Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lauren, a thirteen-year-old girl, alleged that her father, Jobert Molde, sexually assaulted her between January 2011 and January 2012. These allegations surfaced in 2017 after Lauren attempted suicide. Molde was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child under twelve and incest with a child. The key evidence against Molde included Lauren's in-court testimony and a recording of her forensic interview.The Dunn County Circuit Court allowed a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert, but she was unavailable, so Dr. Alice Swenson, a licensed child abuse pediatrician, testified instead. Dr. Swenson supervised Lauren's forensic interview but did not personally evaluate her. During the trial, a juror asked Dr. Swenson about the frequency of false sexual abuse disclosures, to which she responded that false disclosures are extraordinarily rare, around one percent. Molde's counsel did not object to this testimony. The jury found Molde guilty on both counts. Molde then moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to Dr. Swenson's testimony. The circuit court denied the motion.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Dr. Swenson's testimony constituted impermissible vouching and that Molde's attorney was ineffective for not objecting. The state petitioned for review, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted it.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Dr. Swenson's statistical testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule, which prohibits witnesses from vouching for another witness's credibility. The court held that statistical evidence alone about the prevalence of false reporting does not constitute impermissible vouching. Since Dr. Swenson did not opine on Lauren's truthfulness, Molde's counsel was not deficient for failing to object. Therefore, Molde's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed, and the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Molde" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, Kordell L. Grady was charged with multiple criminal offenses. He accepted a plea deal, pleading no contest to three charges. The dispute arose over whether Grady's due process rights were violated during a restitution hearing, where he was ordered to pay for damages caused to a law enforcement vehicle during the chase. Grady's counsel argued he lacked the ability to pay, and Grady, attending via Zoom, interrupted the proceedings. The court allowed him to speak with his attorney but warned that the conversation could be heard by everyone in the courtroom. Grady's statements undermined his counsel's argument, and the court ordered him to pay the full restitution amount.Grady filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his due process rights were violated because he could not consult confidentially with his counsel, and that the Assistant District Attorney improperly used his statements. The circuit court rejected these arguments, finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation to be confidential. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and deferred to the circuit court's factual finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation with his counsel to be confidential. The Supreme Court held that Grady's due process rights were not violated, as he did not seek a confidential conversation. Consequently, his conversation was not privileged under Wisconsin Statute § 905.03(2). The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Grady" on Justia Law

H.C. appealed an order terminating her parental rights, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and public policy require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence, or at least a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the child. H.C.'s son, John, has significant medical and developmental needs, which H.C. failed to address. John was taken into custody at age two after numerous incidents of abuse and neglect. H.C. struggled with addiction, mental health issues, and was often absent from her group home. The State filed a petition to terminate H.C.'s parental rights, citing continuing CHIPS and failure to assume parental responsibility.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court found H.C. unfit and determined that terminating her parental rights was in John's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the circuit court did not err in its discretion. However, the court of appeals also asserted that due process requires the child's best interests to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of proof shared by all parties.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the best interests of the child during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding constitute a discretionary determination by the circuit court, with no burden of proof placed on any party. The court concluded that neither the Due Process Clause nor applicable statutory law imposes a burden of proof during the dispositional phase. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, agreeing that the circuit court committed no error in terminating H.C.'s parental rights but rejected the court of appeals' due process analysis. View "State v. H. C." on Justia Law

Melissa Hubbard sought medical treatment from Dr. Carol Neuman for reproductive health issues and was diagnosed with severe endometriosis. Dr. Neuman advised Hubbard to consider removing her left fallopian tube and ovary, but Hubbard did not consent. Dr. Neuman then referred Hubbard to Dr. Michael McGauley for colon surgery. Hubbard alleges that Dr. Neuman and Dr. McGauley planned the surgery without her knowledge, including a recommendation by Dr. Neuman to remove Hubbard’s ovaries, which Dr. McGauley ultimately did during the surgery.The Rock County Circuit Court denied Dr. Neuman’s motion to dismiss Hubbard’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Dr. Neuman argued that she was not the physician who removed Hubbard’s ovaries and thus not liable under Wisconsin’s informed consent statute, WIS. STAT. § 448.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that Hubbard’s allegations were sufficient to claim that Dr. Neuman was a “physician who treats a patient” under the statute.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Hubbard’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Dr. Neuman was involved in the treatment process, even though she did not perform the surgery herself. The court emphasized that when examining the sufficiency of a complaint, all facts and reasonable inferences must be accepted as true. The court concluded that Hubbard’s allegations, if true, could entitle her to relief under the informed consent statute, thus Dr. Neuman’s motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "Hubbard v. Neuman" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Governor Tony Evers' use of his partial veto authority under the Wisconsin Constitution. The dispute centers on the 2023-25 biennial budget bill, where the governor used his partial veto power to extend an education revenue limit increase from two fiscal years to 402 fiscal years by striking certain words and digits from the bill.The petitioners did not ask the court to overrule existing precedent but instead brought two novel challenges. They argued that the governor's partial vetoes violated Article V, Section 10(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Constitution because extending a duration from two years to 402 years is not a "part" of two years. They also contended that the vetoes violated Section 10(1)(c) because it prohibits the governor from striking digits to create new numbers.The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The court found that the first argument improperly relied on the holding in Citizens Utility Board v. Klauser, which was limited to the specific circumstance of write-in vetoes, not applicable here. The second argument failed because Section 10(1)(c) does not prohibit the governor from striking digits to create new numbers. The court concluded that the 2023 partial vetoes did not violate the constitution and denied the petitioners' requested relief.The court also highlighted potential legislative options to address the governor's partial veto power, including future budget bills, constitutional amendments, and legislative drafting strategies. The court upheld the partial vetoes as consistent with the Wisconsin Constitution. View "LeMieux v. Evers" on Justia Law

Gregory and Jeffrey Cota, employees of the Oconomowoc Area School District, were accused by a coworker of stealing money from the District. An internal investigation by the District was inconclusive, and the case was handed over to the police. The police investigation did not uncover new evidence, but the Cotas were cited for municipal theft. Approximately a year later, the assistant city attorney informed the District that he believed he could obtain a conviction. The next day, the District terminated the Cotas' employment.The Cotas filed claims of arrest-record discrimination under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, alleging that their termination was due to their arrest records. An administrative law judge initially found in favor of the District, but the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) reversed this decision, concluding that the District had engaged in arrest-record discrimination. The circuit court affirmed LIRC's decision, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the Act's definition of "arrest record" did not include non-criminal offenses like municipal theft.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the phrase "any . . . other offense" in the Act's definition of "arrest record" includes non-criminal offenses. The Court found that LIRC's conclusion that the District terminated the Cotas because of their arrest records was supported by substantial evidence. The Court rejected the District's argument that it was protected by the "Onalaska defense," which allows termination based on an internal investigation's findings, because LIRC found that the District relied on arrest-record information. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed, affirming LIRC's decision that the District violated the Act by terminating the Cotas due to their arrest records. View "Oconomowoc Area School District v. Cota" on Justia Law

High school athlete Hayden Halter was ejected from a varsity wrestling meet for unsportsmanlike conduct. The Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA) has a rule requiring an athlete disqualified for unsportsmanlike conduct to serve a suspension at the next competitive event. Halter attempted to serve his suspension at a junior varsity event before the regional tournament, but the WIAA did not agree that this would satisfy the suspension. Halter and his father obtained a temporary restraining order in circuit court, allowing him to participate in regionals and eventually win the state championship. The litigation over his eligibility continued.The Racine County Circuit Court initially granted a temporary restraining order in favor of Halter, allowing him to compete. However, after further hearings, the circuit court ruled in favor of the WIAA. The court of appeals reversed this decision, leading to the WIAA petitioning for review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the WIAA acted reasonably in interpreting and applying its rules. The court found that the WIAA's interpretation of Rule 8(a), which required Halter to serve his suspension at the next varsity event, was reasonable and consistent with the rule's purpose of imposing real punishment for unsportsmanlike conduct. The court also found that the WIAA's appeal process, which did not allow for appeals of sport-specific season regulations, was reasonable and not arbitrary. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, ruling in favor of the WIAA. View "Halter v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association" on Justia Law

Kenneth Brown filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) alleging that the in-person absentee voting procedures in Racine during the August 2022 primary election violated the law. Brown observed voting at City Hall and a local mall and believed the procedures were unlawful. WEC found no probable cause of a violation and declined to take action. Brown then appealed WEC’s decision to the Racine County Circuit Court.The circuit court determined that Brown had standing to bring the action, as the alleged invalid voting procedures impacted his right to vote. The court partially ruled in Brown’s favor, concluding that the Racine City Clerk’s choice of alternate voting sites violated statutory requirements and that the use of a mobile election unit was unlawful. WEC sought to appeal this decision, and the case was brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court via a bypass petition.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed whether Brown had standing to seek judicial review of WEC’s decision. The court interpreted Wisconsin Statute § 5.06(8), which allows for appeals from WEC’s decisions, and determined that to be “aggrieved” by a decision, an individual must suffer an injury to a legally recognized interest. The court found that Brown did not demonstrate any personal injury resulting from WEC’s decision, as he did not allege that the decision made it more difficult for him to vote or affected him personally.The court held that Brown was not “aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute and therefore did not have standing to seek judicial review. Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Brown’s complaint. View "Brown v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) and certain legislators regarding the appointment of a new administrator for WEC. The legislators argued that the term of the current administrator, Meagan Wolfe, expired on July 1, 2023, and that WEC is required to appoint a new administrator. WEC contended that Wolfe could continue to hold over in her position until a new administrator is appointed and confirmed by the Senate.The Dane County Circuit Court granted WEC's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the legislators' motion. The court concluded that WEC does not have a duty to appoint a new administrator simply because the current administrator's term has expired. Instead, WEC is only required to appoint a new administrator if there is a vacancy in the position. The court also issued a permanent injunction preventing the legislators from taking any action contrary to its declarations.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case on bypass. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision in part and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin Statute § 15.61(1)(b)1. specifies that WEC must appoint an administrator by a majority vote of its members and with the Senate's confirmation. However, the statute imposes a duty on WEC to appoint a new administrator only if a vacancy occurs in the position. Since no vacancy existed, WEC did not have a duty to appoint a new administrator to replace Wolfe simply because her term had ended. View "Wisconsin Elections Commission v. LeMahieu" on Justia Law

David Morway sought review of an unpublished order by the court of appeals that dismissed his appeal as untimely. The appeal was against a May 24, 2023, circuit court order denying his motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance. The court of appeals concluded that the order was final for purposes of appeal under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) and dismissed the appeal because David filed his notice of appeal outside the 90-day timeframe.In the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, David and Karen Morway were divorced in 2019, with David ordered to pay spousal maintenance. David filed a motion to modify the maintenance in May 2022 due to a change in his employment circumstances. The family court commissioner reduced David’s maintenance obligation, but Karen appealed. The circuit court held a trial and denied David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance in an oral decision on April 19, 2023, which was later memorialized in the May 24 order. Karen’s post-trial motion for attorney fees based on overtrial was also denied at that time.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the May 24 order was final because it disposed of the entire matter in litigation, specifically David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance. The court held that the order was unambiguous in its finality, despite lacking an explicit finality statement. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that David’s notice of appeal was not timely filed within the 90-day period, and thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Morway v. Morway" on Justia Law