Justia Wisconsin Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Nicole Shanahan submitted nomination papers to the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) to run as independent candidates for President and Vice President in the November 2024 election. On August 23, 2024, Kennedy requested to withdraw his candidacy, but WEC denied his request based on Wisconsin law, which states that a candidate who has filed nomination papers cannot decline the nomination unless they die. Consequently, WEC included Kennedy's name on the certified list of candidates.Kennedy sought judicial review of WEC's decision in the Dane County Circuit Court and filed a motion for a temporary injunction to remove his name from the ballot. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Kennedy had not demonstrated irreparable harm, that the injunction would alter the status quo, and that he had no reasonable probability of success on the merits. The court also found that Kennedy's constitutional claims lacked legal merit.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court's decision to deny the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court's task was to determine whether the circuit court had properly exercised its discretion. The Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy failed to demonstrate that the circuit court had erred in its decision. Specifically, Kennedy did not adequately argue that the circuit court misinterpreted the relevant statute or that his constitutional claims had merit. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying the temporary injunction. View "Kennedy v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves M.A.C., a homeless individual with mental health disorders, who was involuntarily committed in Waukesha County in 2020. In 2022, the County sought to extend M.A.C.'s commitment. However, M.A.C. was not present at the recommitment hearing, and her appointed counsel had been unable to contact her. The circuit court found M.A.C. in default and ordered her to be recommitted and involuntarily medicated. M.A.C. appealed, challenging the recommitment and involuntary medication orders on three grounds: lack of individual notice of the hearings, the unavailability of default judgment in such hearings, and insufficient evidence for her involuntary medication.The case was initially reviewed by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's orders. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on a previous case, Waukesha County v. S.L.L., to uphold the circuit court's decisions. M.A.C. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that under Wisconsin statutes, a subject individual is entitled to notice of recommitment and involuntary medication hearings, and providing notice to counsel only is not sufficient. The court also held that default judgment is not available for recommitment or involuntary medication hearings under Wisconsin statutes. Finally, the court found that the County failed to provide sufficient evidence for M.A.C.'s involuntary medication. The court overruled the contrary holdings of the S.L.L. case. View "Waukesha County v. M.A.C." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to several voting requirements in Wisconsin, including the requirement that absentee ballots be returned only by mail or in person to the clerk's office and not to a secure drop box. The Circuit Court for Dane County dismissed the claim related to the drop box, citing a previous decision, Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, which determined that the use of ballot drop boxes was not allowed under Wisconsin law.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the law. The Supreme Court found that the language of the relevant statute, Wisconsin Statute § 6.87(4)(b)1, allows for the use of ballot drop boxes. The court noted that the statute requires that a completed absentee ballot be "mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots." The court interpreted this to mean that delivering a ballot to a drop box is a means of delivering it in person "to the municipal clerk."The court also rejected the argument that the use of drop boxes contravenes the legislative policy expressed in Wisconsin Statute § 6.84(1), which states that absentee balloting must be "carefully regulated." The court found that drop boxes are a form of regulation and are consistent with the decentralized system of election administration in Wisconsin.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin therefore reversed the order of the Circuit Court for Dane County dismissing the claim related to the drop box and remanded the case back to the lower court to reinstate the claim. View "Priorities USA v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that certain legislative review provisions governing the Knowles-Nelson Stewardship Program, a land conservation initiative, were unconstitutional. The provisions in question allowed the Joint Committee on Finance (JFC), a legislative committee, to review and potentially block expenditures exceeding $250,000 or for land acquisitions outside of a project boundary, even after the legislature had already appropriated the funds.The case was brought by Governor Tony Evers and several state departments, who argued that these provisions violated the separation of powers by allowing the legislature to intrude on the executive branch's power to execute the law. The legislative respondents defended the statutes, arguing that they were necessary for overseeing the executive branch's expenditure of state funds.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with the legislative respondents, ruling that the provisions unconstitutionally authorized the legislative branch to impede the executive's core power to execute the law. The court held that once the legislature appropriates funds for a particular purpose, the executive branch possesses the power to distribute those funds in accordance with the purposes outlined by the legislature. The court concluded that the legislative review provisions violated the separation of powers structurally enshrined in the Wisconsin Constitution. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law

The case involves a harassment injunction issued against Brian Aish, an anti-abortion protestor, for statements he made to Nancy Kindschy, a nurse practitioner at a family planning clinic. Aish regularly protested outside the clinics where Kindschy worked, initially expressing his Christian and anti-abortion beliefs broadly. However, in 2019, Aish began directing his comments towards Kindschy, which she perceived as threatening. Kindschy petitioned for a harassment injunction under Wisconsin law, which allows for an injunction if there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner."The circuit court heard two days of testimony and found that Aish's statements were intimidating and did not serve a legitimate purpose. The court issued a four-year injunction prohibiting Aish from speaking to Kindschy or going to her residence or any other premises temporarily occupied by her. Aish appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the injunction. The court concluded that the injunction was a content-based restriction on Aish's speech and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The court held that the injunction failed to satisfy either of the two standards required for such a restriction to comply with the First Amendment: (1) Aish's statements were not "true threats" and he did not "consciously disregard a substantial risk that his statements would be viewed as threatening violence," or (2) the injunction did not satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. View "Kindschy v. Aish" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights of a father, B.W., to his son, Bob. The State of Wisconsin filed a petition to terminate B.W.'s parental rights on the grounds that Bob was a child in continuing need of protection or services and that B.W. failed to assume parental responsibility. B.W. entered a no-contest plea to the grounds for termination. At the dispositional hearing, the court terminated B.W.'s parental rights, finding it was in Bob's best interest.B.W. filed a post-disposition motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that the plea colloquy was defective because the court miscommunicated the burden of proof required at the dispositional phase. He also argued that the court improperly relied on the proposed adoptive parent's assurance that she would allow B.W. to continue to visit Bob. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that B.W. failed to make a prima facie showing that the plea colloquy was defective. The court also concluded that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by relying on the proposed adoptive parent's testimony. The court held that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion, considering the testimony and weighing the statutory dispositional factors. View "State v. B. W." on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights of R.A.M., the mother of P.M., a child born in 2015. In 2017, R.A.M. was convicted of child abuse after a police officer found P.M. with scratches, bruising, and bleeding from the nose. P.M. was placed in foster care and later with his paternal uncle. In 2021, the State filed a petition for the termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights, citing a continuing need for protection and services (CHIPS) and R.A.M.'s failure to assume parental responsibility. R.A.M. contested both grounds.The case was heard in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During the proceedings, R.A.M. failed to appear for a hearing on July 5, 2022, despite a standing order requiring her to attend all court appearances. The court found her absence to be egregious and without justification, and granted the State's motion for default judgment. The court then immediately moved to the dispositional phase and concluded the hearing on the same day, finding that termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights would be in P.M.'s best interest.R.A.M. appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the order, holding that the circuit court lost competency when it proceeded to the dispositional hearing on the same day that the grounds phase concluded. The Court of Appeals also held that R.A.M.'s due process rights were violated. The case was remanded to the circuit court with instructions to hold a new dispositional hearing.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., the circuit court was required to wait at least two days after finding R.A.M.'s conduct in failing to appear as ordered was egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse before proceeding to the dispositional phase of proceedings. The court's failure to abide by this statutory mandate resulted in a loss of competency to proceed. Therefore, R.A.M. is entitled to a new dispositional hearing. View "State v. R.A.M." on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Sojenhomer LLC and the Village of Egg Harbor over the Village's decision to condemn a small portion of Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The Village aimed to improve safety at a dangerous intersection by constructing a sidewalk along County Highway G. Sojenhomer, however, contested the condemnation, arguing that Wisconsin statutes prohibit property acquisition by condemnation to establish or extend a "pedestrian way," which it claimed included sidewalks.The Door County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the Village, holding that sidewalks are not pedestrian ways and thus the Village had the authority to condemn the property for sidewalk construction. Sojenhomer appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that sidewalks are indeed pedestrian ways as defined by Wisconsin statutes. The court reasoned that sidewalks fall within the broad definition of a pedestrian way as "a walk designated for the use of pedestrian travel."The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation. The court held that when read in context, the definition of pedestrian way does not include sidewalks. The court noted that the statutory language, history, and broader context indicate that sidewalks and pedestrian ways are distinct, non-overlapping categories. Therefore, the court concluded that the statutes did not prohibit the Village from condemning Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant who fell asleep in a McDonald's drive-thru lane. An employee woke him up and called the police. The responding officer observed the defendant driving normally and without any signs of impairment. However, the officer decided to pull the defendant over due to the report of him falling asleep. The defendant explained that he was tired from a 24-hour shift. Despite not observing any signs of impairment, the officer prolonged the stop to investigate further. The officer eventually ordered the defendant out of his truck, at which point the defendant showed signs of intoxication, leading to his arrest and charges.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the stop. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the stop and further investigation were justified as a permissible "community caretaking function." The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's decision.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, even if the traffic stop was permissible as a community caretaking activity, the court held that the stop was unreasonably prolonged when it transformed into an unjustified criminal investigation. The court stated that the scope of caretaking stops should be guided and limited by the justification for the stop. This means that, absent another permissible reason to detain someone, the detention must end when the original community caretaking justification is resolved. The court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and grant the motion to suppress. View "State v. Wiskowski" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-marital couple, A.M.B. and T.G., who sought to adopt A.M.B.'s biological child, M.M.C. T.G. had been a father figure to M.M.C. for over a decade and had assumed various parental duties. The parental rights of M.M.C.'s biological father had been terminated. Despite a positive Home Study Report recommending the adoption, the Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition. The court cited Wisconsin's adoption statutes, which only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition, citing Wisconsin's adoption statutes. The statutes only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. The court referenced a previous case, Georgina G. v. Terry M., which held that an adoption by a third party who is not the spouse of the parent is not permissible. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the decision, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the adoption statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the statutes did not restrict a fundamental right or regulate a protected class. The court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting stability for adoptive children through marital families, which provided a rational basis for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt a child. View "A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County" on Justia Law