Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After receiving a letter from a debt collector that she believed was misleading and threatening, an individual felt confused and feared potential legal action. She consulted an attorney and then initiated a putative class action lawsuit, seeking damages for herself and similarly situated Wisconsin consumers under both federal and state consumer protection statutes. The alleged violation centered on the misleading nature of the debt collection letter and its implications regarding possible litigation. After some discovery, she elected to pursue monetary damages for a putative class under the Wisconsin Consumer Act and sent the debt collector a statutory notice and demand.In response, the debt collector offered the individual actual damages and the maximum statutory penalty, and promised to cease sending similar collection letters, offering this as “an appropriate remedy.” The individual rejected the offer and moved for class certification. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court granted class certification, reasoning that the statutory provision required an appropriate remedy to be offered to the whole class, not just the named plaintiff. The court concluded that allowing a defendant to “pick off” the class representative would undermine the purpose of class actions under the Wisconsin Consumer Act. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the public policy interests underlying class actions.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. The court held that under Wis. Stat. § 426.110(4)(c), when a customer initiates a class action for damages, the statute requires that an appropriate remedy be given to the party bringing suit—not the putative class—within 30 days after notice. If the party plaintiff receives or is promised an appropriate remedy, a class action for damages cannot be maintained. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gudex v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc." on Justia Law

A young man, referred to as Jared, was charged with battery to a law enforcement officer after an incident in which he threatened his family and police, and struck an officer. Following his arrest, concerns about Jared’s mental health led to a competency evaluation. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incompetent to stand trial. While initially taking prescribed medication inconsistently in jail, Jared later refused medication in a mental health institution, resulting in disruptive and aggressive behavior. The State, through a Department of Health Services doctor, sought and obtained a Milwaukee County Circuit Court order for involuntary medication to restore Jared’s competency for trial.On appeal, Jared challenged the involuntary medication order, arguing that neither the statutory requirements under Wisconsin law nor the constitutional standards articulated in Sell v. United States were met. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, finding the circuit court’s findings on both the statutory and Sell factors clearly erroneous and concluding that the State had not sufficiently established any of the four Sell factors necessary for involuntary medication.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case to clarify the standard of appellate review for each of the Sell factors and to determine whether the circuit court’s application of those factors and the statutory requirements was correct. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether an important governmental interest exists (Sell factor one) is reviewed de novo, while the remaining three Sell factors (significant furtherance of the interest, necessity, and medical appropriateness) are findings of fact reviewed for clear error. The Supreme Court found that the State’s interest in prosecuting Jared was important and not sufficiently diminished by special circumstances. It further held that the lower court’s findings on the remaining Sell factors and the statutory requirements were not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the circuit court’s order for involuntary medication. View "State v. J. D. B." on Justia Law

A digital service provider scanned a user’s online photo storage account for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) as part of its ongoing content moderation efforts. After the system flagged several files, an employee at the company reviewed and confirmed they were CSAM. The provider then generated a report to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, supplying the files and information linking them to a specific user. Law enforcement traced the report to a residence, viewed the flagged files without a warrant, and subsequently obtained a warrant to search the home, where additional CSAM was found on the user’s device.The Jefferson County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the technology company acted on its own initiative and was not functioning as an agent or instrument of the government. The court held there was no Fourth Amendment violation and found that the defendant had not established that the company was acting on behalf of law enforcement. The defendant pleaded guilty and appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, requesting clarification on whether the provider’s search was private or governmental and whether a search warrant was required for police review of the flagged files.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the provider acted as a private actor when it scanned and reviewed the files, and not as an agent of the government. Therefore, the provider’s actions did not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. The Court further ruled that law enforcement’s review of the files did not constitute a new “search” under the Fourth Amendment, as it merely replicated the provider’s actions and did not exceed their scope. The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Sharak" on Justia Law

Law enforcement charged the defendant with multiple counts of possession of child sexual abuse material and child exploitation after content was discovered on his cell phone. The investigation began when Snapchat’s automated hash-based scanning program flagged a 16-second video uploaded from the defendant’s account as known child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Snapchat forwarded this video to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which confirmed the file’s hash matched previously identified CSAM but did not view the video itself. NCMEC then sent the report and video to the Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ), where a DOJ analyst first viewed the video without a warrant. Subsequently, local law enforcement also viewed the video without a warrant, obtained account information via subpoena, and secured a search warrant for the defendant’s home and devices, leading to the recovery of additional CSAM.In Waukesha County Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that viewing the video without a warrant constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court granted the motion, finding a legitimate privacy interest in the cell phone and concluding that the private search doctrine was inapplicable because no human at Snapchat had seen the video and the hash algorithm used was allegedly unreliable.The State appealed, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the video due to Snapchat’s policies and the nature of the conduct, and found no Fourth Amendment search occurred.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Snapchat’s automated scan constituted a private search, and that the government’s subsequent viewing of the flagged video did not exceed the scope of that private search. Because any expectation of privacy was frustrated by the private scan and there was virtual certainty regarding the video’s contents, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. The court affirmed the court of appeals’ reversal of suppression and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Gasper" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of certain Wisconsin statutes that grant the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the power to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules. The Governor and other petitioners argue that these statutes amount to unconstitutional legislative vetoes, as they allow JCRAR to halt the implementation of rules without passing legislation. The Legislature contends that these statutes are permissible extensions of legislative power, maintaining that rulemaking must remain subordinate to the legislature.The lower courts had previously upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions. In Martinez v. DILHR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a three-month rule suspension by JCRAR did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. This reasoning was later extended in SEIU, where the court upheld the multiple suspension provision, allowing JCRAR to suspend rules repeatedly.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, adopted the reasoning from Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which requires bicameralism and presentment when legislative action alters the legal rights and duties of others outside the legislative branch. Applying this standard, the court found that the challenged statutes empower JCRAR to take actions that alter the legal rights and duties of the executive branch and the people of Wisconsin without requiring bicameralism and presentment. Consequently, the court held that the statutes WIS. STAT. §§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm), and 227.26(2)(d), (im) facially violate the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and are therefore unconstitutional. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) sought to revoke Keyo Sellers's probation based on five alleged violations, including entering K.A.B.'s home without consent, sexual assault, theft, trespassing, and providing false information to his probation agent. Sellers admitted to the fifth violation, and a revocation hearing was held for the remaining allegations. The DOC did not present K.A.B. as a witness, relying instead on her written statement and the testimony of a police officer. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the allegations substantiated and revoked Sellers's probation.Sellers appealed to the Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA) administrator, who reversed the ALJ's decision, citing the reliance on hearsay evidence without good cause to deny Sellers's right to confront adverse witnesses. The administrator found that without K.A.B.'s testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the revocation. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court reversed the administrator's decision, but the Court of Appeals reinstated it, agreeing that the administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence and made according to law.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The court concluded that the administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence, as the non-hearsay evidence presented was not compelling enough to establish the violations. The court also determined that the administrator correctly applied the law by excluding hearsay testimony without a finding of good cause. The decision to not revoke Sellers's probation was affirmed. View "Department of Corrections v. Hayes" on Justia Law

The defendant endured years of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by her husband. On the night in question, after a violent attack in which her husband threatened her and chased her with a heavy object, she fled their home by car, despite having consumed alcohol earlier. She intended to reach the couple’s lake house, which she considered a safe place. While en route, she passed a police car but did not stop, later explaining that she distrusted the police due to prior negative experiences. She was stopped by police before reaching her destination and was found to have a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. She was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration as a second offense.The Waukesha County Circuit Court conducted a bench trial. The defendant stipulated to her blood alcohol level but raised the statutory coercion defense, arguing that she reasonably believed driving was the only way to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. The circuit court found that the defense applied when she initially fled but concluded that, by the time she passed the police car, she knew other means of safety were available and thus the elements of the defense were no longer met. The court found her guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the circuit court’s finding that her belief in the necessity of continued driving was no longer reasonable once she was out of immediate danger and had other options.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It held that the elements of the coercion defense must be met throughout the entire duration of an ongoing, otherwise-criminal act, not just at its inception. The court also held that a defendant’s personal history can be relevant to the reasonableness of her belief in the necessity of her actions. Finding that the circuit court applied the correct legal standards and that its decision was supported by sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Stetzer" on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

Carl Lee McAdory was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance (OWI) and operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance (RCS) in his blood, both as eighth offenses. A jury found him guilty of both charges. At sentencing, the circuit court dismissed the RCS charge and sentenced McAdory only on the OWI charge.The Court of Appeals later reversed McAdory's OWI conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on the OWI charge. Instead of holding a new trial, the circuit court reinstated the previously dismissed RCS charge and guilty verdict, and sentenced McAdory on the RCS charge.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if the circuit court was permitted to reinstate the RCS charge and guilty verdict. The court held that the circuit court had implicit statutory authority under WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(c) to reinstate the RCS charge and guilty verdict. The court also concluded that the State did not forfeit its right to seek reinstatement by failing to raise the issue in the initial appeal. Additionally, the court found that reinstating the RCS charge did not violate the Court of Appeals' mandate or McAdory's double jeopardy rights.The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, allowing the reinstatement of the RCS charge and guilty verdict. View "State v. McAdory" on Justia Law

Luis A. Ramirez, an inmate serving a lengthy sentence for felony convictions, attacked a corrections officer with a sharpened pencil. He was charged with battery by a prisoner and disorderly conduct. Due to multiple continuances and rescheduled trial dates, Ramirez was tried and convicted by a jury 46 months after the charges were filed.Ramirez moved for postconviction relief, claiming the delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The postconviction court denied his motion, and Ramirez appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, concluding that Ramirez's right to a speedy trial was violated and ordered the charges dismissed. The State sought review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. The court found that while the 46-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was not long enough to declare prejudice as a matter of law. The reasons for the delay were attributed to neutral factors, such as the orderly administration of justice and the State's negligence, but not deliberate or bad-faith conduct. Ramirez's significant delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial and his failure to demonstrate particularized prejudice weighed against him.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Ramirez's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law