preferred groups are categorically ineligible for this aid.The Jefferson County Circuit Court ruled in favor of HEAB, holding that the taxpayers had standing and that the program was constitutional. The court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, finding that fostering diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest and that the program was narrowly tailored to address high attrition rates among minority students. The taxpayers appealed this decision.While the case was on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, which held that achieving diversity in higher education is no longer a compelling interest justifying race-based classifications. Applying this new precedent, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding the program unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and ordering HEAB to stop administering it.On further review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the taxpayers had standing because any illegal expenditure of public funds creates taxpayer injury. The court also held that the grant program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It found that neither promoting diversity nor equalizing educational opportunity for certain groups was a sufficiently compelling interest under current law, and that the means chosen were not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the Court of Appeals and enjoined HEAB from operating the program. View "Rabiebna v. Higher Educational Aids Board" on Justia Law

A landlord served a residential tenant with an eviction notice for nonpayment of rent during a period when the governor had ordered a temporary ban on such notices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The tenant responded by counterclaiming that the landlord violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA), specifically Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j), which bars attempts to collect a debt under an “agreement to defer payment” when the right to collect does not exist. The tenant also alleged the lease was void under Wis. Stat. § 704.44(10) and Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(10) because it permitted eviction for a crime committed in relation to the property but lacked the required notice of domestic abuse protections.The Marathon County Circuit Court dismissed the landlord’s eviction claim since the notice was issued during the moratorium. The court also held that the WCA did not apply to the lease and found the lease was not void under the cited statutes and regulations, concluding that the tenant was not entitled to damages or attorney fees. The tenant’s attorney was denied intervention for attorney fees but was later allowed to intervene to appeal that issue.The Court of Appeals reversed, holding for the first time that a residential lease with monthly rent payments is a “consumer transaction” and an “agreement to defer payment” under the WCA, and that serving the eviction notice violated the Act. The appellate court also found the lease void for omitting the required domestic abuse notice and allowed recovery of double damages and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the appellate court. It held that a typical residential lease with monthly rent payments is not an “agreement to defer payment” under Wis. Stat. § 427.104, so the WCA does not apply. Even if the lease were void, the tenant showed no pecuniary loss, precluding recovery of damages, costs, or attorney fees under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) or § 425.308(1). View "Koble Investments v. Marquardt" on Justia Law

Nathan was emergently detained and subsequently subjected to involuntary commitment proceedings under Wisconsin law after reporting auditory hallucinations that suggested self-harm. During the circuit court hearings, Nathan’s counsel indicated that Nathan was not contesting the commitment or involuntary medication orders, and the court accepted this stipulation after some discussion on the record. Nathan expressed a desire for release but ultimately agreed to the commitment, particularly after assurances regarding his likely discharge timeline.Following entry of the six-month commitment and involuntary medication orders by the Sheboygan County Circuit Court, Nathan filed a post-disposition motion arguing his due process rights were violated because the court did not conduct a colloquy to ensure his stipulation was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The circuit court denied this motion. Nathan appealed both the entry of the orders and the denial of his post-disposition motion. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s orders.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether constitutional due process requires a circuit court to conduct a colloquy before accepting a stipulation to orders for commitment and involuntary medication. The Court held that due process does not require such a colloquy in this context. The absence of a colloquy is not a structural constitutional error; rather, a due process violation would arise only if a waiver of fundamental rights was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Because Nathan did not otherwise challenge the validity of his waiver, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. View "Sheboygan County v. N. A. L." on Justia Law