Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Evers v. Marklein
The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of certain Wisconsin statutes that grant the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the power to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules. The Governor and other petitioners argue that these statutes amount to unconstitutional legislative vetoes, as they allow JCRAR to halt the implementation of rules without passing legislation. The Legislature contends that these statutes are permissible extensions of legislative power, maintaining that rulemaking must remain subordinate to the legislature.The lower courts had previously upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions. In Martinez v. DILHR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a three-month rule suspension by JCRAR did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. This reasoning was later extended in SEIU, where the court upheld the multiple suspension provision, allowing JCRAR to suspend rules repeatedly.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, adopted the reasoning from Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which requires bicameralism and presentment when legislative action alters the legal rights and duties of others outside the legislative branch. Applying this standard, the court found that the challenged statutes empower JCRAR to take actions that alter the legal rights and duties of the executive branch and the people of Wisconsin without requiring bicameralism and presentment. Consequently, the court held that the statutes WIS. STAT. §§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm), and 227.26(2)(d), (im) facially violate the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and are therefore unconstitutional. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Department of Corrections v. Hayes
The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) sought to revoke Keyo Sellers's probation based on five alleged violations, including entering K.A.B.'s home without consent, sexual assault, theft, trespassing, and providing false information to his probation agent. Sellers admitted to the fifth violation, and a revocation hearing was held for the remaining allegations. The DOC did not present K.A.B. as a witness, relying instead on her written statement and the testimony of a police officer. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the allegations substantiated and revoked Sellers's probation.Sellers appealed to the Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA) administrator, who reversed the ALJ's decision, citing the reliance on hearsay evidence without good cause to deny Sellers's right to confront adverse witnesses. The administrator found that without K.A.B.'s testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court reversed the administrator's decision, but the Court of Appeals reinstated it, agreeing that the administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence and made according to law.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The court concluded that the administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence, as the non-hearsay evidence presented was not compelling enough to establish the violations. The court also determined that the administrator correctly applied the law by excluding hearsay testimony without a finding of good cause. The decision to not revoke Sellers's probation was affirmed. View "Department of Corrections v. Hayes" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
State v. Stetzer
The defendant endured years of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by her husband. On the night in question, after a violent attack in which her husband threatened her and chased her with a heavy object, she fled their home by car, despite having consumed alcohol earlier. She intended to reach the couple’s lake house, which she considered a safe place. While en route, she passed a police car but did not stop, later explaining that she distrusted the police due to prior negative experiences. She was stopped by police before reaching her destination and was found to have a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. She was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration as a second offense.The Waukesha County Circuit Court conducted a bench trial. The defendant stipulated to her blood alcohol level but raised the statutory coercion defense, arguing that she reasonably believed driving was the only way to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. The circuit court found that the defense applied when she initially fled but concluded that, by the time she passed the police car, she knew other means of safety were available and thus the elements of the defense were no longer met. The court found her guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the circuit court’s finding that her belief in the necessity of continued driving was no longer reasonable once she was out of immediate danger and had other options.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the elements of the coercion defense must be met throughout the entire duration of an ongoing, otherwise-criminal act, not just at its inception. The court also held that a defendant’s personal history can be relevant to the reasonableness of her belief in the necessity of her actions. Finding that the circuit court applied the correct legal standards and that its decision was supported by sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Stetzer" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Kaul v. Urmanski
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law
State v. McAdory
Carl Lee McAdory was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance (OWI) and operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance (RCS) in his blood, both as eighth offenses. A jury found him guilty of both charges. At sentencing, the circuit court dismissed the RCS charge and sentenced McAdory only on the OWI charge.The Court of Appeals later reversed McAdory's OWI conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on the OWI charge. Instead of holding a new trial, the circuit court reinstated the previously dismissed RCS charge and guilty verdict, and sentenced McAdory on the RCS charge.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if the circuit court was permitted to reinstate the RCS charge and guilty verdict. The court held that the circuit court had implicit statutory authority under WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(c) to reinstate the RCS charge and guilty verdict. The court also concluded that the State did not forfeit its right to seek reinstatement by failing to raise the issue in the initial appeal. Additionally, the court found that reinstating the RCS charge did not violate the Court of Appeals' mandate or McAdory's double jeopardy rights.The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, allowing the reinstatement of the RCS charge and guilty verdict. View "State v. McAdory" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
State v. Ramirez
Luis A. Ramirez, an inmate serving a lengthy sentence for felony convictions, attacked a corrections officer with a sharpened pencil. He was charged with battery by a prisoner and disorderly conduct. Due to multiple continuances and rescheduled trial dates, Ramirez was tried and convicted by a jury 46 months after the charges were filed.Ramirez moved for postconviction relief, claiming the delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The postconviction court denied his motion, and Ramirez appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, concluding that Ramirez's right to a speedy trial was violated and ordered the charges dismissed. The State sought review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. The court found that while the 46-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was not long enough to declare prejudice as a matter of law. The reasons for the delay were attributed to neutral factors, such as the orderly administration of justice and the State's negligence, but not deliberate or bad-faith conduct. Ramirez's significant delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial and his failure to demonstrate particularized prejudice weighed against him.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Ramirez's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
The University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority (the Authority) was created by the legislature in 1995 and was initially required to engage in collective bargaining under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act (Peace Act). However, in 2011, Act 10 was signed into law, which removed the Authority from the Peace Act and eliminated its obligation to engage in collective bargaining.After Act 10, the Authority ceased collective bargaining with its employees. In recent years, employees requested the Authority to recognize the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as their collective bargaining agent, which the Authority declined. This led to a Memorandum of Understanding between SEIU and the Authority, and they petitioned the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to determine if the Authority was still required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. WERC concluded that the Authority was no longer required to engage in collective bargaining, citing Act 10's amendments. SEIU sought review in the circuit court, which affirmed WERC's decision. SEIU then appealed, and the Authority filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals, which was granted.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Authority is no longer required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. The court examined the statutory language and history, concluding that Act 10 ended the collective bargaining requirements for the Authority. The decision of WERC and the circuit court was affirmed. View "Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law
Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction
The case involves a dispute between the Wisconsin State Legislature and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) regarding the governor's partial veto power and the allocation of funds for literacy programs. The legislature argued that the governor exceeded his constitutional authority by partially vetoing a bill that was not an appropriation bill. DPI and the governor contended that the legislature's Joint Committee on Finance (JCF) improperly withheld funds appropriated for DPI's literacy programs.The Dane County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in part for each party. The court concluded that the governor did not exceed his constitutional boundaries in partially vetoing the bill and that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI. The court reasoned that the bill in question was an appropriation bill and that the governor's partial veto was valid. However, the court also held that DPI was not entitled to the funds appropriated to JCF.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the governor breached his constitutional boundaries because the bill he partially vetoed was not an appropriation bill. The court reaffirmed the "four corners rule," which requires that an appropriation bill must set aside public funds for a public purpose within its text. The court concluded that the bill in question did not meet this requirement and, therefore, was not subject to the governor's partial veto authority. The court also held that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI, as the funds were lawfully appropriated to JCF. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's summary judgment order. View "Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources
The case involves the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and its application of the Spills Law, which mandates that parties responsible for hazardous substance discharges must notify the DNR and take necessary actions to mitigate environmental harm. The central issue is whether the DNR must promulgate rules identifying specific substances, including PFAS, as hazardous before enforcing the Spills Law.The Waukesha County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. (WMC) and Leather Rich, Inc., holding that the DNR's policies on emerging contaminants like PFAS were invalid unpromulgated rules. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the DNR's statements regarding PFAS and other emerging contaminants as hazardous substances were guidance documents, not rules, and thus did not require rulemaking. The Court also determined that the DNR's interim decision to offer only partial liability exemptions in the Voluntary Party Remediation and Exemption from Liability program was a guidance document. Additionally, the Court found that the DNR's communications did not impose a reporting threshold for PFAS discharges.The Supreme Court concluded that the DNR has broad but explicit authority under the Spills Law to enforce reporting thresholds for hazardous substances without promulgating specific rules. Therefore, the DNR's actions were within its statutory authority, and the decision of the court of appeals was reversed, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the DNR. View "Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
McDaniel v. Department of Corrections
Two corrections officers, Nicole McDaniel and Matthew Davis, filed a class-action lawsuit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC), seeking compensation for time spent in correctional facilities before and after their shifts. They argued that these pre- and post-shift activities, such as passing through security and obtaining equipment, are integral to their principal activities and should be compensable under Wisconsin regulations. The DOC employs approximately 5,000 corrections officers across 37 prisons, all of whom are required to complete these activities, though the specifics and duration may vary.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court certified the class, finding that the plaintiffs made a plausible argument for compensation and met the statutory requirements for class certification, including commonality, typicality, predominance, and superiority. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the class would lose on the merits because the pre- and post-shift activities were not compensable, thus failing the commonality and typicality requirements.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that a court should not consider the merits of the underlying claim when assessing class-certification requirements. The court determined that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in certifying the class. The Supreme Court held that the common question of whether the pre- and post-shift activities are compensable predominates over individual issues and that a class action is a superior method for resolving the controversy. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "McDaniel v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Class Action, Labor & Employment Law